I love Peace
Dec. 14 (Bloomberg) -- European Union leaders moved toward a showdown with Russia over influence in the Balkans by pledging to chart the way to statehood for Serbia's breakaway province of Kosovo.
EU governments will coordinate an independence declaration with the U.S. and plan to deploy European police to Kosovo, rejecting Russia's efforts to keep the province officially part of Serbia.
``Kosovo's independence is inevitable,'' French President Nicolas Sarkozy told a press conference after an EU summit in Brussels today. ``It's an issue for Europe to sort out.''
Fresh from signing a new treaty yesterday that will create the post of permanent EU president, the 27-nation bloc is making the peaceful settlement of Kosovo's status a test of its ambitions as a global power. Europe failed to prevent Yugoslavia's descent into civil war in the 1990s and relied on the U.S. to end the bloodshed.
Officially part of Serbia, the mostly ethnic Albanian province of 2 million has been under international control and policed by 16,000 North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops since the alliance's 1999 air offensive pushed out the Serb army.
Russia, then under President Boris Yeltsin, opposed NATO's war and sent troops to briefly seize Kosovo's main airport when the bombing stopped. Russian President Vladimir Putin backs continued Serb authority over Kosovo and has warned that a declaration of independence might fuel Russian separatist movements in Western-leaning former Soviet republics such as Georgia.
No `Russian Veto'
``We have a duty to deliver as far as Kosovo is concerned and we cannot be blocked by a kind of Russian veto,'' Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said.
In Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on state television that the EU is ``ignoring international law, including UN Security Council resolutions and ignoring the fact that Kosovo's population is not only Albanian but Serbian.''
The EU response, in a statement today, is that Kosovo's status ``does not set any precedent.''
Russia blocked Kosovo's independence in the United Nations Security Council, leading to four months of talks between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians that ended Dec. 10 without a negotiated settlement.
Anti-Serb Riots
That breakdown led NATO, which almost lost control of Kosovo in anti-Serb riots in 2004, to put additional troops on standby to quash any outbreak of violence. No incidents have been reported.
``The most important thing is for the EU to take the next steps with as much unity as possible,'' German Chancellor Angela Merkel said today. ``We want to find a reasonable solution but we also want to signal to Serbia that we need a stable Serbia.''
Serbia's path toward the EU has been slowed by the government's failure to arrest war-crimes suspects still at large from the 1990s, notably former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, charged with masterminding the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims.
Italy is pushing the EU to grant immediate ``candidate'' status to Serbia, to soften the blow of the loss of Kosovo. Most other governments, led by the Netherlands, first want to see evidence that Serbia is hunting down war criminals.
No EU incentives would lead Serbia to surrender Kosovo, Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic said. ``Serbia will never trade Kosovo for speedier accession to the EU and these things are not negotiable,'' he said today in Belgrade.
Elections
To avoid baiting Serb nationalists, Sarkozy said the final break by Kosovo will have to wait until after Serbia's presidential election campaign is over in early February.
Kosovo has a 90 percent ethnic-Albanian majority, with an estimated 100,000 Serbs scattered along the province's northern and eastern borders with Serbia and in isolated pockets.
European recognition ``will be the solution in the end but we have to proceed carefully,'' European Parliament President Hans- Gert Poettering said.
Russia's call for an extension of the Serb-Kosovo talks was rejected Dec. 12 by the U.S., Britain and France. Backed by Russia, Serbia is offering home rule for Kosovo that stops short of legal independence.
``Serbia should understand it will not progress and persist as a colonial power,'' Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha said. ``Kosovo is a European matter and the EU is getting together on it.''
Kosovo Prime Minister-elect Hashim Thaci, who fought the Serbs in the 1990s as a guerrilla leader, promised to coordinate a legal split from Serbia with the U.S. and EU.
More EU Unity
So far, the EU has shown more unity on Kosovo than it did when Yugoslavia started to crumble in 1991. At the time, Germany rushed to recognize breakaway republics, splitting the bloc and leaving it indecisive when Serbia went to war against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Only one EU country, Cyprus, backed Russia's call for further Serb-Kosovo talks. The government in Nicosia fears that diplomatic recognition of Kosovo would bestow legitimacy on the separatist Turkish regime that has controlled the northern tier of Cyprus since 1974.
``We're not split, there is broad unity on this,'' Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer said. ``This is the last unsolved status question of the 20th century, and we will solve this 20th century problem in the 21st.''
To contact the reporter on this story: James G. Neuger in Brussels at jneuger@bloomberg.net
15 December 2007
30 November 2007
Fjala e Veton Surroit në takimin e Badenit
I love Peace
Zonja dhe zotërinj, Zoti President, Zoti Kryeministër Ekselencë, Isha shumë i befasuar, në fakt i mbetur pa fjalë, kur dëgjova sot nga dy juristë të njohur nga ana tjetër e tavolinës formulimin se rezoluta 1244 është aq e qartë sa nuk ka nevojë për interpretim, apo jo zoti Fleiner? Po shoh se po pohoni. E pra, ekziston vetëm një sistem ku ligjet nuk janë çështje e interpretueshme e ai është sistemi diktatorial. Në të gjitha demokracitë ligjet janë subjekt i interpretimeve. Është bazament i ndërtimit të sistemit juridik. Janë të paramenduara për të qenë të interpretuara përndryshe do të ishin vendime të prera te një sistemi diktatorial. Në rezolutën 1244, dhe nuk do të ndalem shumë në të, sepse mendoj se duhet një sqarim me i detajuar nga zoti Shala. Por kur përmendët artikullin 11 të rezolutës 1244 e përdorët në favorin tuaj. Tani më lejoni t’u tregoj interpretimin i cili mund të përdoret në favor të palës tjetër. Ju thoni se çdo zgjidhje duhet bazohet në autonomi substanciale, por autonomia substanciale në këtë rezolute, në artikullin 11, parashihet si fazë e ndërmjetme e cila i paraprinë - dhe këtu po citojë - “zgjidhjes finale te statusit”, e unë do te përdorja fjalën zgjidhje e përhershme. Dhe kjo në thelb, legalisht, logjikisht apo si të doni, thotë se autonomia substanciale nuk është zgjidhje e paragjykuar. Po e përdorni rezolutën 1244 si formulë për paragjykim derisa 1244 është gjendja në të cilën jemi sot. Jemi duke diskutuar statusin bazuar në premisat e rezolutës 1244 e cila thotë se duhet të ketë një proces në të cilin bisedohet për zgjidhjen e finale të statusit. Ne kemi diskutuar për statusin, ne nuk i jemi shmangur diskutimit për status, kemi diskutuar për statusin në formën në të cilën ne e shohim statusin. Për ne statusi është pavarësia ndërsa për ju është format tjetër i statusit. Por, megjithëse kemi biseduar në dy kanale të ndryshme të komunikimit, nuk kemi arritur pajtim për sa i përket formateve, koncepteve dhe modeleve tjera. Kemi insistuar që nga takimi i parë dhe po insistojmë sot në takimin e fundit se nuk ka zgjidhje për Kosovën e cila parasheh subordinimin e Kosovës ne sistemin juridik serb. Ne nuk e duam dhe nuk do ta kemi. Ne dëshirojmë të kemi partneritet dhe duam të kemi një marrëveshje të bazuar në partneritet. Jemi bashkëpunues ndërsa varet nga ju se a do ta pranoni apo jo këtë gatishmëri. Më lejoni t’ju tregoj se nga po vijmë dhe se ku po pretendojmë të shkojmë. Nga takimi i fundit kemi pasur një deklaratë nga presidenti Tadiq për personat e zhdukur, në të cilën merret përgjegjësia e shtetit serb. Mendoj se kjo është një qasje që si delegacion do përshëndetur. Personat e zhdukur është një çështje të cilën e ndajmë së bashku dhe është dhimbje të cilën duhet ta ndajmë dhe ta posedojmë. Është dhimbje e cila duhet shfrytëzuar për përmirësimin e marrëdhënieve tona. Nëse më tutje vazhdojmë me këtë lloj gjuhe, atëherë arrijmë të përkushtimi i përbashkët për një moment, apo një datë, në të cilët dy palët deklarojnë se është qëllim i yni që kjo gjë të mos përsëritet, sepse ne kurrë më, nuk duhet të lejojmë që të arrijmë tek situata e cila krijon persona të zhdukur. Që nga takimi i Brukselit po ashtu po dëgjoj deklarata dhe një deklaratë të veçantë të thënë fillimisht nga zoti Koshtunica dhe të përsëritur nga zoti Tadiq më pas se, oferta nga Serbia është ofertë, e cila mund të pranohet sot për tu tejkaluar si periudhë transitore 20 vjeçare dhe pas kësaj periudhe do të duhej të uleshim prapë për të diskutuar se, a është adekuat ky model i aranzhimit të statusit. Në një mënyrë paradoksale po arrijmë tek një pikë konsensusi në këtë çështje sepse është interesante por propozimi jonë dhe ajo që ju po thoni është pak a shumë e njëjtë, sepse nuk shohim mundësi që të arrijmë marrëveshje për status të përhershëm formë të negociatave. Kur thoni t’i kemi 20 vjet te një statusi dhe me pas te bisedojmë për një status tjetër, atëherë po propozoni edhe një fazë të ndërmjetme ndërsa ne po themi se nuk duam procese të ndërmjetme. Dhe nëse kjo është oferta juaj, ne duhet tu përgjigjemi se, kjo është një ofertë të cilën nuk mund ta pranojmë. Por isha i impresionuar me deklaratën e zotit Koshtunica sepse mendoj se prekë thelbin e çështjeve të cilat i trajtojmë si probleme por edhe mund të përdoret si zgjidhje në të ardhmen. Kemi dëgjuar përgjatë procesit të Ahtisarit pjesë të ndara të këtij qëndrimi nga elokuenca e zotit Jakshiq, por asnjëherë me aq konkretësi siç e bëri kryeministri Koshtunica. Dhe baza e saj është të ballafaquarit me konceptin e serbizmit, dhe kjo është çështje të cilën do të duhej ta trajtonim në këtë konferencë. Ka të bëjë me identitetin e popullit serb, historinë e tij, jetët e qytetarëve serb dhe trashëgiminë kulturore të Kishës Ortodokse Serbe. Dallimi qëndron në deklaratën e bërë nga zoti Koshtunica sepse - nëse më kujtohen saktë fjalët - e keni përdorur formulimin i cili kërkon pronësi ndaj Manastirit të Deçanit apo atij të Graçanicës apo identiteti serb ne tërësi. “Është përgjegjësi e shtetit serb që të udhëheqë me Graçanicën dhe Deçanin për shkak të identitetit serb” thuhej pak a shumë në deklaratë. Pozicioni ynë nuk është ai i pronësisë. Ne nuk besojmë në pronësinë e Deçanit apo Graçanicës dhe këtë u munduam ta sqarojmë në takimin me Treshen. Të marrim një shembull të thjeshtë siç është Deçani. Manastiri i Deçanit është diçka të cilën nuk mund ta posedosh si shtet. I përket në aspekt kulturor botës si qendër e trashëgimisë, në aspekt fetar i përket Kishës Ortodokse Serbe dhe ju zotërinj nuk jeni te titulluar ta udhëhiqni atë, në aspekt kulturor po ashtu Manastiri i Deçanit shërben si urë lidhëse në mes dy formave të krishterimit. Është ndërtuar si kishë me model arkitektonik perëndimor ndërsa ka shërbesën e kishës lindore. Është simbol i cili duhet jetë i përbashkët, i ndarë nga të gjithë. Është diçka që ilustron projektimet tona për të ardhmen. Familja ime vjen nga Prizreni dhe ju e përmendët zoti kryeministër Kishën e Bogorodicës. Në Prizren ekziston po ashtu kisha e Shën Premtes. Shën Premtja ilustron Kosovën dhe kuptimin e saj. Në një pikë historike ky vend ishte tempull parakrishter, u shndërrua në kishë katolike tani është kishë ortodokse serbe ndërsa në një periudhë të sundimit osman ishte xhami dhe quhej Xhuma Xhami apo Xhamia e së premtes dhe kremtonte të premten si ditë të veçantë për kulturën islame. Andaj është diçka të cilin as ju as ne nuk mund ta posedojmë, por është diçka që mund ta ndajmë së bashku. Dhe ky është qëllimi ynë, që të ndajmë bashkërisht kulturën tonë dhe atë tuajën, duam të shohim mënyrat se si ti ndërtojmë, mbrojmë dhe komunikojmë së bashku. Si mundemi që bashkërisht të kontribuojmë në mbrojtjen e identitetit serb në Kosovë. Si bashkërisht të krijojmë ambient të sigurt për serbët që jetojnë në Kosovë dhe për ata që dëshirojnë të kthehen dhe si bashkërisht të kontribuojmë në mbrojtjen e identitetit të serbëve të Kosovës si pjesë e identitetit të përbashkët kosovar. Dhe u kemi propozuar një traktat dhe nuk jam i sigurt se ju është shpërndarë të gjithëve në delegacionin tuaj. Do të ishim të lumtur nëse i lëshoni një sy. Mos paragjykoni. Fakti se ju e pranoni apo jo, nuk çon peshë në aspektin e pranimit formal si propozim negociator. Pranojeni së paku si një propozim jozyrtar. Dhe nëse doni ia hiqni edhe kopertinën për shkak se në titull thuhet “traktat në mes shtetesh” dhe ju nuk dëshironi ta pranoni atë formulim. Shikoni përmbajtjen. Shikoni se cilat janë ato pika të cilat mendoni se janë të dobishme apo mendoni se duhet hequr. Na informoni për këtë e kemi edhe një pasdite për të biseduar. Më lejoni, në fund të prezantoj se kush jemi ne, sepse nuk kemi pasur rast deri tani në këto dy vjet negociatash Ta prezantoj delegacionin e Kosovës. Që të pesë anëtarët e Ekipit të Unitetit kemi ardhur këtu me histori të ndryshme. Zoti Kolë Berisha ishte marrë nga forcat serbe në një natë të vitit 1989 ishte dërguar në burg. Dhjet policë në njërën anë dhe dhjetë në anën tjetër e rrihnin atë duke hyrë në dhomën e burgut. Ai nuk pajtohej me aranzhimet kushtetuese të propozuara dhe të imponuara nga zoti Millosheviq. Ai mendonte se gjerat duhet të rrjedhin në kah tjetër. Ai ka kaluar 18 vite të jetës duke luftuar që gjërat të ndryshojnë, duke u përpjekur të luftoj për dinjitetin e familjes së tij, për dinjitetin e tij dhe popullit te tij. Kryeministri Çeku ka luftuar dy luftëra. Në një ditë të marsit apo prillit të vitit 99 fshati i tij ishte rrethuar, njerëzit nga ishin marrë nga forcat serbe ndërsa komandanti i policisë kishte pyetur se kush është babai i gjeneralit Çeku. Ai ishte nxjerrë nga masa dhe ishte ekzekutuar. Kryeministri gjatë tetë viteve të fundit po përpiqet të kërkojë një jetë me dinjitet për familjen dhe popullin e tij. Kryetari Sejdiu dhe unë morëm pjesë në demonstrata dora e tij i ishte thyer nga dhuna e policisë serbe, po ashtu edhe krahu im. Ishim kundër luftës që po zhvillohej kundër civilëve në Kosovë. Ishim kundër vrasjes së njerëzve për të imponuar aranzhmanet kushtetuese. Zoti Thaçi. Kur krejt ky proces filloi, zoti Thaçi ishte student. Ai ishte nxjerr jashtë me forcë nga fakulteti i tij. Ai luftoi, luftoi me studimet e tij , luftoj me armët e tij. Luftoj për dinjitetin e tij dhe të popullit të tij. Të gjithë ne, të pestit, nuk kemi ardhur këtu me urrejtje, por përkundrazi, me dinjitet. Dinjitet të cilin dëshirojmë ta ndajmë duke dëshiruar një zgjidhje të dinjitetshme. Një zgjidhje që do të ndihmoj, do tu ndihmoj edhe juve, një zgjidhje që do të mbrojë identitetin serb në Kosovë për ç‘gjë edhe ju po përpiqeni. Kjo është thelbi i asaj që dëshirojmë të marrim me vete sot. Ju faleminderit!
Zonja dhe zotërinj, Zoti President, Zoti Kryeministër Ekselencë, Isha shumë i befasuar, në fakt i mbetur pa fjalë, kur dëgjova sot nga dy juristë të njohur nga ana tjetër e tavolinës formulimin se rezoluta 1244 është aq e qartë sa nuk ka nevojë për interpretim, apo jo zoti Fleiner? Po shoh se po pohoni. E pra, ekziston vetëm një sistem ku ligjet nuk janë çështje e interpretueshme e ai është sistemi diktatorial. Në të gjitha demokracitë ligjet janë subjekt i interpretimeve. Është bazament i ndërtimit të sistemit juridik. Janë të paramenduara për të qenë të interpretuara përndryshe do të ishin vendime të prera te një sistemi diktatorial. Në rezolutën 1244, dhe nuk do të ndalem shumë në të, sepse mendoj se duhet një sqarim me i detajuar nga zoti Shala. Por kur përmendët artikullin 11 të rezolutës 1244 e përdorët në favorin tuaj. Tani më lejoni t’u tregoj interpretimin i cili mund të përdoret në favor të palës tjetër. Ju thoni se çdo zgjidhje duhet bazohet në autonomi substanciale, por autonomia substanciale në këtë rezolute, në artikullin 11, parashihet si fazë e ndërmjetme e cila i paraprinë - dhe këtu po citojë - “zgjidhjes finale te statusit”, e unë do te përdorja fjalën zgjidhje e përhershme. Dhe kjo në thelb, legalisht, logjikisht apo si të doni, thotë se autonomia substanciale nuk është zgjidhje e paragjykuar. Po e përdorni rezolutën 1244 si formulë për paragjykim derisa 1244 është gjendja në të cilën jemi sot. Jemi duke diskutuar statusin bazuar në premisat e rezolutës 1244 e cila thotë se duhet të ketë një proces në të cilin bisedohet për zgjidhjen e finale të statusit. Ne kemi diskutuar për statusin, ne nuk i jemi shmangur diskutimit për status, kemi diskutuar për statusin në formën në të cilën ne e shohim statusin. Për ne statusi është pavarësia ndërsa për ju është format tjetër i statusit. Por, megjithëse kemi biseduar në dy kanale të ndryshme të komunikimit, nuk kemi arritur pajtim për sa i përket formateve, koncepteve dhe modeleve tjera. Kemi insistuar që nga takimi i parë dhe po insistojmë sot në takimin e fundit se nuk ka zgjidhje për Kosovën e cila parasheh subordinimin e Kosovës ne sistemin juridik serb. Ne nuk e duam dhe nuk do ta kemi. Ne dëshirojmë të kemi partneritet dhe duam të kemi një marrëveshje të bazuar në partneritet. Jemi bashkëpunues ndërsa varet nga ju se a do ta pranoni apo jo këtë gatishmëri. Më lejoni t’ju tregoj se nga po vijmë dhe se ku po pretendojmë të shkojmë. Nga takimi i fundit kemi pasur një deklaratë nga presidenti Tadiq për personat e zhdukur, në të cilën merret përgjegjësia e shtetit serb. Mendoj se kjo është një qasje që si delegacion do përshëndetur. Personat e zhdukur është një çështje të cilën e ndajmë së bashku dhe është dhimbje të cilën duhet ta ndajmë dhe ta posedojmë. Është dhimbje e cila duhet shfrytëzuar për përmirësimin e marrëdhënieve tona. Nëse më tutje vazhdojmë me këtë lloj gjuhe, atëherë arrijmë të përkushtimi i përbashkët për një moment, apo një datë, në të cilët dy palët deklarojnë se është qëllim i yni që kjo gjë të mos përsëritet, sepse ne kurrë më, nuk duhet të lejojmë që të arrijmë tek situata e cila krijon persona të zhdukur. Që nga takimi i Brukselit po ashtu po dëgjoj deklarata dhe një deklaratë të veçantë të thënë fillimisht nga zoti Koshtunica dhe të përsëritur nga zoti Tadiq më pas se, oferta nga Serbia është ofertë, e cila mund të pranohet sot për tu tejkaluar si periudhë transitore 20 vjeçare dhe pas kësaj periudhe do të duhej të uleshim prapë për të diskutuar se, a është adekuat ky model i aranzhimit të statusit. Në një mënyrë paradoksale po arrijmë tek një pikë konsensusi në këtë çështje sepse është interesante por propozimi jonë dhe ajo që ju po thoni është pak a shumë e njëjtë, sepse nuk shohim mundësi që të arrijmë marrëveshje për status të përhershëm formë të negociatave. Kur thoni t’i kemi 20 vjet te një statusi dhe me pas te bisedojmë për një status tjetër, atëherë po propozoni edhe një fazë të ndërmjetme ndërsa ne po themi se nuk duam procese të ndërmjetme. Dhe nëse kjo është oferta juaj, ne duhet tu përgjigjemi se, kjo është një ofertë të cilën nuk mund ta pranojmë. Por isha i impresionuar me deklaratën e zotit Koshtunica sepse mendoj se prekë thelbin e çështjeve të cilat i trajtojmë si probleme por edhe mund të përdoret si zgjidhje në të ardhmen. Kemi dëgjuar përgjatë procesit të Ahtisarit pjesë të ndara të këtij qëndrimi nga elokuenca e zotit Jakshiq, por asnjëherë me aq konkretësi siç e bëri kryeministri Koshtunica. Dhe baza e saj është të ballafaquarit me konceptin e serbizmit, dhe kjo është çështje të cilën do të duhej ta trajtonim në këtë konferencë. Ka të bëjë me identitetin e popullit serb, historinë e tij, jetët e qytetarëve serb dhe trashëgiminë kulturore të Kishës Ortodokse Serbe. Dallimi qëndron në deklaratën e bërë nga zoti Koshtunica sepse - nëse më kujtohen saktë fjalët - e keni përdorur formulimin i cili kërkon pronësi ndaj Manastirit të Deçanit apo atij të Graçanicës apo identiteti serb ne tërësi. “Është përgjegjësi e shtetit serb që të udhëheqë me Graçanicën dhe Deçanin për shkak të identitetit serb” thuhej pak a shumë në deklaratë. Pozicioni ynë nuk është ai i pronësisë. Ne nuk besojmë në pronësinë e Deçanit apo Graçanicës dhe këtë u munduam ta sqarojmë në takimin me Treshen. Të marrim një shembull të thjeshtë siç është Deçani. Manastiri i Deçanit është diçka të cilën nuk mund ta posedosh si shtet. I përket në aspekt kulturor botës si qendër e trashëgimisë, në aspekt fetar i përket Kishës Ortodokse Serbe dhe ju zotërinj nuk jeni te titulluar ta udhëhiqni atë, në aspekt kulturor po ashtu Manastiri i Deçanit shërben si urë lidhëse në mes dy formave të krishterimit. Është ndërtuar si kishë me model arkitektonik perëndimor ndërsa ka shërbesën e kishës lindore. Është simbol i cili duhet jetë i përbashkët, i ndarë nga të gjithë. Është diçka që ilustron projektimet tona për të ardhmen. Familja ime vjen nga Prizreni dhe ju e përmendët zoti kryeministër Kishën e Bogorodicës. Në Prizren ekziston po ashtu kisha e Shën Premtes. Shën Premtja ilustron Kosovën dhe kuptimin e saj. Në një pikë historike ky vend ishte tempull parakrishter, u shndërrua në kishë katolike tani është kishë ortodokse serbe ndërsa në një periudhë të sundimit osman ishte xhami dhe quhej Xhuma Xhami apo Xhamia e së premtes dhe kremtonte të premten si ditë të veçantë për kulturën islame. Andaj është diçka të cilin as ju as ne nuk mund ta posedojmë, por është diçka që mund ta ndajmë së bashku. Dhe ky është qëllimi ynë, që të ndajmë bashkërisht kulturën tonë dhe atë tuajën, duam të shohim mënyrat se si ti ndërtojmë, mbrojmë dhe komunikojmë së bashku. Si mundemi që bashkërisht të kontribuojmë në mbrojtjen e identitetit serb në Kosovë. Si bashkërisht të krijojmë ambient të sigurt për serbët që jetojnë në Kosovë dhe për ata që dëshirojnë të kthehen dhe si bashkërisht të kontribuojmë në mbrojtjen e identitetit të serbëve të Kosovës si pjesë e identitetit të përbashkët kosovar. Dhe u kemi propozuar një traktat dhe nuk jam i sigurt se ju është shpërndarë të gjithëve në delegacionin tuaj. Do të ishim të lumtur nëse i lëshoni një sy. Mos paragjykoni. Fakti se ju e pranoni apo jo, nuk çon peshë në aspektin e pranimit formal si propozim negociator. Pranojeni së paku si një propozim jozyrtar. Dhe nëse doni ia hiqni edhe kopertinën për shkak se në titull thuhet “traktat në mes shtetesh” dhe ju nuk dëshironi ta pranoni atë formulim. Shikoni përmbajtjen. Shikoni se cilat janë ato pika të cilat mendoni se janë të dobishme apo mendoni se duhet hequr. Na informoni për këtë e kemi edhe një pasdite për të biseduar. Më lejoni, në fund të prezantoj se kush jemi ne, sepse nuk kemi pasur rast deri tani në këto dy vjet negociatash Ta prezantoj delegacionin e Kosovës. Që të pesë anëtarët e Ekipit të Unitetit kemi ardhur këtu me histori të ndryshme. Zoti Kolë Berisha ishte marrë nga forcat serbe në një natë të vitit 1989 ishte dërguar në burg. Dhjet policë në njërën anë dhe dhjetë në anën tjetër e rrihnin atë duke hyrë në dhomën e burgut. Ai nuk pajtohej me aranzhimet kushtetuese të propozuara dhe të imponuara nga zoti Millosheviq. Ai mendonte se gjerat duhet të rrjedhin në kah tjetër. Ai ka kaluar 18 vite të jetës duke luftuar që gjërat të ndryshojnë, duke u përpjekur të luftoj për dinjitetin e familjes së tij, për dinjitetin e tij dhe popullit te tij. Kryeministri Çeku ka luftuar dy luftëra. Në një ditë të marsit apo prillit të vitit 99 fshati i tij ishte rrethuar, njerëzit nga ishin marrë nga forcat serbe ndërsa komandanti i policisë kishte pyetur se kush është babai i gjeneralit Çeku. Ai ishte nxjerrë nga masa dhe ishte ekzekutuar. Kryeministri gjatë tetë viteve të fundit po përpiqet të kërkojë një jetë me dinjitet për familjen dhe popullin e tij. Kryetari Sejdiu dhe unë morëm pjesë në demonstrata dora e tij i ishte thyer nga dhuna e policisë serbe, po ashtu edhe krahu im. Ishim kundër luftës që po zhvillohej kundër civilëve në Kosovë. Ishim kundër vrasjes së njerëzve për të imponuar aranzhmanet kushtetuese. Zoti Thaçi. Kur krejt ky proces filloi, zoti Thaçi ishte student. Ai ishte nxjerr jashtë me forcë nga fakulteti i tij. Ai luftoi, luftoi me studimet e tij , luftoj me armët e tij. Luftoj për dinjitetin e tij dhe të popullit të tij. Të gjithë ne, të pestit, nuk kemi ardhur këtu me urrejtje, por përkundrazi, me dinjitet. Dinjitet të cilin dëshirojmë ta ndajmë duke dëshiruar një zgjidhje të dinjitetshme. Një zgjidhje që do të ndihmoj, do tu ndihmoj edhe juve, një zgjidhje që do të mbrojë identitetin serb në Kosovë për ç‘gjë edhe ju po përpiqeni. Kjo është thelbi i asaj që dëshirojmë të marrim me vete sot. Ju faleminderit!
22 November 2007
Kosovo Talks Stall as Deadline Nears
I love Peace
Serbian and Kosovo officials on Tuesday, Nov. 20, failed to break a deadlock over the future status of the breakaway province. Both sides stuck to their previous positions but agreed to hold intensive talks next week.
Meeting in Brussels under the auspices of the EU-US-Russia troika, Serbian and Kosovo delegations were unable to make progress on finding a solution for the future status of the Serbian breakaway province. According to a statement issued by European, US and Russian mediators, negotiators for Kosovo rejected a Serb offer of broad autonomy and insisted that nothing short of an EU-supervised independence would be acceptable.
"Yet again, I cannot report any progress due to the intransigence of the Serbian delegation," said Skender Hyseni, spokesman for the Kosovo delegation.
Hyseni rejected Serbia's latest proposal which would turn Kosovo into an autonomous province modeled on Aland, a Swedish-speaking archipelago belonging to Finland, saying there was "nothing new" to it. He also said Kosovo had endured a long period of "harsh occupation" and that it had become a "de facto independent" state awaiting recognition from the international community.
Kostunica (l.) blamed the Kosovars for the impasse
Serbia's delegation, led by President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, rejected Kosovo's demands for independence and accused their counterparts of wasting time ahead of a Dec. 10 deadline set by the United Nations for an agreement to be reached.
"Serbia is always looking for compromises. If someone is wasting time, it's not Serbia," Kostunica said.
Final chance for compromise? Kostunica (l.) blamed the Kosovars for the
impasse
Kosovo's prime minister-in-waiting, Hashim Thaci, said he was willing to consult with the United States and the European Union before proclaiming his province's independence from Serbia.
"We will take a decision on Kosovo after Dec. 10, together with the US and EU," Thaci said.
Serbian President Tadic dismissed imposed solutions as unhelpful and said unilateral announcements of independence by Kosovo would stand in the way of an agreement.
A last-ditch attempt to find a compromise is slated to take place in Austria on Nov. 26-28, the troika said in its statement.
The predominantly ethnic-Albanian province of two million people is aspiring to become independent and to eventually join the EU and NATO. But the EU, which is split over whether to recognize the new country, has urged its leaders not to be too hasty in declaring independence.
Russia, which is backing Serbia on the issue, has already threatened to veto a deal granting Kosovo independence, which was put forward by UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari.
Thaci is focused on independence for Kosovo
Serbian and Kosovo officials on Tuesday, Nov. 20, failed to break a deadlock over the future status of the breakaway province. Both sides stuck to their previous positions but agreed to hold intensive talks next week.
Meeting in Brussels under the auspices of the EU-US-Russia troika, Serbian and Kosovo delegations were unable to make progress on finding a solution for the future status of the Serbian breakaway province. According to a statement issued by European, US and Russian mediators, negotiators for Kosovo rejected a Serb offer of broad autonomy and insisted that nothing short of an EU-supervised independence would be acceptable.
"Yet again, I cannot report any progress due to the intransigence of the Serbian delegation," said Skender Hyseni, spokesman for the Kosovo delegation.
Hyseni rejected Serbia's latest proposal which would turn Kosovo into an autonomous province modeled on Aland, a Swedish-speaking archipelago belonging to Finland, saying there was "nothing new" to it. He also said Kosovo had endured a long period of "harsh occupation" and that it had become a "de facto independent" state awaiting recognition from the international community.
Kostunica (l.) blamed the Kosovars for the impasse
Serbia's delegation, led by President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, rejected Kosovo's demands for independence and accused their counterparts of wasting time ahead of a Dec. 10 deadline set by the United Nations for an agreement to be reached.
"Serbia is always looking for compromises. If someone is wasting time, it's not Serbia," Kostunica said.
Final chance for compromise? Kostunica (l.) blamed the Kosovars for the
impasse
Kosovo's prime minister-in-waiting, Hashim Thaci, said he was willing to consult with the United States and the European Union before proclaiming his province's independence from Serbia.
"We will take a decision on Kosovo after Dec. 10, together with the US and EU," Thaci said.
Serbian President Tadic dismissed imposed solutions as unhelpful and said unilateral announcements of independence by Kosovo would stand in the way of an agreement.
A last-ditch attempt to find a compromise is slated to take place in Austria on Nov. 26-28, the troika said in its statement.The predominantly ethnic-Albanian province of two million people is aspiring to become independent and to eventually join the EU and NATO. But the EU, which is split over whether to recognize the new country, has urged its leaders not to be too hasty in declaring independence.
Russia, which is backing Serbia on the issue, has already threatened to veto a deal granting Kosovo independence, which was put forward by UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari.
Thaci is focused on independence for Kosovo
"No negotiations -- self determination"
I love Peace
"No negotiations -- self determination," reads this Pristina graffiti
These graffities are everywhere on Kosovo, written by activists of Self determination Organization, leaded by Albin Kurti.
20 November 2007
RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES
I love Peace
The following piece was written by former US Ambassador to Belgrade
WIlliam Montgomery and will appear in this Saturday's edition of the
Belgrade daily DANAS. It is very timely, troubling and accurate.
RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES
Serbia today has a ruling coalition which is radically
divided in its priorities and underlying political philosophies. G17+
wants to improve the country's international financial position and
its overall economic underpinnings. DS is trying to move Serbia
towards full integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions and more
importantly, have Serbia perceived as a normal European country,
sharing a common system of values. DSS remains focused on Serbian
national questions such as Kosovo and Bosnia . The rivalries and
animosity among these three parties is far stronger and more evident
than towards either the Socialist or Radical Parties, which would
logically be their political and philosophical opposition.
The end result is a government with major internal
contradictions; "fiefdoms" exclusively controlled by individual
parties; a patronage system where party loyalty rates far higher than
competence, honesty or effectiveness; stalled reforms; and lack of
coordination in public statements which results in contradictory
messages to the outside world.
Despite all of above, the government under normal conditions
could most likely stumble along, because none of the participating
parties are eager for new elections. They have adeptly avoided
confronting any issue which would make a split inevitable.
That is probably about to change. At least twenty members of
the EU now seem prepared to join the United States in recognizing a
unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians. It is
unclear exactly when various steps will take place, but the starting
date will certainly be around December 10, the date when the troika of
negotiators is due to submit their report to the UN. Serbian
politicians are confronted with two fundamental and related questions.
The first is what additional last-minute steps can be taken
to either delay or discourage key members of the EU from supporting
this unilateral action. The second is what steps Serbia should take in
the event that the worst case scenario actually happens and Kosovo in
December starts down the independence road.
The DSS is prepared to take far stronger measures both in
advance of December 10 to prevent any declaration of independence and
also far stronger reactive measures if it does happen. The problem,
however, is that many of the measures would adversely impact on the
key goals of their coalition partners. The result is that the gap
between the coalition partners is growing and will continue to do so
as the DSS raises the ante on Kosovo.
The DSS has already taken steps to demonstrate that there
will be serious regional repercussions in the event of Kosovo
independence. A major initiative in this regard was to link the date
of elections for the Serbian President to events in Kosovo. In other
words, the DSS has deliberately taken steps which make it far more
possible that the next President of Serbia will be from the Radical
Party. They are sending a message to the International Community that
this is one of the potential downsides of unilateral recognition of
Kosovo Independence .
This is a fascinating gambit in a number of ways. It shows
clearly the actual state of relations between Prime Minister Kostunica
and President Tadic. Secondly, as in the case of the DSS vote for a
Radical as President of Parliament during the coalition negotiations
several months ago, it shows that the DSS does not have the same
degree of discomfort with the Radical Party that other parties in the
governmental coalition and much of the International Community share.
Thirdly, it magnifies once again the issue of Kosovo on the Serbian
political scene, as the DSS wants to do. Fourthly, it could have the
tactical impact of delaying action in Kosovo. This however, would only
be for a short period and only if there was a date certain for the
Serbian elections within the next two months. But finally, it has to
raise questions about what sort of future the DSS envisions for Serbia
if it is willing to facilitate a Radical as President with the
implications this would have for Serbia 's image in much of the world.
The strong reaction of the EU to the potential for a Right Wing
Nationalist Party sharing power in Austria a few years ago comes to
mind in this regard.
The second step which the Prime Minister and his party has
taken is to support aggressively the Bosnian Serb leadership in its
protests over measures taken by the High Representative to facilitate
the work of the Bosnian Parliament and Council of Ministers. This was
accompanied by a coordinated media campaign reminiscent of the
Milosevic years. This was intentionally done to present a case of the
International Community mistreating Serbs not only in Kosovo, but also
in Bosnia . The end result was to solidify, at least in the minds of
the Serbs, a definite linkage between the two cases. It raises the
possibility that any unilateral declaration by the Kosovo Albanians of
independence could lead either to further Bosnian Serb challenges to
the authority of the High Representative or even an effort to stage a
referendum on independence for the Republika Srpska. The intent, once
again, is to convince the International Community that supporting
unilateral independence for Kosovo will create more problems than it
would solve.
Thirdly, the DSS has taken the lead in visibly cozying up to
Russia. This includes claims that the West's purpose in supporting
Kosovo Albanian independence is to create a " NATO State " in the
Balkans and other NATO bashing. The obvious intent is to show that the
end result of Kosovo independence would be a Serbia far, far closer to
Russia and more distant from the EU.
Finally, even though the government has been careful to
avoid any overt signs of support, the announced formation of a "St.
Tsar Lazar Guard" composed of Serbian volunteers to fight to defend
Kosovo in the event of an unilateral declaration of independence is
obviously designed to raise the possibility of paramilitary units
going into Kosovo as they did in Bosnia and Croatia in 1990-95.
The hope of the DSS is that these threats and actions will
be sufficient to scare key EU countries such as Germany so that they
defer any action on Kosovo. At least as of today, however, it appears
as if the majority of EU countries (including all of the "heavy
hitters" with the support and encouragement of the United States has
decided to proceed regardless of the potential consequences. In fact,
it unfortunately seems that many in the West are beginning to view
Serbia, as during the Milosevic years, as a destabilizing factor in
the region. The "honeymoon" following the downfall of Milosevic is
definitely over.
The question then becomes, exactly what will Serbia do in
the event of unilateral independence. My best guess is as follows:
a) A contingency plan has already been worked out with Kosovo Serbs so
that they will react immediately in rejecting any unilateral
declaration of independence. Serbian-controlled areas will be
established in Kosovo similar to those set up in Bosnia and Croatia
sixteen years ago.
b) At least some "volunteers" from Serbia proper will go to help the
Kosovo Serbs. The government will take a hands-off position and claim
that it had nothing to do with it.
c) The Bosnian Serbs will be encouraged to further challenge the High
Representative, possibly even with a referendum initiative.
d) Large protest rallies will be staged in many cities in Serbia .
e) Efforts will be made in Parliament and in the media to
significantly downgrade relations with countries which recognize
Kosovo independence.
f) Serbia will renounce any responsibility for its debts in Kosovo
with international financial institutions.
g) Serbia will close its boundaries with Kosovo for all traffic other
than Serbs.
h) Serbia will consider cutting off its supply of electrical energy to Kosovo.
i) Serbia even now will encourage Russia to use the renewal of the
EUFOR Mission in Bosnia in the UN Security, which is scheduled for
December, to extract unacceptable concessions in exchange for its
support.
As these events unfold, the potential for violence and
pressure for additional measures will be very high. Relations with the
United States and the EU will deteriorate sharply. The coalition
partners of the DSS will see much of their work and their goals
evaporating in front of them and will be confronted with either
leaving the government or accepting responsibility for actions which
will take them further from their professed reasons for joining the
government in the first place. The problem is that although I see this
train wreck comely clearly down the line, I just don't see how it will
be stopped
The following piece was written by former US Ambassador to Belgrade
WIlliam Montgomery and will appear in this Saturday's edition of the
Belgrade daily DANAS. It is very timely, troubling and accurate.
RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES
Serbia today has a ruling coalition which is radically
divided in its priorities and underlying political philosophies. G17+
wants to improve the country's international financial position and
its overall economic underpinnings. DS is trying to move Serbia
towards full integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions and more
importantly, have Serbia perceived as a normal European country,
sharing a common system of values. DSS remains focused on Serbian
national questions such as Kosovo and Bosnia . The rivalries and
animosity among these three parties is far stronger and more evident
than towards either the Socialist or Radical Parties, which would
logically be their political and philosophical opposition.
The end result is a government with major internal
contradictions; "fiefdoms" exclusively controlled by individual
parties; a patronage system where party loyalty rates far higher than
competence, honesty or effectiveness; stalled reforms; and lack of
coordination in public statements which results in contradictory
messages to the outside world.
Despite all of above, the government under normal conditions
could most likely stumble along, because none of the participating
parties are eager for new elections. They have adeptly avoided
confronting any issue which would make a split inevitable.
That is probably about to change. At least twenty members of
the EU now seem prepared to join the United States in recognizing a
unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians. It is
unclear exactly when various steps will take place, but the starting
date will certainly be around December 10, the date when the troika of
negotiators is due to submit their report to the UN. Serbian
politicians are confronted with two fundamental and related questions.
The first is what additional last-minute steps can be taken
to either delay or discourage key members of the EU from supporting
this unilateral action. The second is what steps Serbia should take in
the event that the worst case scenario actually happens and Kosovo in
December starts down the independence road.
The DSS is prepared to take far stronger measures both in
advance of December 10 to prevent any declaration of independence and
also far stronger reactive measures if it does happen. The problem,
however, is that many of the measures would adversely impact on the
key goals of their coalition partners. The result is that the gap
between the coalition partners is growing and will continue to do so
as the DSS raises the ante on Kosovo.
The DSS has already taken steps to demonstrate that there
will be serious regional repercussions in the event of Kosovo
independence. A major initiative in this regard was to link the date
of elections for the Serbian President to events in Kosovo. In other
words, the DSS has deliberately taken steps which make it far more
possible that the next President of Serbia will be from the Radical
Party. They are sending a message to the International Community that
this is one of the potential downsides of unilateral recognition of
Kosovo Independence .
This is a fascinating gambit in a number of ways. It shows
clearly the actual state of relations between Prime Minister Kostunica
and President Tadic. Secondly, as in the case of the DSS vote for a
Radical as President of Parliament during the coalition negotiations
several months ago, it shows that the DSS does not have the same
degree of discomfort with the Radical Party that other parties in the
governmental coalition and much of the International Community share.
Thirdly, it magnifies once again the issue of Kosovo on the Serbian
political scene, as the DSS wants to do. Fourthly, it could have the
tactical impact of delaying action in Kosovo. This however, would only
be for a short period and only if there was a date certain for the
Serbian elections within the next two months. But finally, it has to
raise questions about what sort of future the DSS envisions for Serbia
if it is willing to facilitate a Radical as President with the
implications this would have for Serbia 's image in much of the world.
The strong reaction of the EU to the potential for a Right Wing
Nationalist Party sharing power in Austria a few years ago comes to
mind in this regard.
The second step which the Prime Minister and his party has
taken is to support aggressively the Bosnian Serb leadership in its
protests over measures taken by the High Representative to facilitate
the work of the Bosnian Parliament and Council of Ministers. This was
accompanied by a coordinated media campaign reminiscent of the
Milosevic years. This was intentionally done to present a case of the
International Community mistreating Serbs not only in Kosovo, but also
in Bosnia . The end result was to solidify, at least in the minds of
the Serbs, a definite linkage between the two cases. It raises the
possibility that any unilateral declaration by the Kosovo Albanians of
independence could lead either to further Bosnian Serb challenges to
the authority of the High Representative or even an effort to stage a
referendum on independence for the Republika Srpska. The intent, once
again, is to convince the International Community that supporting
unilateral independence for Kosovo will create more problems than it
would solve.
Thirdly, the DSS has taken the lead in visibly cozying up to
Russia. This includes claims that the West's purpose in supporting
Kosovo Albanian independence is to create a " NATO State " in the
Balkans and other NATO bashing. The obvious intent is to show that the
end result of Kosovo independence would be a Serbia far, far closer to
Russia and more distant from the EU.
Finally, even though the government has been careful to
avoid any overt signs of support, the announced formation of a "St.
Tsar Lazar Guard" composed of Serbian volunteers to fight to defend
Kosovo in the event of an unilateral declaration of independence is
obviously designed to raise the possibility of paramilitary units
going into Kosovo as they did in Bosnia and Croatia in 1990-95.
The hope of the DSS is that these threats and actions will
be sufficient to scare key EU countries such as Germany so that they
defer any action on Kosovo. At least as of today, however, it appears
as if the majority of EU countries (including all of the "heavy
hitters" with the support and encouragement of the United States has
decided to proceed regardless of the potential consequences. In fact,
it unfortunately seems that many in the West are beginning to view
Serbia, as during the Milosevic years, as a destabilizing factor in
the region. The "honeymoon" following the downfall of Milosevic is
definitely over.
The question then becomes, exactly what will Serbia do in
the event of unilateral independence. My best guess is as follows:
a) A contingency plan has already been worked out with Kosovo Serbs so
that they will react immediately in rejecting any unilateral
declaration of independence. Serbian-controlled areas will be
established in Kosovo similar to those set up in Bosnia and Croatia
sixteen years ago.
b) At least some "volunteers" from Serbia proper will go to help the
Kosovo Serbs. The government will take a hands-off position and claim
that it had nothing to do with it.
c) The Bosnian Serbs will be encouraged to further challenge the High
Representative, possibly even with a referendum initiative.
d) Large protest rallies will be staged in many cities in Serbia .
e) Efforts will be made in Parliament and in the media to
significantly downgrade relations with countries which recognize
Kosovo independence.
f) Serbia will renounce any responsibility for its debts in Kosovo
with international financial institutions.
g) Serbia will close its boundaries with Kosovo for all traffic other
than Serbs.
h) Serbia will consider cutting off its supply of electrical energy to Kosovo.
i) Serbia even now will encourage Russia to use the renewal of the
EUFOR Mission in Bosnia in the UN Security, which is scheduled for
December, to extract unacceptable concessions in exchange for its
support.
As these events unfold, the potential for violence and
pressure for additional measures will be very high. Relations with the
United States and the EU will deteriorate sharply. The coalition
partners of the DSS will see much of their work and their goals
evaporating in front of them and will be confronted with either
leaving the government or accepting responsibility for actions which
will take them further from their professed reasons for joining the
government in the first place. The problem is that although I see this
train wreck comely clearly down the line, I just don't see how it will
be stopped
19 November 2007
Kosovo Election
I love Peace
Election monitors have confirmed that the opposition Democratic Party of former ethnic Albanian guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci won the November 17 parliamentary elections in Serbia's Kosovo province.
The election monitoring group "Democracy in Action" says that with votes from 90 percent of polling stations counted, Thaci's PDK is leading with 34 percent, beating the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) into second place with 22 percent.
The election result puts Thaci in a position to form a coalition government.
He has vowed that if he becomes prime minister, he intends to declare Kosovo independent from Serbia after December 10 -- the deadline for international mediators to report back to the United Nations on the progress of negotiations to resolve the dispute over Kosovo's future status.
The vote was boycotted by Kosovo's Serbian minority, which strongly rejects the ethnic Albanian plan for independence.
The United States has praised the peaceful conduct of the elections, but criticized the Serbian boycott of the vote.
16 November 2007
KOSOVO ELECTIONS 2007/ A NEW REFERENDUM ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO
I love Peace
The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Drago Flis, an albanologist and member of the IFIMES International Institute, has presented the current situation before the general and local elections in Kosovo which will be held on 17. November 2007. His article entitled "Kosovo elections 2007 – A new referendum on the independence of Kosovo" is published in full.
Drago FLIS
Albanologist and
Member of the IFIMES International Institute
KOSOVO ELECTIONS 2007
A NEW REFERENDUM ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO
Kosovo's parliamentary elections scheduled for 17 November 2007, which will be held together with the local elections, are the third elections since the international community introduced its civil and military administration in Kosovo. The third democratic elections since 1999 will thus round off the political context for the independence of Kosovo. The concept of controlled independence is envisaged already by Ahtisaari's plan which remains the only viable political roadmap for Kosovo in the international community regardless of eventual difficulties in its implementation.
Ever since it became an international protectorate the West has granted Kosovo the right to its own elections within the existing borders, while it never took a position on the possibility of another referendum on independence, although such referenda have had quite a long tradition in Kosovo. The Constitutional Framework (Korniza kushtetuese) of 15 May 2001 provisionally replacing the constitution contains no provisions on referendum either. Nevertheless Korniza acknowledges certain elements of administrative self-government. It provides for direct elections to the parliament while it remains restrictive regarding the elections of the president who is not elected directly but by the qualified majority of the parliament.
The provisional Constitutional Framework is based on the UN Resolution No. 1244, which has left the issue of sovereignty formally open pending the final solution of the status of Kosovo. All previous elections have been organized separately from the Serbian elections although the minority has occasionally held its own elections.
The 2001 and 2004 parliamentary elections were organized by the international community. In this year's elections the role of international organizations has diminished substantially to the level of observing and advising, as envisaged by Ahtisaari, and the realization of the elections is the responsibility of the Central Election Commission (KQZ) headed by Kosovo's officials.
INDEPENDENCE – THE FOCAL TOPIC OF ELECTIONS
The 2007 elections have practically no other topic except for the focal issue of independence. Regardless of their political differences and personal rivalries, all majority parties present independence as their sine qua non goal. This goal has been promoted also by some minority parties except for the Serbian ones. Most minority parties are already looking for the possibilities of forming coalitions with certain Albanian parties. Serbian minority is still skeptical about the elections since it rejects independence. The official Belgrade has repeatedly called the Serbian minority to boycott the elections, as has the Raška-Prizren Orthodox Metropolite Artemije. By doing so the Serbian minority in Kosovo would deprive itself of the possibility to ensure its own position in the future Kosovo state through participation at the elections as one of the signs of loyalty. The Serbian minority and Belgrade authorities have decided to take another road, although that can not prevent the realization of elections but only aggravate the position of the Serbian community after the elections and the solution of the final status.
ANOTHER DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Should it be necessary the political representatives of Kosovo majority are ready to organize another referendum on independence while still fully respecting the agenda envisaged by the international community which neither stipulates nor prohibits such possibility. The international community is still withholding its decision on the final status and insists on always new and new negotiation rounds. Even in the negotiating process no positions have been assumed on the previous and eventual future decisions on independence taken by the Kosovo leadership. Nevertheless, the latter announced a new declaration of independence without stating the date. The former Kosovo leadership announced the independent republic of Kosovo already in July 1990, which was not recognized by the international community. Regardless of that they continued the sovereignty process, proclaiming the new constitution in September 1990 and rounding off the process with the referendum on independence in 1991.
In addition to independence as the focal point the pre-election campaign has introduced some novelties in the probable post-election structure of authority. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaçi stands out as the country's central party which will most probably form the coalition government.
The present government has been based on the division of power between the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the former party of Ibrahim Rugova which appoints the President of Kosovo, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) headed by the incumbent Prime Minister. AAK had lost Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj who resigned immediately following the indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently his position was assumed by Agim Çeku.
The pre-election campaign is taking place in parallel with direct negotiations between Belgrade and Priština on the final status of Kosovo, organized alternately in Vienna and Brussels. Until now the negotiations have borne no tangible results. Despite enormous efforts by the international community to bring the two sides closer together, the gap between them is still deepening Notwithstanding the obligations of the pre-election fight the Kosovo side fully respects the desire of the international community to participate at the negotiations which are to last until the end of November.
In view of the obligations assumed by Kosovar politicians during the election campaign, the declaration of independence is inevitably going to take place after 10 December 2007 together with the appeal to the international community to remain in Kosovo and recognize its independence.
Even if the international community further postponed the recognition, the Kosovo Parliament will, in the framework of its efforts to achieve international recognition, initiate the procedure for the adoption of the new constitution based on Ahtisaari's plan.
The third set of tasks for the newly elected government will be the regulation of relations with the neighboring countries. Although this will be a time-consuming and complex process no one can doom it to fail. The initial period of blockades may be replaced by a process of gradual and practical approximation and eventual peaceful settlement of relations between Kosovo and its South Slavic neighbors.
EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS?
The international community has been postponing long enough the recognition of Kosovo as the independent state. In the international community, the Serbian lobby has been permanently rejecting independence regardless of the self-determination principle. The Serbian lobby relies on traditional allies, especially Russia and some other states, as well as on the customary distrusting attitude of the international community towards the Albanians. That attitude is also present in the newly emerged states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since their political mentality had developed under the strong influence of Belgrade. This accounts for their reserved and hesitating expression of positions when it comes to the issue of Kosovo and consequently their postponed decisions on its independence.
The traditional antagonism between Serbs and Albanians in the area of West Balkans can not be overcome without the recognition of Kosovo's independence which is the precondition for eventual reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians living together.
The Serbian lobby among other claims that the independence of Kosovo would lead Serbia to a collapse, although there are no reasons for such fears. Another example of political fiction was the idea on annexing the Bosnian Republic of Srpska to Serbia should the international community decide to recognize Kosovo's independence. Serbia has simply no possibility to achieve this.
Kosovo's odyssey to independence may thus end with a peculiar political paradox: the country which has suffered so many wars and devastations in its own and neighboring territories will eventually enter its independence in a peaceful manner.
Ljubljana, November 14, 2007
International Institute for Middle-East
and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) - Ljubljana
Director: Bakhtyar Aljaf
The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Drago Flis, an albanologist and member of the IFIMES International Institute, has presented the current situation before the general and local elections in Kosovo which will be held on 17. November 2007. His article entitled "Kosovo elections 2007 – A new referendum on the independence of Kosovo" is published in full.
Drago FLIS
Albanologist and
Member of the IFIMES International Institute
KOSOVO ELECTIONS 2007
A NEW REFERENDUM ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO
Kosovo's parliamentary elections scheduled for 17 November 2007, which will be held together with the local elections, are the third elections since the international community introduced its civil and military administration in Kosovo. The third democratic elections since 1999 will thus round off the political context for the independence of Kosovo. The concept of controlled independence is envisaged already by Ahtisaari's plan which remains the only viable political roadmap for Kosovo in the international community regardless of eventual difficulties in its implementation.
Ever since it became an international protectorate the West has granted Kosovo the right to its own elections within the existing borders, while it never took a position on the possibility of another referendum on independence, although such referenda have had quite a long tradition in Kosovo. The Constitutional Framework (Korniza kushtetuese) of 15 May 2001 provisionally replacing the constitution contains no provisions on referendum either. Nevertheless Korniza acknowledges certain elements of administrative self-government. It provides for direct elections to the parliament while it remains restrictive regarding the elections of the president who is not elected directly but by the qualified majority of the parliament.
The provisional Constitutional Framework is based on the UN Resolution No. 1244, which has left the issue of sovereignty formally open pending the final solution of the status of Kosovo. All previous elections have been organized separately from the Serbian elections although the minority has occasionally held its own elections.
The 2001 and 2004 parliamentary elections were organized by the international community. In this year's elections the role of international organizations has diminished substantially to the level of observing and advising, as envisaged by Ahtisaari, and the realization of the elections is the responsibility of the Central Election Commission (KQZ) headed by Kosovo's officials.
INDEPENDENCE – THE FOCAL TOPIC OF ELECTIONS
The 2007 elections have practically no other topic except for the focal issue of independence. Regardless of their political differences and personal rivalries, all majority parties present independence as their sine qua non goal. This goal has been promoted also by some minority parties except for the Serbian ones. Most minority parties are already looking for the possibilities of forming coalitions with certain Albanian parties. Serbian minority is still skeptical about the elections since it rejects independence. The official Belgrade has repeatedly called the Serbian minority to boycott the elections, as has the Raška-Prizren Orthodox Metropolite Artemije. By doing so the Serbian minority in Kosovo would deprive itself of the possibility to ensure its own position in the future Kosovo state through participation at the elections as one of the signs of loyalty. The Serbian minority and Belgrade authorities have decided to take another road, although that can not prevent the realization of elections but only aggravate the position of the Serbian community after the elections and the solution of the final status.
ANOTHER DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Should it be necessary the political representatives of Kosovo majority are ready to organize another referendum on independence while still fully respecting the agenda envisaged by the international community which neither stipulates nor prohibits such possibility. The international community is still withholding its decision on the final status and insists on always new and new negotiation rounds. Even in the negotiating process no positions have been assumed on the previous and eventual future decisions on independence taken by the Kosovo leadership. Nevertheless, the latter announced a new declaration of independence without stating the date. The former Kosovo leadership announced the independent republic of Kosovo already in July 1990, which was not recognized by the international community. Regardless of that they continued the sovereignty process, proclaiming the new constitution in September 1990 and rounding off the process with the referendum on independence in 1991.
In addition to independence as the focal point the pre-election campaign has introduced some novelties in the probable post-election structure of authority. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaçi stands out as the country's central party which will most probably form the coalition government.
The present government has been based on the division of power between the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the former party of Ibrahim Rugova which appoints the President of Kosovo, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) headed by the incumbent Prime Minister. AAK had lost Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj who resigned immediately following the indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently his position was assumed by Agim Çeku.
The pre-election campaign is taking place in parallel with direct negotiations between Belgrade and Priština on the final status of Kosovo, organized alternately in Vienna and Brussels. Until now the negotiations have borne no tangible results. Despite enormous efforts by the international community to bring the two sides closer together, the gap between them is still deepening Notwithstanding the obligations of the pre-election fight the Kosovo side fully respects the desire of the international community to participate at the negotiations which are to last until the end of November.
In view of the obligations assumed by Kosovar politicians during the election campaign, the declaration of independence is inevitably going to take place after 10 December 2007 together with the appeal to the international community to remain in Kosovo and recognize its independence.
Even if the international community further postponed the recognition, the Kosovo Parliament will, in the framework of its efforts to achieve international recognition, initiate the procedure for the adoption of the new constitution based on Ahtisaari's plan.
The third set of tasks for the newly elected government will be the regulation of relations with the neighboring countries. Although this will be a time-consuming and complex process no one can doom it to fail. The initial period of blockades may be replaced by a process of gradual and practical approximation and eventual peaceful settlement of relations between Kosovo and its South Slavic neighbors.
EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS?
The international community has been postponing long enough the recognition of Kosovo as the independent state. In the international community, the Serbian lobby has been permanently rejecting independence regardless of the self-determination principle. The Serbian lobby relies on traditional allies, especially Russia and some other states, as well as on the customary distrusting attitude of the international community towards the Albanians. That attitude is also present in the newly emerged states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since their political mentality had developed under the strong influence of Belgrade. This accounts for their reserved and hesitating expression of positions when it comes to the issue of Kosovo and consequently their postponed decisions on its independence.
The traditional antagonism between Serbs and Albanians in the area of West Balkans can not be overcome without the recognition of Kosovo's independence which is the precondition for eventual reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians living together.
The Serbian lobby among other claims that the independence of Kosovo would lead Serbia to a collapse, although there are no reasons for such fears. Another example of political fiction was the idea on annexing the Bosnian Republic of Srpska to Serbia should the international community decide to recognize Kosovo's independence. Serbia has simply no possibility to achieve this.
Kosovo's odyssey to independence may thus end with a peculiar political paradox: the country which has suffered so many wars and devastations in its own and neighboring territories will eventually enter its independence in a peaceful manner.
Ljubljana, November 14, 2007
International Institute for Middle-East
and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) - Ljubljana
Director: Bakhtyar Aljaf
14 November 2007
Back Again!!!
I love Peace
Well seams I took a long break.... even though there was a lot to say and a lot of things going on.... but this is how life is, we start something, then we jump in something that we think is more important and then we get back to where we been and we see that things were moving and the situation is not same...
I was very busy during all this time, preparing documents for scholarships, new job, helping one of my professor to prepare the election campaign, implementing different projects of NGO and having a lot of debates with candidates and forgetting about the books in TOTAL....
Anyway, I didn't done to much. After failing to get any scholarship for studying abroad I sow that being graduated doesn't give you an easy way but in contrary it leads you to more difficult challenges and you need to be prepared for failures, questions that people think you should know answers and this made me get back on "earth" and think of what a hell I want to do in next coming year... So, I created a plan where keeping to write in blog is part of it.... so here I am...
thanks god elections are almost finishing, at least I'm done with campaign :) also with debates of NGO and know I have time to read (I started to read something about Diplomacy-H.Kissinger) and also paying more attention to situation in Kosovo, final status- the question that still remains in Kosovars minds and harts, promises of creating a paradise after elections, analyzing international declarations about Kosovo status and reading, reading and reading...
Well it's nice to be back... see yaaa later......
Well seams I took a long break.... even though there was a lot to say and a lot of things going on.... but this is how life is, we start something, then we jump in something that we think is more important and then we get back to where we been and we see that things were moving and the situation is not same...
I was very busy during all this time, preparing documents for scholarships, new job, helping one of my professor to prepare the election campaign, implementing different projects of NGO and having a lot of debates with candidates and forgetting about the books in TOTAL....
Anyway, I didn't done to much. After failing to get any scholarship for studying abroad I sow that being graduated doesn't give you an easy way but in contrary it leads you to more difficult challenges and you need to be prepared for failures, questions that people think you should know answers and this made me get back on "earth" and think of what a hell I want to do in next coming year... So, I created a plan where keeping to write in blog is part of it.... so here I am...
thanks god elections are almost finishing, at least I'm done with campaign :) also with debates of NGO and know I have time to read (I started to read something about Diplomacy-H.Kissinger) and also paying more attention to situation in Kosovo, final status- the question that still remains in Kosovars minds and harts, promises of creating a paradise after elections, analyzing international declarations about Kosovo status and reading, reading and reading...
Well it's nice to be back... see yaaa later......
22 July 2007
Kosovo: A Short History, by Noel Malcolm
I love Peace
If we needed any reminder of what is at stake in the present crisis over Kosovo, Noel Malcolm offers us, on the first page of his new history, a chilling forecast. "It is arguably the area with the worst human-rights abuses in the whole of Europe, and certainly the place where, if war does break out, the killing and destruction will be more intense than anything hitherto witnessed in the region." A grim prospect, indeed, especially coming on the heels of the war in Bosnia, the origins of which Malcolm has already outlined for us in his admirable Bosnia: A Short History.
As with his earlier study, Malcolm opens his historical account with the migration of the Slavs into the Balkans in the declining years of the Roman Empire. The Roman hegemony was succeeded by that of Byzantium, at least in name, for the Serbs, Albanians, and Vlachs were a turbulent people, not readily subjugated. One of the great obstacles that Malcolm runs up against is the absolute dearth of historical material about events in Kosovo from the ninth to the fourteenth century--five hundred years, of which virtually nothing is known other than the extension of Serbian control over Kosovo in the early thirteenth century.
The veil begins to lift in the late fourteenth century--by which time the Serbian state itself was breaking up--with the semi-mythical battle of Kosovo Polje, a few miles northwest of Prishtina, in 1389, when a combined Serbian-Bosnian army was defeated by an Ottoman force under the command of Sultan Murat I. Almost nothing is known for certain about the battle, apart from the fact that both Murat and the Serbian commander were slain; yet the Serbs persist to this day in celebrating it as one of the glorious moments in their history. Malcolm has an enjoyable time examining and exposing as fraudulent the myths the Serbs have woven around Kosovo Polje over the centuries, an exposure which will doubtless be accorded a surly reception in Belgrade.
The last vestiges of Serbian control over Kosovo vanished in the middle of the fifteenth century, after the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Thereafter Kosovo remained an Ottoman possession for four and a half centuries. Signs of discontent, even sporadic rebellions, were manifested from time to time; but the Kosovars in general remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. Even the so-called League of Prizren, set up in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to press for greater local autonomy, was essentially a Muslim religious movement which did not question the Sultan's ultimate authority. Even so, it did not escape retribution from Constantinople. The Sublime Porte acted quickly to suppress the League, and the Kosovars remained quiet and well-behaved for the next thirty years.
Turkish rule over Kosovo ended in 1912, when Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro all went to war with the Ottoman Empire. The Serbians quickly overran Kosovo, and over the next two years, by a policy of systematic butchery and destruction of property, they gave the Albanian inhabitants a foretaste of what was to be their lot under Serbian rule in the years ahead. A respite was afforded the Kosovars by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, when the Austrians occupied the northern half of the country, and the Bulgarians the southern. But the postwar settlement placed the Kosovars once more under the rule of Belgrade, when the province was incorporated in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thousands of Serbian and Montenegrin colonists were settled in the province, riding roughshod, in most cases, over the Albanians' property as well as their civil rights.
Much the same fate befell Kosovo during the Second World War. After the German invasion of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 the province was divided between Italy and Bulgaria, the lion's share going to the Italians, who were then more or less in control of Albania. In the course of the war the bulk of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the country fled or were driven out. Only a minority of them returned after 1945, making up around 12 per cent of the population. By 1991 they accounted for only 11 per cent, while the Kosovar Albanians accounted for 82 per cent, a discrepancy due in large measure to the Albanians' higher birth rate. (Serbia, by way of contrast, boasted--if that is the right word--the highest abortion rate in Europe.)
Malcolm does not believe that Tito treated Kosovo too badly. Perhaps, being a Croat, Tito had some sympathy for non-Serbian minorities. All the same, his years as dictator saw the implementation of a deliberate anti-Islamic policy in Kosovo: madrasas (Koranic schools) were closed down, the shari'ah courts were suppressed, and the Dervish orders were outlawed. Yugoslavia had been reconstituted after 1945 as a federation of six republics. Kosovo was declared an "autonomous region," although remaining a constituent part of Serbia. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo a status almost equivalent to that of the six republics, though not quite. To have categorized Kosovo as a republic might well have opened the road to secession, perhaps even to the unification of Kosovo with Albania. So it remained constitutionally part of Serbia, the Kosovars being classified as a nationality, not a nation.
The screws were turned on Kosovo after the death of Tito. Serbian propaganda in the 1980s depicted the Kosovars as a mob of ruffians and rapists who were making life unbearable for the Serbian colonists in their midst. This alleged persecution of the Kosovar Serbs provided the theme that Slobodan Milosevic, then seeking an issue that might help propel him into the presidency of Yugoslavia, lost little time in appropriating. It served him well. After winning the presidency he moved to amend the Serbian constitution in the spring of 1989 so as to reduce Kosovo's autonomy and to invest Serbia with control over the region's judicial system, as well as ultimate authority over its social, economic, and educational institutions. A year later the provincial assembly and government were dissolved by order of Belgrade, most of the Albanian Kosovars holding government posts were dismissed, and the majority of Albanian doctors practicing in the provincial hospitals were discharged. To add to these various insults the Serbs embarked upon a propaganda campaign at the time of the Serbian attack on Bosnia in the spring of 1992, conjuring up the specter of a vast Muslim conspiracy to undermine the Yugoslav federation. For the Muslim Albanians of Kosovo it was the last straw.
It has to be confessed that Noel Malcolm's book is not an easy read--for this reviewer, at least--which makes one look a little askance at the praise which has been bestowed upon it by numerous reviewers in the British press. (The exception, which must have caused Malcolm some amusement, was a sour appraisal by Douglas Hurd, the Conservative former foreign secretary, who had been roasted by Malcolm in his earlier book for his, Hurd's, limp-wristed approach to the Bosnian conflict.) Although Kosovo is a work of considerable scholarship, it is not without some minor flaws, more particularly in its references to Islamic institutions. For instance, it is not correct to speak of Muslim "clergy" or Islamic "theology"; and the shari'ah is more a system or codification of law, tout court, than of religious or canon law. But these are small errors in a work on Balkan history, mere slips of the pen which do not detract in any substantial way from the overall worth of Malcolm's book.
Mr. Kelly is an historian of the modern Middle East.
COPYRIGHT 1998 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group
If we needed any reminder of what is at stake in the present crisis over Kosovo, Noel Malcolm offers us, on the first page of his new history, a chilling forecast. "It is arguably the area with the worst human-rights abuses in the whole of Europe, and certainly the place where, if war does break out, the killing and destruction will be more intense than anything hitherto witnessed in the region." A grim prospect, indeed, especially coming on the heels of the war in Bosnia, the origins of which Malcolm has already outlined for us in his admirable Bosnia: A Short History.
As with his earlier study, Malcolm opens his historical account with the migration of the Slavs into the Balkans in the declining years of the Roman Empire. The Roman hegemony was succeeded by that of Byzantium, at least in name, for the Serbs, Albanians, and Vlachs were a turbulent people, not readily subjugated. One of the great obstacles that Malcolm runs up against is the absolute dearth of historical material about events in Kosovo from the ninth to the fourteenth century--five hundred years, of which virtually nothing is known other than the extension of Serbian control over Kosovo in the early thirteenth century.
The veil begins to lift in the late fourteenth century--by which time the Serbian state itself was breaking up--with the semi-mythical battle of Kosovo Polje, a few miles northwest of Prishtina, in 1389, when a combined Serbian-Bosnian army was defeated by an Ottoman force under the command of Sultan Murat I. Almost nothing is known for certain about the battle, apart from the fact that both Murat and the Serbian commander were slain; yet the Serbs persist to this day in celebrating it as one of the glorious moments in their history. Malcolm has an enjoyable time examining and exposing as fraudulent the myths the Serbs have woven around Kosovo Polje over the centuries, an exposure which will doubtless be accorded a surly reception in Belgrade.
The last vestiges of Serbian control over Kosovo vanished in the middle of the fifteenth century, after the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Thereafter Kosovo remained an Ottoman possession for four and a half centuries. Signs of discontent, even sporadic rebellions, were manifested from time to time; but the Kosovars in general remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. Even the so-called League of Prizren, set up in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to press for greater local autonomy, was essentially a Muslim religious movement which did not question the Sultan's ultimate authority. Even so, it did not escape retribution from Constantinople. The Sublime Porte acted quickly to suppress the League, and the Kosovars remained quiet and well-behaved for the next thirty years.
Turkish rule over Kosovo ended in 1912, when Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro all went to war with the Ottoman Empire. The Serbians quickly overran Kosovo, and over the next two years, by a policy of systematic butchery and destruction of property, they gave the Albanian inhabitants a foretaste of what was to be their lot under Serbian rule in the years ahead. A respite was afforded the Kosovars by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, when the Austrians occupied the northern half of the country, and the Bulgarians the southern. But the postwar settlement placed the Kosovars once more under the rule of Belgrade, when the province was incorporated in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thousands of Serbian and Montenegrin colonists were settled in the province, riding roughshod, in most cases, over the Albanians' property as well as their civil rights.
Much the same fate befell Kosovo during the Second World War. After the German invasion of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 the province was divided between Italy and Bulgaria, the lion's share going to the Italians, who were then more or less in control of Albania. In the course of the war the bulk of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the country fled or were driven out. Only a minority of them returned after 1945, making up around 12 per cent of the population. By 1991 they accounted for only 11 per cent, while the Kosovar Albanians accounted for 82 per cent, a discrepancy due in large measure to the Albanians' higher birth rate. (Serbia, by way of contrast, boasted--if that is the right word--the highest abortion rate in Europe.)
Malcolm does not believe that Tito treated Kosovo too badly. Perhaps, being a Croat, Tito had some sympathy for non-Serbian minorities. All the same, his years as dictator saw the implementation of a deliberate anti-Islamic policy in Kosovo: madrasas (Koranic schools) were closed down, the shari'ah courts were suppressed, and the Dervish orders were outlawed. Yugoslavia had been reconstituted after 1945 as a federation of six republics. Kosovo was declared an "autonomous region," although remaining a constituent part of Serbia. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo a status almost equivalent to that of the six republics, though not quite. To have categorized Kosovo as a republic might well have opened the road to secession, perhaps even to the unification of Kosovo with Albania. So it remained constitutionally part of Serbia, the Kosovars being classified as a nationality, not a nation.
The screws were turned on Kosovo after the death of Tito. Serbian propaganda in the 1980s depicted the Kosovars as a mob of ruffians and rapists who were making life unbearable for the Serbian colonists in their midst. This alleged persecution of the Kosovar Serbs provided the theme that Slobodan Milosevic, then seeking an issue that might help propel him into the presidency of Yugoslavia, lost little time in appropriating. It served him well. After winning the presidency he moved to amend the Serbian constitution in the spring of 1989 so as to reduce Kosovo's autonomy and to invest Serbia with control over the region's judicial system, as well as ultimate authority over its social, economic, and educational institutions. A year later the provincial assembly and government were dissolved by order of Belgrade, most of the Albanian Kosovars holding government posts were dismissed, and the majority of Albanian doctors practicing in the provincial hospitals were discharged. To add to these various insults the Serbs embarked upon a propaganda campaign at the time of the Serbian attack on Bosnia in the spring of 1992, conjuring up the specter of a vast Muslim conspiracy to undermine the Yugoslav federation. For the Muslim Albanians of Kosovo it was the last straw.
It has to be confessed that Noel Malcolm's book is not an easy read--for this reviewer, at least--which makes one look a little askance at the praise which has been bestowed upon it by numerous reviewers in the British press. (The exception, which must have caused Malcolm some amusement, was a sour appraisal by Douglas Hurd, the Conservative former foreign secretary, who had been roasted by Malcolm in his earlier book for his, Hurd's, limp-wristed approach to the Bosnian conflict.) Although Kosovo is a work of considerable scholarship, it is not without some minor flaws, more particularly in its references to Islamic institutions. For instance, it is not correct to speak of Muslim "clergy" or Islamic "theology"; and the shari'ah is more a system or codification of law, tout court, than of religious or canon law. But these are small errors in a work on Balkan history, mere slips of the pen which do not detract in any substantial way from the overall worth of Malcolm's book.
Mr. Kelly is an historian of the modern Middle East.
COPYRIGHT 1998 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group
15 July 2007
Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves
I love Peace
Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves
Pergatiti: L.Komani
Disa artikuj interesante mund te lexohen ne edicionet e dy diteve te fundit te disa gazetave te rendesishme te huaja. Po e sjellim si vijon esencen e secilit prej tyre. Shquajme cka thene z.Veton Surroi lidhur me Planin B qe eshte ne shqyrtim e siper dhe e vendosim dhe si titull per kete permbledhje.
Gazeta NY Times flet mbi mundesine e nje vendimi jashte OKB-se per pavaresine e Kosoves duke iu referuar fjaleve te ambasadorit amerikan prane OKB-se, z.Zalmay Khalilzad.
Gazeta austriake Die Presse nxirrte ne pah fjalet e ministrit te jashtem francez, z.Bernard Kouchner ne adrese te qeverise serbe, sipas se cilave Serbia nuk mund t’i kundervihet nje plani perendimor per pavaresine e Kosoves e njekohesisht te pretendoje pranimin ne BE. Sipas tij eshte e pamundur per nje shtet te hyje ne BE me nje konflikt etnik brenda vetes. Gazeta Der Standard i referohej z.Veton Surroi, sipas te cilit rruga deri tek pavaresia permes OKB-se eshte deshmuar si rruge qorre. Plani A ka deshtuar dhe tani po punohet per planin B. Dhe per kete plan nuk jane te nevojshme bisedime me Rusine.
Gazeta Le Monde ka sjelle dje nje artikull nga Denis MacShane, ish-minister britanik per Evropen, ku thuren mes te tjerash lavde per Serbine dhe popullin serb dhe ku shtrohet pyetja mbi kush vendos per politiken e jashtme BE-se, Bashkimi Evropian apo Rusia. Ne artikull argumentohet ne menyre te tille qe ne fund te mberrihet ne ceshtjen kyce: a do ta lejoje veten BE qe te kushtezohet nga Rusia cka do te conte ne thellimin e ndasive me SHBA-ne? A nuk do t’i jepte kjo shkas forcave militante te Kosoves qe tashme durimi I politikaneve te zgjedhur te zevendesohet me aksione me te forta. Sipas ish-ministrit zgjidhja e lojes eshte si vijon: nje Serbi e liruar nga Kosova qe ribashkohet me Kroacine dhe Sllovenine ne nje Bashkim Evropian dhe nje NATO qe mund te sjellin prosperitet dhe siguri ne Ballkan. Evropa dhe jo Rusia duhet te vendose per te ardhmen e rajonit.
===
Ne vazhdim per lexim individual artikujt nga NY Times dhe nga Le Monde:
U.S. May Bypass the U.N. for Kosovo Independence
By WARREN HOGE
Published: July 14, 2007
UNITED NATIONS, July 13 — Declaring the need for a timely decision on Kosovo’s desire for independence from Serbia, the United States threatened Friday to seek a solution outside the United Nations if Russia persisted in blocking Security Council action.
“We are determined to move forward, either within the Council or otherwise,” Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, said in a conference call with news agency reporters.
Russia supports Serbia’s determination to prevent Kosovo, Serbia’s breakaway western province, from becoming independent and has threatened to use its veto if the matter comes to a vote.
“The noises that we hear from Moscow are not encouraging, but we have not heard the final word from Moscow, and it is up to Russia whether the Council plays a role in deciding the next stage in regard to Kosovo or not,” Mr. Khalilzad said.
On Friday, the United States and its European allies circulated a new Kosovo resolution with the latest of a half-dozen revisions aimed at overcoming Russian objections.
Kosovo, with a population that is 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbian, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign in 1999 that pushed Serbian forces from the province.
The original resolution called for a managed independence under the aegis of the European Union, with built-in protections for the Serbs.
It endorsed a plan laid out by Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations special envoy, after 13 months of direct talks between Serbia and Kosovo that he said in March had produced an impasse. Russia had said it would not agree to any measure that resulting in Kosovo independence.
The latest version of the resolution calls for 120 days of new negotiations that, contrary to an earlier formulation, would not result in an automatic return to the Ahtisaari model in the event the talks failed.
Mr. Khalilzad indicated the latest revision might be the last and said he would push Monday for a decision on whether and when to schedule a vote.
“The core of what we are proposing is in there and is not subject to further changes,” he said, except what he called “the wording at the margins.”
Striking a balance that will satisfy Moscow is sure to provoke the leaders of Kosovo, who have threatened to declare unilateral independence if the United Nations does not act.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s secretary general, warned in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday that there was a danger of going from a “controlled to an uncontrolled” outcome unless both sides showed restraint.
Point de vue
Poutine, l'Europe et les Balkans, par Denis MacShane
Qui décide aujourd'hui de la politique étrangère de l'Union européenne, les nations européennes ou le Kremlin ? Tandis que les europhobes à Paris et Londres ont toujours à coeur de dénoncer Bruxelles comme source d'interférence avec les Etats européens souverains, Moscou en profite pour dire à l'Europe ce qui peut ou ne peut pas être fait en matière de politique étrangère.
Les problèmes sont connus, que ce soit la question de la défense antimissile, la guerre cybernétique contre les Etats baltes ou le meurtre d'Alexandre Litvinenko à Londres. Mais la Russie semble, en outre, convaincue que c'est elle, et non l'UE, qui décidera de l'avenir des Balkans. La Slovénie est déjà dans l'Union européenne, et la Croatie en route vers l'accession. L'enjeu réel pour la paix et la stabilité dans la région est donc incarné par la Serbie. Les Serbes sont la nation dominante des Balkans, et Belgrade leur capitale. Le peuple serbe est intelligent, éduqué, multilingue, membre d'une société postindustrielle ; il est prêt, une fois que la Serbie sera membre de l'UE, à entraîner la région entière vers son rendez-vous avec la modernité.
Un obstacle de taille subsiste cependant : le refus de Belgrade de comprendre que l'époque de son contrôle du Kosovo a pris fin. Les connexions historiques, religieuses et culturelles entre la Serbie et le Kosovo ne peuvent être discutées. Elles sont aussi fortes que les liens qui existaient entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande à la veille de l'indépendance irlandaise. Mais le Kosovo s'est libéré de manière pacifique du joug serbe dans les années 1980 et 1990, avant que sa population ne s'oppose, au cours d'une guerre armée cruelle, à la brutalité des milices de Milosevic. L'Europe et les Etats-Unis ont alors enfin décidé d'intervenir afin de mettre fin aux massacres. Mais ils ont ensuite laissé le Kosovo dans les limbes, certes sous contrôle des Nations unies mais toujours légalement territoire serbe. Des émissaires puissants furent envoyés sans succès à Pristina, dont le nouveau ministre français des affaires étrangères, Bernard Kouchner.
Tant qu'un accord de paix ne sera pas conclu, le peuple kosovar et son Etat putatif n'auront ni la reconnaissance ni la responsabilité nécessaires pour agir en leur propre nom.
La non-indépendance et la non-reconnaissance du Kosovo ne font plus sens. Le Kosovo doit être libéré de la tutelle serbe, précisément afin de permettre à la Serbie de rejoindre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN. En privé, tous les responsables et dirigeants politiques serbes sérieux, à l'exception des ultranationalistes et des derniers fidèles de Milosevic, acceptent que le Kosovo ne sera plus jamais contrôlé par Belgrade. En public, personne à Belgrade n'a le courage de le dire.
A la demande des Nations unies, l'ancien président finlandais Martii Ahtisaari vient de proposer un plan d'action pour sortir de la crise qui permet une indépendance conditionnelle du Kosovo sous la supervision de l'UE. Ce plan de bon sens a été accepté par les Américains et les Européens.
Mais il ne satisfait pas la Russie, qui se montre plus serbe que les Serbes et a annoncé sa décision d'utiliser son droit de veto au conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Apparemment, sa justification principale est que Pristina et Belgrade doivent se mettre d'accord elles-mêmes. En réalité, étant donné que les Serbes refuseront l'indépendance même conditionnelle du Kosovo, la position de Moscou est malhonnête et témoigne de la volonté russe de n'accepter aucun règlement final du conflit. L'ambition de Moscou est davantage la balkanisation de l'Europe que l'européanisation des Balkans.
L'Union européenne est donc face à un choix décisif. Autorisera-t-elle la prise en otage par le Kremlin de sa politique étrangère dans les Balkans, ce qui pourrait conduire à un renforcement des divisions entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis ? Cela ne risquerait-il pas de convaincre les militants têtes brûlées du Kosovo que le pacifisme et la patience des dirigeants élus du Kosovo doivent désormais être remplacés par des actions plus fortes ?
La fin de partie est claire. Il ne peut s'agir que d'une Serbie libérée du Kosovo, rejoignant la Croatie et la Slovénie dans une Union européenne et une OTAN qui puissent apporter prospérité et sécurité aux Balkans. L'Europe, et non la Russie, devrait décider de l'avenir de la région.
Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves
Pergatiti: L.Komani
Disa artikuj interesante mund te lexohen ne edicionet e dy diteve te fundit te disa gazetave te rendesishme te huaja. Po e sjellim si vijon esencen e secilit prej tyre. Shquajme cka thene z.Veton Surroi lidhur me Planin B qe eshte ne shqyrtim e siper dhe e vendosim dhe si titull per kete permbledhje.
Gazeta NY Times flet mbi mundesine e nje vendimi jashte OKB-se per pavaresine e Kosoves duke iu referuar fjaleve te ambasadorit amerikan prane OKB-se, z.Zalmay Khalilzad.
Gazeta austriake Die Presse nxirrte ne pah fjalet e ministrit te jashtem francez, z.Bernard Kouchner ne adrese te qeverise serbe, sipas se cilave Serbia nuk mund t’i kundervihet nje plani perendimor per pavaresine e Kosoves e njekohesisht te pretendoje pranimin ne BE. Sipas tij eshte e pamundur per nje shtet te hyje ne BE me nje konflikt etnik brenda vetes. Gazeta Der Standard i referohej z.Veton Surroi, sipas te cilit rruga deri tek pavaresia permes OKB-se eshte deshmuar si rruge qorre. Plani A ka deshtuar dhe tani po punohet per planin B. Dhe per kete plan nuk jane te nevojshme bisedime me Rusine.
Gazeta Le Monde ka sjelle dje nje artikull nga Denis MacShane, ish-minister britanik per Evropen, ku thuren mes te tjerash lavde per Serbine dhe popullin serb dhe ku shtrohet pyetja mbi kush vendos per politiken e jashtme BE-se, Bashkimi Evropian apo Rusia. Ne artikull argumentohet ne menyre te tille qe ne fund te mberrihet ne ceshtjen kyce: a do ta lejoje veten BE qe te kushtezohet nga Rusia cka do te conte ne thellimin e ndasive me SHBA-ne? A nuk do t’i jepte kjo shkas forcave militante te Kosoves qe tashme durimi I politikaneve te zgjedhur te zevendesohet me aksione me te forta. Sipas ish-ministrit zgjidhja e lojes eshte si vijon: nje Serbi e liruar nga Kosova qe ribashkohet me Kroacine dhe Sllovenine ne nje Bashkim Evropian dhe nje NATO qe mund te sjellin prosperitet dhe siguri ne Ballkan. Evropa dhe jo Rusia duhet te vendose per te ardhmen e rajonit.
===
Ne vazhdim per lexim individual artikujt nga NY Times dhe nga Le Monde:
U.S. May Bypass the U.N. for Kosovo Independence
By WARREN HOGE
Published: July 14, 2007
UNITED NATIONS, July 13 — Declaring the need for a timely decision on Kosovo’s desire for independence from Serbia, the United States threatened Friday to seek a solution outside the United Nations if Russia persisted in blocking Security Council action.
“We are determined to move forward, either within the Council or otherwise,” Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, said in a conference call with news agency reporters.
Russia supports Serbia’s determination to prevent Kosovo, Serbia’s breakaway western province, from becoming independent and has threatened to use its veto if the matter comes to a vote.
“The noises that we hear from Moscow are not encouraging, but we have not heard the final word from Moscow, and it is up to Russia whether the Council plays a role in deciding the next stage in regard to Kosovo or not,” Mr. Khalilzad said.
On Friday, the United States and its European allies circulated a new Kosovo resolution with the latest of a half-dozen revisions aimed at overcoming Russian objections.
Kosovo, with a population that is 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbian, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign in 1999 that pushed Serbian forces from the province.
The original resolution called for a managed independence under the aegis of the European Union, with built-in protections for the Serbs.
It endorsed a plan laid out by Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations special envoy, after 13 months of direct talks between Serbia and Kosovo that he said in March had produced an impasse. Russia had said it would not agree to any measure that resulting in Kosovo independence.
The latest version of the resolution calls for 120 days of new negotiations that, contrary to an earlier formulation, would not result in an automatic return to the Ahtisaari model in the event the talks failed.
Mr. Khalilzad indicated the latest revision might be the last and said he would push Monday for a decision on whether and when to schedule a vote.
“The core of what we are proposing is in there and is not subject to further changes,” he said, except what he called “the wording at the margins.”
Striking a balance that will satisfy Moscow is sure to provoke the leaders of Kosovo, who have threatened to declare unilateral independence if the United Nations does not act.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s secretary general, warned in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday that there was a danger of going from a “controlled to an uncontrolled” outcome unless both sides showed restraint.
Point de vue
Poutine, l'Europe et les Balkans, par Denis MacShane
Qui décide aujourd'hui de la politique étrangère de l'Union européenne, les nations européennes ou le Kremlin ? Tandis que les europhobes à Paris et Londres ont toujours à coeur de dénoncer Bruxelles comme source d'interférence avec les Etats européens souverains, Moscou en profite pour dire à l'Europe ce qui peut ou ne peut pas être fait en matière de politique étrangère.
Les problèmes sont connus, que ce soit la question de la défense antimissile, la guerre cybernétique contre les Etats baltes ou le meurtre d'Alexandre Litvinenko à Londres. Mais la Russie semble, en outre, convaincue que c'est elle, et non l'UE, qui décidera de l'avenir des Balkans. La Slovénie est déjà dans l'Union européenne, et la Croatie en route vers l'accession. L'enjeu réel pour la paix et la stabilité dans la région est donc incarné par la Serbie. Les Serbes sont la nation dominante des Balkans, et Belgrade leur capitale. Le peuple serbe est intelligent, éduqué, multilingue, membre d'une société postindustrielle ; il est prêt, une fois que la Serbie sera membre de l'UE, à entraîner la région entière vers son rendez-vous avec la modernité.
Un obstacle de taille subsiste cependant : le refus de Belgrade de comprendre que l'époque de son contrôle du Kosovo a pris fin. Les connexions historiques, religieuses et culturelles entre la Serbie et le Kosovo ne peuvent être discutées. Elles sont aussi fortes que les liens qui existaient entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande à la veille de l'indépendance irlandaise. Mais le Kosovo s'est libéré de manière pacifique du joug serbe dans les années 1980 et 1990, avant que sa population ne s'oppose, au cours d'une guerre armée cruelle, à la brutalité des milices de Milosevic. L'Europe et les Etats-Unis ont alors enfin décidé d'intervenir afin de mettre fin aux massacres. Mais ils ont ensuite laissé le Kosovo dans les limbes, certes sous contrôle des Nations unies mais toujours légalement territoire serbe. Des émissaires puissants furent envoyés sans succès à Pristina, dont le nouveau ministre français des affaires étrangères, Bernard Kouchner.
Tant qu'un accord de paix ne sera pas conclu, le peuple kosovar et son Etat putatif n'auront ni la reconnaissance ni la responsabilité nécessaires pour agir en leur propre nom.
La non-indépendance et la non-reconnaissance du Kosovo ne font plus sens. Le Kosovo doit être libéré de la tutelle serbe, précisément afin de permettre à la Serbie de rejoindre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN. En privé, tous les responsables et dirigeants politiques serbes sérieux, à l'exception des ultranationalistes et des derniers fidèles de Milosevic, acceptent que le Kosovo ne sera plus jamais contrôlé par Belgrade. En public, personne à Belgrade n'a le courage de le dire.
A la demande des Nations unies, l'ancien président finlandais Martii Ahtisaari vient de proposer un plan d'action pour sortir de la crise qui permet une indépendance conditionnelle du Kosovo sous la supervision de l'UE. Ce plan de bon sens a été accepté par les Américains et les Européens.
Mais il ne satisfait pas la Russie, qui se montre plus serbe que les Serbes et a annoncé sa décision d'utiliser son droit de veto au conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Apparemment, sa justification principale est que Pristina et Belgrade doivent se mettre d'accord elles-mêmes. En réalité, étant donné que les Serbes refuseront l'indépendance même conditionnelle du Kosovo, la position de Moscou est malhonnête et témoigne de la volonté russe de n'accepter aucun règlement final du conflit. L'ambition de Moscou est davantage la balkanisation de l'Europe que l'européanisation des Balkans.
L'Union européenne est donc face à un choix décisif. Autorisera-t-elle la prise en otage par le Kremlin de sa politique étrangère dans les Balkans, ce qui pourrait conduire à un renforcement des divisions entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis ? Cela ne risquerait-il pas de convaincre les militants têtes brûlées du Kosovo que le pacifisme et la patience des dirigeants élus du Kosovo doivent désormais être remplacés par des actions plus fortes ?
La fin de partie est claire. Il ne peut s'agir que d'une Serbie libérée du Kosovo, rejoignant la Croatie et la Slovénie dans une Union européenne et une OTAN qui puissent apporter prospérité et sécurité aux Balkans. L'Europe, et non la Russie, devrait décider de l'avenir de la région.
14 July 2007
Kosovo is back in the headlines
I love Peace
Kosovo must be independen by Former Foreign Ministers
Kosovo is back in the headlines. President George W. Bush says that it should become independent soon. President Vladimir Putin of Russia opposes independence and prefers time for more talks. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has suggested that we move forward, with a six-month delay.
This has a familiar ring to it. Eight years ago, many of us - then foreign ministers - put in place an international process to decide who should govern Kosovo. We believe that the only viable option is for Kosovo to become independent under strict supervision. That is the proposal that is currently before the UN Security Council and is part of the process that the Council, including Russia, agreed upon and has implemented since 1999.
Kosovo is the last substantial territorial issue remaining from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. In 2005, as called for by decisions of the Security Council, the UN secretary general appointed a special envoy - former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland - to achieve a political settlement.
After 14 months of negotiations with the leaderships of Serbia and Kosovo, Ahtisaari announced that the irreconcilable positions of the two parties had made consensus unattainable and that no amount of additional talks would overcome the impasse. In lieu of a negotiated agreement by all sides, Ahtisaari proposed that Kosovo receive independence supervised by the international community (primarily the European Union and NATO) and provide strong guarantees for the Serbs who live in Kosovo.
Now is the time to act. Tensions are likely to rise, and they certainly will not cool. Moreover, without a resolution on Kosovo's final status, the future of Serbia and Kosovo will remain uncertain.
Some may say that Russia would prefer this limbo to a situation where Serbia and Kosovo join the European Union and NATO. Serbs and Kosovars should prefer otherwise. They deserve to be in the European Union. And Kosovo cannot develop as things stand. It has been unable to gain access to international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy, or attract the political capital it needs to address its widespread unemployment and poverty.
Russia has complained of not being included in talks. It should participate, but constructively and not just to block it. What may be needed is a formulation that allows Russia to acquiesce without having to break openly with Serbia. Russia can reassure Serbs and emphasize that Kosovo is a unique situation, without precedent for other regions.
The Ahtisaari plan has several advantages. It gives rights to Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs to manage their own affairs within a democratic Kosovo, which will be protected and monitored by the international community. It also requires protection for Orthodox and Serbian cultural and religious sites. Finally, it provides for an international presence that will oversee Kosovo's institutions and monitor the settlement's implementation. It also places Kosovo on the road toward EU integration.
The European Union has agreed to supervise Kosovo during the transition period and deploy a police mission alongside the current NATO peacekeeping force. An indefinite delay caused by continued confusion over Kosovo's status could jeopardize a smooth transition to European oversight.
Kosovo is a unique situation that has required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 in response to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, it laid the groundwork for a political process that would ultimately determine Kosovo's future.
We know that all decisions on Kosovo are difficult. Some of us kicked the issue down the road eight years ago. Today, the international community faces the hardest issue of all. But the decision is necessary, and it is the result of eight years of international collaboration.
Serbia must recognize, however, that greater stability in the Balkans promoted by the Ahtisaari plan will allow it to use its location, resources and talent to become a major regional player and a constructive force in European politics. The Serb people deserve a legitimate place in Europe and Serbia could also begin to move towards possible EU membership.
Our goal remains a Europe whole and free, with all the people of the western Balkans participating fully as EU members. The benefits of a concerted EU effort in Kosovo, backed by the UN and NATO, are enormous. As such, Russia and the other UN Security Council members should follow through on the promise that the Council made in 1999 and agree to complete the process of self-governance in Kosovo. This is the best option at this stage of a very difficult history of the whole region. Viable alternatives do not exist.
Madeleine Albright, United States
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada
Jan Eliasson, Sweden
Gareth Evans, Australia
Joschka Fischer, Germany
Bronislaw Geremek, Poland
Niels Helveg Petersen, Denmark
Lydie Polfer, Luxembourg
Jozias van Artsen, Netherlands
Hubert Vedrine, France
Kosovo must be independen by Former Foreign Ministers
Kosovo is back in the headlines. President George W. Bush says that it should become independent soon. President Vladimir Putin of Russia opposes independence and prefers time for more talks. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has suggested that we move forward, with a six-month delay.
This has a familiar ring to it. Eight years ago, many of us - then foreign ministers - put in place an international process to decide who should govern Kosovo. We believe that the only viable option is for Kosovo to become independent under strict supervision. That is the proposal that is currently before the UN Security Council and is part of the process that the Council, including Russia, agreed upon and has implemented since 1999.
Kosovo is the last substantial territorial issue remaining from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. In 2005, as called for by decisions of the Security Council, the UN secretary general appointed a special envoy - former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland - to achieve a political settlement.
After 14 months of negotiations with the leaderships of Serbia and Kosovo, Ahtisaari announced that the irreconcilable positions of the two parties had made consensus unattainable and that no amount of additional talks would overcome the impasse. In lieu of a negotiated agreement by all sides, Ahtisaari proposed that Kosovo receive independence supervised by the international community (primarily the European Union and NATO) and provide strong guarantees for the Serbs who live in Kosovo.
Now is the time to act. Tensions are likely to rise, and they certainly will not cool. Moreover, without a resolution on Kosovo's final status, the future of Serbia and Kosovo will remain uncertain.
Some may say that Russia would prefer this limbo to a situation where Serbia and Kosovo join the European Union and NATO. Serbs and Kosovars should prefer otherwise. They deserve to be in the European Union. And Kosovo cannot develop as things stand. It has been unable to gain access to international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy, or attract the political capital it needs to address its widespread unemployment and poverty.
Russia has complained of not being included in talks. It should participate, but constructively and not just to block it. What may be needed is a formulation that allows Russia to acquiesce without having to break openly with Serbia. Russia can reassure Serbs and emphasize that Kosovo is a unique situation, without precedent for other regions.
The Ahtisaari plan has several advantages. It gives rights to Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs to manage their own affairs within a democratic Kosovo, which will be protected and monitored by the international community. It also requires protection for Orthodox and Serbian cultural and religious sites. Finally, it provides for an international presence that will oversee Kosovo's institutions and monitor the settlement's implementation. It also places Kosovo on the road toward EU integration.
The European Union has agreed to supervise Kosovo during the transition period and deploy a police mission alongside the current NATO peacekeeping force. An indefinite delay caused by continued confusion over Kosovo's status could jeopardize a smooth transition to European oversight.
Kosovo is a unique situation that has required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 in response to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, it laid the groundwork for a political process that would ultimately determine Kosovo's future.
We know that all decisions on Kosovo are difficult. Some of us kicked the issue down the road eight years ago. Today, the international community faces the hardest issue of all. But the decision is necessary, and it is the result of eight years of international collaboration.
Serbia must recognize, however, that greater stability in the Balkans promoted by the Ahtisaari plan will allow it to use its location, resources and talent to become a major regional player and a constructive force in European politics. The Serb people deserve a legitimate place in Europe and Serbia could also begin to move towards possible EU membership.
Our goal remains a Europe whole and free, with all the people of the western Balkans participating fully as EU members. The benefits of a concerted EU effort in Kosovo, backed by the UN and NATO, are enormous. As such, Russia and the other UN Security Council members should follow through on the promise that the Council made in 1999 and agree to complete the process of self-governance in Kosovo. This is the best option at this stage of a very difficult history of the whole region. Viable alternatives do not exist.
Madeleine Albright, United States
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada
Jan Eliasson, Sweden
Gareth Evans, Australia
Joschka Fischer, Germany
Bronislaw Geremek, Poland
Niels Helveg Petersen, Denmark
Lydie Polfer, Luxembourg
Jozias van Artsen, Netherlands
Hubert Vedrine, France
16 June 2007
How to improve interethnic dialogue in Balkans?
I love Peace
“The reality today is that we are all interdependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue”. - Dalai Lama
Looking back on Balkan’s history; war seems to be part of its life. The aim of Balkan’s states and nations was the destruction of enemies (neighbors), and when achieved it was called a victory. There was a relevance to violence and war. This created a hateful collective memory of people of Balkans which unfortunately is still present. This memory is created by fake historians which couldn’t get out of their nationalism and tell the truth to a future generations that all these wars and terrible things happened because there was no cooperation, no dialogue and that happened because the envy of each other and the aim to be the stronger, which prevailed over the peace and normal life. And the other reason is that on Balkan’s was not born any Nelson Mandela or Abraham Lincoln, but the only hero’s are the ones that died fighting on wars. And the history got repeated over and over again.
Unfortunately, Balkan’s region didn’t get to keep up with other European countries which used to cooperate and compete to succeed each other in other forms of control (by developing economically, technologically, intellectually) even if they were rivals on all kind of aspects and the example of cooperation between French and German after World War II and the result of this cooperation gives a perfect example to Balkan’s states on what they need to focus on.
But did the Balkan countries today achieved that intellectual development to get out of hateful collective memory and are the people of Balkan’s ready to move toward dialogue and integration?
I think today when we face a problem or disagreements; we achieved to understand that the only way to come up with any solution is through dialogue. But the dialog doesn’t mean making the bunch of words and meetings without getting a solution. When the dialog starts both sides must be aware that there should be a willing to change. Balkan’s states and people must know that effective dialogue is the only appropriate method. We must understand that one sided victory is no longer objective and we don’t need to destroy our neighbors; we don’t need to ignore their interests; mark: we need to cooperate.
How we may achieve this? Not by erasing or rewriting history because that’s impossible, not by forgetting the past because I cannot forget the loved once killed, and not by revenge. Revenge is something that will lead to same history and events; all what is necessary to achieve better dialog and cooperation between Balkan’s nations and states, is an official apology from a people that used to support the criminals and regret for what they did which will result on bringing criminals in front of justice. From the other side a respect to those people and honest cooperation to move and create mutual objectives for peace an better life. When this faze is achieved then the other way is more easy.
For improving the dialogue between Balkan’s another important way is the economical development and cooperation. The economical cooperation will get this people near each other especially will bring the trust and a modern competition which is an precaution for this region to move toward integration. The CEFTA agreement is an good start and is a light for a hope that this region started to improve on economical cooperation. The free trade and free movement will integrate people.
In the other hand the cultural and intellectual meetings is another way to get near each other. Summer universities, regional competitions in every kind of cultural or intellectual accepts will help these countries and nations to share and compete with the best they have, and at the same time will help them to expound their intellectual horizon of knowledge and seek for same objectives.
Doing so, these countries will have more easy to get integrated on Europe and on the world of globalization; the world where borders are only in paper where the sovereignty and land concepts takes another meaning and becomes out dated.
Therefore the conclusion will lead us to concept that violence and hegemony is unsuitable and the nonviolence and dialog are the appropriate methods of dealing with difficulties and differences and I believe that people of Balkan’s will understand it and it will become an ideology (instead of their nationalism); the ideology of moving the civilization toward peace and normal life.
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This is final essay submitted to virtual school of dialogue, graduating at VI generation....
“The reality today is that we are all interdependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue”. - Dalai Lama
Looking back on Balkan’s history; war seems to be part of its life. The aim of Balkan’s states and nations was the destruction of enemies (neighbors), and when achieved it was called a victory. There was a relevance to violence and war. This created a hateful collective memory of people of Balkans which unfortunately is still present. This memory is created by fake historians which couldn’t get out of their nationalism and tell the truth to a future generations that all these wars and terrible things happened because there was no cooperation, no dialogue and that happened because the envy of each other and the aim to be the stronger, which prevailed over the peace and normal life. And the other reason is that on Balkan’s was not born any Nelson Mandela or Abraham Lincoln, but the only hero’s are the ones that died fighting on wars. And the history got repeated over and over again.
Unfortunately, Balkan’s region didn’t get to keep up with other European countries which used to cooperate and compete to succeed each other in other forms of control (by developing economically, technologically, intellectually) even if they were rivals on all kind of aspects and the example of cooperation between French and German after World War II and the result of this cooperation gives a perfect example to Balkan’s states on what they need to focus on.
But did the Balkan countries today achieved that intellectual development to get out of hateful collective memory and are the people of Balkan’s ready to move toward dialogue and integration?
I think today when we face a problem or disagreements; we achieved to understand that the only way to come up with any solution is through dialogue. But the dialog doesn’t mean making the bunch of words and meetings without getting a solution. When the dialog starts both sides must be aware that there should be a willing to change. Balkan’s states and people must know that effective dialogue is the only appropriate method. We must understand that one sided victory is no longer objective and we don’t need to destroy our neighbors; we don’t need to ignore their interests; mark: we need to cooperate.
How we may achieve this? Not by erasing or rewriting history because that’s impossible, not by forgetting the past because I cannot forget the loved once killed, and not by revenge. Revenge is something that will lead to same history and events; all what is necessary to achieve better dialog and cooperation between Balkan’s nations and states, is an official apology from a people that used to support the criminals and regret for what they did which will result on bringing criminals in front of justice. From the other side a respect to those people and honest cooperation to move and create mutual objectives for peace an better life. When this faze is achieved then the other way is more easy.
For improving the dialogue between Balkan’s another important way is the economical development and cooperation. The economical cooperation will get this people near each other especially will bring the trust and a modern competition which is an precaution for this region to move toward integration. The CEFTA agreement is an good start and is a light for a hope that this region started to improve on economical cooperation. The free trade and free movement will integrate people.
In the other hand the cultural and intellectual meetings is another way to get near each other. Summer universities, regional competitions in every kind of cultural or intellectual accepts will help these countries and nations to share and compete with the best they have, and at the same time will help them to expound their intellectual horizon of knowledge and seek for same objectives.
Doing so, these countries will have more easy to get integrated on Europe and on the world of globalization; the world where borders are only in paper where the sovereignty and land concepts takes another meaning and becomes out dated.
Therefore the conclusion will lead us to concept that violence and hegemony is unsuitable and the nonviolence and dialog are the appropriate methods of dealing with difficulties and differences and I believe that people of Balkan’s will understand it and it will become an ideology (instead of their nationalism); the ideology of moving the civilization toward peace and normal life.
--------
This is final essay submitted to virtual school of dialogue, graduating at VI generation....
04 May 2007
Kosova these days
I love Peace
Political events on Kosova are getting very interesting and difficult because now the ball is outside the Kosova field and internationals are playing for us. What I’m trying to say is that now the Kosova status matter becomes an international problem which needs to be resolved on an international level on this case on Security Council by approving the new resolution for Kosova.
The Ahtisar’s plan supposed to be the base of this resolution but Russia does not agree with it. These days we have and commission from UN with ambassadors of lot of places in leaded by Belgium ambassador and they visited the Kosova and Serbia to get facts about the present situations. The specific of this commission was that they used to visit many places to see how people live not like other delegations that visit only institutions but not other places.
Seams that this visit was useful for many ambassadors but not for Russian ambassador Mr. Churkin. Russians are still trying to enforce the dialog between Serbia and Kosovo for finding any solution accepted by two groups.
I’m sure that if we ask Russians if they know if that solution exists they wouldn’t know it. Anyway, the America and Europe seams to agree that Ahtisari’s plan is the only plan that will bring the long term stability for Kosovo and as well the better life for Serbian minority.
This month America will lead the Security Council and will try to enforce the resolution for Kosova but in case the Russian will take veto on these resolution then Kosova institutions needs to declare self independence. This will lead to tensions between Serbian minority and Albanian majority and what will happened next can lead to Croatia scenery, to any separation of Kosova territory which will lead to any other war or to any other conception of Albanians requests…
Hope new resolution of Security Council will pass because this will give Kosova independence, will give Serbian minority the biggest rights that and minority got on any place and will give the green light to EU to invest on Kosovo.
At this time, Kosova doesn’t need new turmoil but needs peace and safe road to an develop economy and legal state.
Political events on Kosova are getting very interesting and difficult because now the ball is outside the Kosova field and internationals are playing for us. What I’m trying to say is that now the Kosova status matter becomes an international problem which needs to be resolved on an international level on this case on Security Council by approving the new resolution for Kosova.
The Ahtisar’s plan supposed to be the base of this resolution but Russia does not agree with it. These days we have and commission from UN with ambassadors of lot of places in leaded by Belgium ambassador and they visited the Kosova and Serbia to get facts about the present situations. The specific of this commission was that they used to visit many places to see how people live not like other delegations that visit only institutions but not other places.
Seams that this visit was useful for many ambassadors but not for Russian ambassador Mr. Churkin. Russians are still trying to enforce the dialog between Serbia and Kosovo for finding any solution accepted by two groups.
I’m sure that if we ask Russians if they know if that solution exists they wouldn’t know it. Anyway, the America and Europe seams to agree that Ahtisari’s plan is the only plan that will bring the long term stability for Kosovo and as well the better life for Serbian minority.
This month America will lead the Security Council and will try to enforce the resolution for Kosova but in case the Russian will take veto on these resolution then Kosova institutions needs to declare self independence. This will lead to tensions between Serbian minority and Albanian majority and what will happened next can lead to Croatia scenery, to any separation of Kosova territory which will lead to any other war or to any other conception of Albanians requests…
Hope new resolution of Security Council will pass because this will give Kosova independence, will give Serbian minority the biggest rights that and minority got on any place and will give the green light to EU to invest on Kosovo.
At this time, Kosova doesn’t need new turmoil but needs peace and safe road to an develop economy and legal state.
29 April 2007
U.S. says Kosovo to be independent with or without U.N.
I love Peace
By Paul Taylor
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Kosovo will be independent with or without a United Nations resolution, and Russia should back an agreement to protect the Kosovo Serb minority, the United States said on Saturday.
Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried said it was possible the latest Russian criticism of U.N. mediator Marti Ahtisaari's plan for the final status of the breakaway Serbian province meant Moscow intended to block a resolution.
"We hope that Russia understands that Kosovo is going to be independent one way or another," Fried told Reuters in an interview at a Brussels Forum on transatlantic relations.
"It will either be done in a controlled, supervised way that provides for the well-being of the Serbian people, or it will take place in an uncontrolled way and the Kosovo Serbs will suffer the most, which would be terrible."
Moscow has repeatedly said it will not accept a solution which is unacceptable to Serbia, which is adamantly opposed to any form of independence for Kosovo.
A U.N. Security Council fact-finding mission, which visited Kosovo at Russia's suggestion, wrapped up its visit on Saturday saying they would deliberate on the proposal for its independence without setting deadlines.
"Deciding on important issues should never be hostage to predetermined deadlines," Belgian ambassador and mission head Johan Verbeke told a news conference in Pristina.
Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, proposes supervised independence with a strong role for an international presence to protect minority rights.
Fried acknowledged the European Union could be split over whether or not to recognise Kosovo if there was no U.N. resolution and Kosovo's overwhelming Albanian majority declared independence unilaterally.
"I see absolutely no advantage to doing this any other way than through a Security Council resolution. I see merely disadvantages," Fried said. "The alternatives are all worse.
"A divided Europe is a bad thing in general and a terrible thing in this particular case."
A resolution would provide legal authority to protect the Kosovo Serbs and help the Europeans to unite, he said.
Kosovo has been an international protectorate since NATO waged an air war in 1999 to drive out Serbian forces and end ethnic cleansing. Some 90 percent of the province's 2 million population are Albanians.
"Kosovo is in the list of problems that do not improve with age and neglect. The situation there is not inherently stable," said Fried.
Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke told the Brussels Forum the next few weeks would be a fundamental test of Russian President Vladimir Putin's view of his role in the world.
"If he vetoes the Ahtisaari plan in the Security Council, there will be a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The United States will recognise them, I hope the same day ... Some of the EU will, some won't," Holbrooke said.
"There will probably be violence on the ground and it will be Russia's fault."
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt told the Forum he expected a period of "diplomatic trench warfare" over Kosovo at the United Nations and suggested the EU should take the lead in seeking a compromise solution, which would take time.
Asked about Holbrooke's scenario of unilateral independence, he said: "That is playing with fire."
(Additional reporting by Mark John)
By Paul Taylor
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Kosovo will be independent with or without a United Nations resolution, and Russia should back an agreement to protect the Kosovo Serb minority, the United States said on Saturday.
Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried said it was possible the latest Russian criticism of U.N. mediator Marti Ahtisaari's plan for the final status of the breakaway Serbian province meant Moscow intended to block a resolution.
"We hope that Russia understands that Kosovo is going to be independent one way or another," Fried told Reuters in an interview at a Brussels Forum on transatlantic relations.
"It will either be done in a controlled, supervised way that provides for the well-being of the Serbian people, or it will take place in an uncontrolled way and the Kosovo Serbs will suffer the most, which would be terrible."
Moscow has repeatedly said it will not accept a solution which is unacceptable to Serbia, which is adamantly opposed to any form of independence for Kosovo.
A U.N. Security Council fact-finding mission, which visited Kosovo at Russia's suggestion, wrapped up its visit on Saturday saying they would deliberate on the proposal for its independence without setting deadlines.
"Deciding on important issues should never be hostage to predetermined deadlines," Belgian ambassador and mission head Johan Verbeke told a news conference in Pristina.
Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, proposes supervised independence with a strong role for an international presence to protect minority rights.
Fried acknowledged the European Union could be split over whether or not to recognise Kosovo if there was no U.N. resolution and Kosovo's overwhelming Albanian majority declared independence unilaterally.
"I see absolutely no advantage to doing this any other way than through a Security Council resolution. I see merely disadvantages," Fried said. "The alternatives are all worse.
"A divided Europe is a bad thing in general and a terrible thing in this particular case."
A resolution would provide legal authority to protect the Kosovo Serbs and help the Europeans to unite, he said.
Kosovo has been an international protectorate since NATO waged an air war in 1999 to drive out Serbian forces and end ethnic cleansing. Some 90 percent of the province's 2 million population are Albanians.
"Kosovo is in the list of problems that do not improve with age and neglect. The situation there is not inherently stable," said Fried.
Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke told the Brussels Forum the next few weeks would be a fundamental test of Russian President Vladimir Putin's view of his role in the world.
"If he vetoes the Ahtisaari plan in the Security Council, there will be a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The United States will recognise them, I hope the same day ... Some of the EU will, some won't," Holbrooke said.
"There will probably be violence on the ground and it will be Russia's fault."
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt told the Forum he expected a period of "diplomatic trench warfare" over Kosovo at the United Nations and suggested the EU should take the lead in seeking a compromise solution, which would take time.
Asked about Holbrooke's scenario of unilateral independence, he said: "That is playing with fire."
(Additional reporting by Mark John)
20 April 2007
Improving International Peacebuilding Efforts: The Example of Human Rights Culture in Kosovo.
I love Peace
here is nice article about improving the international peacebuilding efforts-Kosovo. I'm very sorry that i couldn't find the whole essay but it's worthy to read even a part of it...
Julie Mertus
Kosovo today is a house of cards. One false move and the house will fall down. Should the international troops--in particular the U.S. and British troops--pull out of Kosovo, it will collapse into communal violence. (1) The international security presence in Kosovo has generally succeeded in preventing the outbreak of another violent armed conflict but has accomplished little else beyond that. This is not surprising. Militaries can help prevent war, but they alone cannot build a sustainable peace. (2) The cessation of hostilities through the use of military force does not, in and of itself, resolve the strategic dilemmas, structural imbalances, and open wounds of unaddressed abuses and interpersonal hostilities. As David Lake and Donald Rothschild stress in their exhaustive study of ethnic conflict, a "stable peace can arise only as effective institutions of government are reestablished, the state begins again to mediate between distrustful ethnic groups, and the parties slowly gain confidence in the safeguards contained in the new ethnic contracts." (3) Peacebuilding requires the efforts of a host of civilian actors focused on institution building, interpersonal reconciliation, and social transformation over the long term. More than 250 well-intentioned nongovernmental and governmental organizations have flooded into Kosovo offering a range of resources and promises. (4) Elections have been held, (5) homes have been rebuilt, schools have reopened, and roads have been repaved. Police and judges have been trained, and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is well under way in its investigations into war crimes committed in Kosovo. Nonetheless, not one of the larger international goals that brought the international community to Kosovo in the first place has been reached. Kosovo is decidedly not a multiethnic and secure society, and equal access to basic human rights protections remains illusory. (6) Local police and administrative and judicial systems are still unable to operate independent of international oversight and, instead of joining government, many of the "best and brightest" in Kosovo have withdrawn from participation altogether. That the citizenry of Kosovo--Serb and Albanian alike--perceive no legitimate governance structure and process only magnifies pervasive feelings of insecurity and unfairness. As the international community looks toward new nation-building challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the struggle for "lessons learned" from Kosovo is acute. The experience of Kosovo suggests that there must be more and better attempts to incorporate local actors and experiences and to draw on them in building human rights cultures. I divide my argument into four parts: (1) an explanation of the use of the term human rights culture and the introduction of a framework for understanding and analyzing the local impact of human rights norms in post-conflict societies; (2) a discussion of the nature of the human rights culture in Kosovar society prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing in 1999; (3) an exploration of the impact of postagreement civil intervention on human rights culture; and (4) suggestions for improvement, with specific attention to human rights education. Toward a Framework for Analyzing "Human Rights Culture" The notion of human rights refers to two fundamental precepts. The first of these precepts is the "dignity principle," or the notion that each human being should be treated with dignity solely because he or she is human and not because he or she belongs to a certain group or has achieved a certain stature. (7) Full acceptance of the "dignity principle" compels the embrace of the "equality principle." This is the idea that all people have dignity. One cannot claim to believe in the idea of human rights and also believe that these rights apply to only some individuals, or that only some states have a responsibility to respect human rights. (8) The disempowered turn to human rights discourse because it so "successfully manages to articulate (evolving) political claims." (9) In Jack Donnelly's words, "Human rights is the language of the victims and the dispossessed." (10) As the disempowered shape human rights ideology and use it for their own goals, they exercise their moral agency. Over time, the individuals and groups that adopt human rights language and thinking become a human rights people. The human rights framework becomes a taken-for-granted lens through which they can view and understand the world and their role in it. (11) Human rights cultures exist when human rights are one of "the forms through which people make sense of their lives." (12) In other words, a human rights culture is a way of seeing the world through the lens of human rights and consequent with the principles of human dignity and equality. It is through human rights culture that human rights norms take root in and influence a population. (13) However, the adoption of human rights culture is not one of simply embracing purely universal interpretations of human rights, but rather consists of the reconceptualization of culture itself through a struggle to interpret human rights norms in a cultural context. (14) Adopting human rights language is an essential step in building a human rights culture, (15) but language alone is insufficient. Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a population develops its own shared (yet contested) understanding of the prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the "frame in which people derive a sense of who they are and where they are going." (16) Central to this process is a population's own experiences of rights deprivation and rights affirmation, which often occur through storytelling. (17) Human rights storytelling serves several functions. Storytelling provides both a "sentimental education" (18) that generates the kind of sympathy necessary for the acceptance of human rights norms and for the validation of the experience of abuse and thus "represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship." (19) Human rights activists in Belgrade, for example, exposed stories about abuses against Albanians in order to garner the Serbs' sympathy for Albanians and to garner the support of the international community against Slobodan Milosevic. (20) Kosovar Albanians and anti-Milosevic Serbs strongly believe that if not for the human rights storytelling, the NATO intervention never would have occurred. (21) Human rights storytelling also facilitates a common understanding of experience (22) and in so doing promotes group cohesion. In Kosovo, the informal telling of stories in Kosovar family living rooms and the more formalized collection of stories by human rights groups served to strengthen Albanian solidarity as a united, oppressed people. (23) Similarly, Serbian stories about Albanians solidified their identity as victims at the hands of Albanians. (24) In this way, within one society, human rights storytelling was both unifying and fragmenting. A useful framework for analyzing the impact of human rights institution building on violently divided postagreement societies is suggested by the work of Christine Bell, who examines the role of human rights in peace agreements, (25) and of John Paul Lederach, who emphasizes the importance of transforming social relationships and structures that institutionalize violence. From these works, we can identify three roles for human rights culture building: an instrumental role, a constitutive role, and a transformative role. Human rights norms, once institutionalized and internalized, play an instrumental role in that they are crucial for advancing some other good. The spread of a human rights culture can lead to increased participation of citizens...
here is nice article about improving the international peacebuilding efforts-Kosovo. I'm very sorry that i couldn't find the whole essay but it's worthy to read even a part of it...
Julie Mertus
Kosovo today is a house of cards. One false move and the house will fall down. Should the international troops--in particular the U.S. and British troops--pull out of Kosovo, it will collapse into communal violence. (1) The international security presence in Kosovo has generally succeeded in preventing the outbreak of another violent armed conflict but has accomplished little else beyond that. This is not surprising. Militaries can help prevent war, but they alone cannot build a sustainable peace. (2) The cessation of hostilities through the use of military force does not, in and of itself, resolve the strategic dilemmas, structural imbalances, and open wounds of unaddressed abuses and interpersonal hostilities. As David Lake and Donald Rothschild stress in their exhaustive study of ethnic conflict, a "stable peace can arise only as effective institutions of government are reestablished, the state begins again to mediate between distrustful ethnic groups, and the parties slowly gain confidence in the safeguards contained in the new ethnic contracts." (3) Peacebuilding requires the efforts of a host of civilian actors focused on institution building, interpersonal reconciliation, and social transformation over the long term. More than 250 well-intentioned nongovernmental and governmental organizations have flooded into Kosovo offering a range of resources and promises. (4) Elections have been held, (5) homes have been rebuilt, schools have reopened, and roads have been repaved. Police and judges have been trained, and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is well under way in its investigations into war crimes committed in Kosovo. Nonetheless, not one of the larger international goals that brought the international community to Kosovo in the first place has been reached. Kosovo is decidedly not a multiethnic and secure society, and equal access to basic human rights protections remains illusory. (6) Local police and administrative and judicial systems are still unable to operate independent of international oversight and, instead of joining government, many of the "best and brightest" in Kosovo have withdrawn from participation altogether. That the citizenry of Kosovo--Serb and Albanian alike--perceive no legitimate governance structure and process only magnifies pervasive feelings of insecurity and unfairness. As the international community looks toward new nation-building challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the struggle for "lessons learned" from Kosovo is acute. The experience of Kosovo suggests that there must be more and better attempts to incorporate local actors and experiences and to draw on them in building human rights cultures. I divide my argument into four parts: (1) an explanation of the use of the term human rights culture and the introduction of a framework for understanding and analyzing the local impact of human rights norms in post-conflict societies; (2) a discussion of the nature of the human rights culture in Kosovar society prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing in 1999; (3) an exploration of the impact of postagreement civil intervention on human rights culture; and (4) suggestions for improvement, with specific attention to human rights education. Toward a Framework for Analyzing "Human Rights Culture" The notion of human rights refers to two fundamental precepts. The first of these precepts is the "dignity principle," or the notion that each human being should be treated with dignity solely because he or she is human and not because he or she belongs to a certain group or has achieved a certain stature. (7) Full acceptance of the "dignity principle" compels the embrace of the "equality principle." This is the idea that all people have dignity. One cannot claim to believe in the idea of human rights and also believe that these rights apply to only some individuals, or that only some states have a responsibility to respect human rights. (8) The disempowered turn to human rights discourse because it so "successfully manages to articulate (evolving) political claims." (9) In Jack Donnelly's words, "Human rights is the language of the victims and the dispossessed." (10) As the disempowered shape human rights ideology and use it for their own goals, they exercise their moral agency. Over time, the individuals and groups that adopt human rights language and thinking become a human rights people. The human rights framework becomes a taken-for-granted lens through which they can view and understand the world and their role in it. (11) Human rights cultures exist when human rights are one of "the forms through which people make sense of their lives." (12) In other words, a human rights culture is a way of seeing the world through the lens of human rights and consequent with the principles of human dignity and equality. It is through human rights culture that human rights norms take root in and influence a population. (13) However, the adoption of human rights culture is not one of simply embracing purely universal interpretations of human rights, but rather consists of the reconceptualization of culture itself through a struggle to interpret human rights norms in a cultural context. (14) Adopting human rights language is an essential step in building a human rights culture, (15) but language alone is insufficient. Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a population develops its own shared (yet contested) understanding of the prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the "frame in which people derive a sense of who they are and where they are going." (16) Central to this process is a population's own experiences of rights deprivation and rights affirmation, which often occur through storytelling. (17) Human rights storytelling serves several functions. Storytelling provides both a "sentimental education" (18) that generates the kind of sympathy necessary for the acceptance of human rights norms and for the validation of the experience of abuse and thus "represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship." (19) Human rights activists in Belgrade, for example, exposed stories about abuses against Albanians in order to garner the Serbs' sympathy for Albanians and to garner the support of the international community against Slobodan Milosevic. (20) Kosovar Albanians and anti-Milosevic Serbs strongly believe that if not for the human rights storytelling, the NATO intervention never would have occurred. (21) Human rights storytelling also facilitates a common understanding of experience (22) and in so doing promotes group cohesion. In Kosovo, the informal telling of stories in Kosovar family living rooms and the more formalized collection of stories by human rights groups served to strengthen Albanian solidarity as a united, oppressed people. (23) Similarly, Serbian stories about Albanians solidified their identity as victims at the hands of Albanians. (24) In this way, within one society, human rights storytelling was both unifying and fragmenting. A useful framework for analyzing the impact of human rights institution building on violently divided postagreement societies is suggested by the work of Christine Bell, who examines the role of human rights in peace agreements, (25) and of John Paul Lederach, who emphasizes the importance of transforming social relationships and structures that institutionalize violence. From these works, we can identify three roles for human rights culture building: an instrumental role, a constitutive role, and a transformative role. Human rights norms, once institutionalized and internalized, play an instrumental role in that they are crucial for advancing some other good. The spread of a human rights culture can lead to increased participation of citizens...
Open Letter to Trent FRANKS (R.Az)
I love Peace
February 5, 2006
The Honorable Trent FRANKS (R.Az)U.S. House of Reprentatives1237 Longworth House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515Fax: (202) 225.6328 Dear Congressman Franks: I have read with great dismay your “Interview” recently given to the American Legion Magazine, regarding “The Serbian Situation….”. I quote:
“…The Serbian situation is an example of the struggle between an ideology that affirms the sanctity of life and the tolerance of all religions, and an ideology that uses violence to force a majority on unwilling individuals. This is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring Jews…Much like Hezbollah, those who lay claim to Kosovo and neighboring lands have made clear their intent to create a religiously and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian state…”
As a student of Balkan affairs, I find your statements to be completely inaccurate, incendiary, and contrary to the interests of the local population, to the U.S.Government policies in the area, and to peace and political stability in the Balkans.
The religious connotation you give, and fully endorse, to the political issues regarding the sad state of affairs where Serbia finds itself today, cannot hide the terrible crimes perpetrated by the successive Serb governments, especially since 1912, and which culminated with the genocidal aggression of the war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Serbia. Since you have approached the “problem of Kosovo” from this vantage point, I would like to make the following clarifications:
The contents of your statements, as well as the tone, echo the declarations of His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova, clearly indicating His Grace’s “aloofness” for the fate of the e n t i r e unfortunate Kosova population –Moslem, Eastern Orthodox and Catholic. Sounding the alarm against “the militant Jihad and terrorism in the heart of Europe” the honorable Bishop neglects to explain why from 1389 to 1912, ALL major churches and objects of worship of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova were protected by the local Albanians, who by the end of the 17th century began their conversion to Islam.
The fear of having”…1.300 Serbian religious objects lost” is unfounded since the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, these “jewels of medieval architecture” have been protected and preserved by the local Moslem and Catholic population, often at the risk of their lives. As late as 1960 ,the late Patriarch of ther Serb Orthodox Church, Gherman, decorated the Albanian family Nikci, of Peje, for having protected the Patriarchate of Peje for generations. There was no complaint then against the Albanians, until ‘Serb politics’ fabricated the threat of annihilation of the Serb Orthodox Church. Spme of those responsible for these politics of division are now facing the
International Courtfor War Crimes in Yugoslavia, at the Hague (Netherland).
It is these “Serb politics’ that have mobilized the dark forces of the Serb Orthodox Church –including His Grace Bishop Artemije whom you met in Washington,D.C.—to declare that Kosova is”occupied” by Albanians (92 percent of the population) and that “…every state has the right to fight an occupier to liberate an occupied part of its terrirory…This is the only response worthy of the State, and the Serbian people”.
Who is the enenmy? It’s Islamic extremism among the Kosova Albanians, a theme incessantly repeated to intimidate the international community…and assiduously exploited to deceive American Christian believers.
The entire scenario turns uglier when one thinks of this “man of God”, Bishop Artemije, never raising the voice to protest the massacres of the marauding Serb “paramilitary gangs’ (Arkan,Franks etc.) as well as of the regular Serbian Army in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally in Kosova. His silence will forever remain a black stain in the history of his Church. There were few low-level Serb clergy who oppoesd the war and its destruction. “Our” Bishop was not one of them!
Historically, “…Serb nationalist doctrine emphasized the role of the Orthodox Church,- wrote Noel Malcolm, of the Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy- as an essential constituent of Serbian identity. Albanian nationalist doctrine, on the other hand, emphasized the Albanian language, accepting the religious diversity of the Albanians…Religion thus mattered, to a certain extent, in reality, because it mattered in Serbian national ideology”.
Andrew Herscher, of the University of Michigan, explains how”…recent studies of violence in anthropolgy, sociology, and political science have come to recognize the ‘ethnicity’ of violence is an abstracion, an interpretation and a staging; violence comes to be understood as ‘ethnic’ in narrations undertaken both by perpetrators and victims”. He states that”…representatives of both Albanian and Serb communities have inflicted violence against the other’s religious sites and have documented and memorialized violence against their own religious sites, in each case, in order to shape particular notions of ethnic identity- which means to be Albanian, or Serb, in Kosova”.
Writing about recent events, Professor Herscher had this to say:
“…During the counter-insurgency campaign waged by Serb forces against the Kosova Liberation Army in l998-l999, however, along with mass explusion of Albanians from Kosova, religious sites associated with Islam were targeted for destruction. Approxi-mately 200 of the more than 600 mosques in Kosova were damaged or destroyed during the 1998-1999, along with Sufi lodges and Islamic schools, archives and libraries … buildings were ruined by deliberately inflicting violence, including vandalism, arson, shelling or toppling of minarets, and the dynamiting of the building from within…” He concluded:
” Yet, the targeting of religious sites does not represent a history of “ethnic violence’ in Kosova, as mush as an ongoing attempt to inextricably enmesh ethnicity, religion, violence and history for contemporary political ends”.
It is these “political ends” that the Serbian lobby in Washington,D.C., is now serving by using the moral and political authority of the distinguished US. Congressmen.
The American scholar, Professor Serge R. Doucette,Jr. in an Essay: “Fourth of July and ’The Face of Terror’” wrote:
“…Serbia has in its recent history initiated five wars against its neighbors; all were justified by their goal of “Greater Serbia”, and all had the sanction and support of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church has consistently manipulated and distorted Christian faith in service of Serbian greed for territorial gain and power. There is no such thing as a minor or justified atrocity, or act of terrorism: but, as wrong as Palestinian suicide bombings are against the Israelis, and as immoral and cowardly as the acts of 9/11 were, they pale in comparison to the atrocities committed by the Serbs against ethnic Albanians.
… Serbian repetition of crimes against humaniy can be seen as a result of a Serbian “mentality” developed and fostered by a Mystical relationship with the Orthodox Churxh which is inseparable with the existentce of the Nation.
Since its inception in the later part of the 13th century, there has Never been a time in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church that it has defended the Humanitarian Rights of anyone, but the Serbs themselves!
.. When you study Serbian history, you will come to undertsand that for Serbs, religion is not governing their daily ways of life, and they rarely attend church on a regular basis. Unlike Albanians, and others…they believe that if their “Church” is destroyed, they wil cease to exist. And, it is this belief that is effectively manipulated by Serbian religious and political leaders. The Serbian Orthodox Church becomes the motivation to sustain aggression, violence and atrocities against the others.”
*
The painful history of Serb repression in Kosova, where the victims were the Albanians, is fully documented. I will submit only two documents dated in 1919 and in 1999:
1) Paris Peace Conference,1919,vol.XII,PPC, 184.018/ 3
The Secretary of State to Mr. A.J.Balfour (British Foreign Minister),Paris,April 18,1919
“…British Embassy at Washington has informed the Department of State as following regarding the alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro:” Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova, Podjour, and Roshji have been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region…” Very truly yours, Robert Lansing, (Secretary of State)
2) Explaining the reason for NATO intervention , President W.J.Clinton had this to say:
“…We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosova from a mounting military offensive…Milosevic stripped Kosova of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed. Now, they started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their bodies. We have seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets. Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and their sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. Its is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people, whose leaders have already agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative…” (March 1999, Federal Document Clearing House)
(Research indicates that 174 Albanian families in Kosova were locked in their houses and burned alive by Serbian troops, men women and children!)
It is, therefore, utterly insane to think that “Moslem” Albanian demands for an indepen-dent Kosova would receive the favorable reception we witness today, if their aims were to build an “Islamic”,”terrorist” state, “to affirm…an ideology that uses violence …(with) the intent to create a religious and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian State…” The inter-national community that support Albanians in Kosova is predominantly Christian-not Moslem- from the U.S. of America to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy , the European Union, the overwhelming academic world, intelectuals, analysts, diplomats, “think tanks”, and human rights organizations. The civilized world preseves intact the horrible images of the Serb aggression in Kosova during the 1998-1999 years- the long columns of refugees expelled…on foot, horse wagons, and especially the long trains reminiscent of the Nazi transportations convoys to the extermination camps during WW II. “This is another Holocaust in Europe, and we are not going to allow it” declared in 1999, Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister.
*
Congressman Franks, in your interview, you made this unfortunate remark:…This Serbian situation is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring the Jews….”
The story of the Jews in Albanian lands is beginning to unfold: it’s a splendid example of religious tolerance, humanity and civil courage. Not one single, solitary, Jew was handed back to the Nazis. It’s a unique case in Europe. This is a fact now being corroborated by researches at the US.Holocaust Musem, in Washington,D.C., only a few steps from your Capitol office. Your distingusihed colleague at the House, the Honorable Tom Lantos, the only Holocaust survivor of the U.S.House of Representatives can attest and confirm it for you. I will limit myself to the following excerpts from a statement by Mrs. Johanna <><>Neumann, of the US Holocaut Musem, made at the end of December 2006, during a Moslem-Jew joint appearance:
“…My parents and I spent the war years in Albania with Muslim families, various families, but in particular one family who actually saved our lives. My parents were imprisoned for about four days, and our wonderful friend, a gentleman by the name of Pilku – whose familiy is inscribed here at the Museum, as well as in Yad Vashem, as among The Righeous Among the Nations- was able to have them released after four days, saved my father by hiding him once the Germans occupied Albania, and my mother and I were introduced as family members of the household. And we were not touched.
The population in Albania was 85 percent Muslim, and 15 pervent of other religious orientations. Everybody knew who we were, and nobody would ever, or even had the thought of denouncing us. Not at all. As a matter of fact, when Germany occupied Yugoslavia, the Albanian people opened their borders, and allowed them (the Jews) to come in. And, when Germans demanded that these people be returned, for some reasons they knew exactly who it was who had crossed the border, they simply said:” We looked for Jews, we didn’t find any. We know only Albanians, We do not know any Jews”. And they had hidden them in the villages, in families, in hospitals that they declared were quarantined because of typhoid fever. Nobody was handed back over to Germans. And those people deserved every respect that anybody can give them. And these were our friends. The story is a long one but this is the essence of it. They saved us and these were good human beings, and as I said before, the majority of them were Muslims, and we have nothing but the highest respect for these people….”
Congressman Franks, I leave the final judgement to you, as I do hope that deep in your conscience you will take into serious consideration the information I suppied today.
Sincerely yours,
Sami Repishti, Ph.D.
City University of New York (retired)
Former political prisoners in Communist Albania (1946-56)
and Communist Yugoslavia (1960-61)
Human rights activist
February 5, 2006
The Honorable Trent FRANKS (R.Az)U.S. House of Reprentatives1237 Longworth House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515Fax: (202) 225.6328 Dear Congressman Franks: I have read with great dismay your “Interview” recently given to the American Legion Magazine, regarding “The Serbian Situation….”. I quote:
“…The Serbian situation is an example of the struggle between an ideology that affirms the sanctity of life and the tolerance of all religions, and an ideology that uses violence to force a majority on unwilling individuals. This is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring Jews…Much like Hezbollah, those who lay claim to Kosovo and neighboring lands have made clear their intent to create a religiously and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian state…”
As a student of Balkan affairs, I find your statements to be completely inaccurate, incendiary, and contrary to the interests of the local population, to the U.S.Government policies in the area, and to peace and political stability in the Balkans.
The religious connotation you give, and fully endorse, to the political issues regarding the sad state of affairs where Serbia finds itself today, cannot hide the terrible crimes perpetrated by the successive Serb governments, especially since 1912, and which culminated with the genocidal aggression of the war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Serbia. Since you have approached the “problem of Kosovo” from this vantage point, I would like to make the following clarifications:
The contents of your statements, as well as the tone, echo the declarations of His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova, clearly indicating His Grace’s “aloofness” for the fate of the e n t i r e unfortunate Kosova population –Moslem, Eastern Orthodox and Catholic. Sounding the alarm against “the militant Jihad and terrorism in the heart of Europe” the honorable Bishop neglects to explain why from 1389 to 1912, ALL major churches and objects of worship of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova were protected by the local Albanians, who by the end of the 17th century began their conversion to Islam.
The fear of having”…1.300 Serbian religious objects lost” is unfounded since the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, these “jewels of medieval architecture” have been protected and preserved by the local Moslem and Catholic population, often at the risk of their lives. As late as 1960 ,the late Patriarch of ther Serb Orthodox Church, Gherman, decorated the Albanian family Nikci, of Peje, for having protected the Patriarchate of Peje for generations. There was no complaint then against the Albanians, until ‘Serb politics’ fabricated the threat of annihilation of the Serb Orthodox Church. Spme of those responsible for these politics of division are now facing the
International Courtfor War Crimes in Yugoslavia, at the Hague (Netherland).
It is these “Serb politics’ that have mobilized the dark forces of the Serb Orthodox Church –including His Grace Bishop Artemije whom you met in Washington,D.C.—to declare that Kosova is”occupied” by Albanians (92 percent of the population) and that “…every state has the right to fight an occupier to liberate an occupied part of its terrirory…This is the only response worthy of the State, and the Serbian people”.
Who is the enenmy? It’s Islamic extremism among the Kosova Albanians, a theme incessantly repeated to intimidate the international community…and assiduously exploited to deceive American Christian believers.
The entire scenario turns uglier when one thinks of this “man of God”, Bishop Artemije, never raising the voice to protest the massacres of the marauding Serb “paramilitary gangs’ (Arkan,Franks etc.) as well as of the regular Serbian Army in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally in Kosova. His silence will forever remain a black stain in the history of his Church. There were few low-level Serb clergy who oppoesd the war and its destruction. “Our” Bishop was not one of them!
Historically, “…Serb nationalist doctrine emphasized the role of the Orthodox Church,- wrote Noel Malcolm, of the Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy- as an essential constituent of Serbian identity. Albanian nationalist doctrine, on the other hand, emphasized the Albanian language, accepting the religious diversity of the Albanians…Religion thus mattered, to a certain extent, in reality, because it mattered in Serbian national ideology”.
Andrew Herscher, of the University of Michigan, explains how”…recent studies of violence in anthropolgy, sociology, and political science have come to recognize the ‘ethnicity’ of violence is an abstracion, an interpretation and a staging; violence comes to be understood as ‘ethnic’ in narrations undertaken both by perpetrators and victims”. He states that”…representatives of both Albanian and Serb communities have inflicted violence against the other’s religious sites and have documented and memorialized violence against their own religious sites, in each case, in order to shape particular notions of ethnic identity- which means to be Albanian, or Serb, in Kosova”.
Writing about recent events, Professor Herscher had this to say:
“…During the counter-insurgency campaign waged by Serb forces against the Kosova Liberation Army in l998-l999, however, along with mass explusion of Albanians from Kosova, religious sites associated with Islam were targeted for destruction. Approxi-mately 200 of the more than 600 mosques in Kosova were damaged or destroyed during the 1998-1999, along with Sufi lodges and Islamic schools, archives and libraries … buildings were ruined by deliberately inflicting violence, including vandalism, arson, shelling or toppling of minarets, and the dynamiting of the building from within…” He concluded:
” Yet, the targeting of religious sites does not represent a history of “ethnic violence’ in Kosova, as mush as an ongoing attempt to inextricably enmesh ethnicity, religion, violence and history for contemporary political ends”.
It is these “political ends” that the Serbian lobby in Washington,D.C., is now serving by using the moral and political authority of the distinguished US. Congressmen.
The American scholar, Professor Serge R. Doucette,Jr. in an Essay: “Fourth of July and ’The Face of Terror’” wrote:
“…Serbia has in its recent history initiated five wars against its neighbors; all were justified by their goal of “Greater Serbia”, and all had the sanction and support of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church has consistently manipulated and distorted Christian faith in service of Serbian greed for territorial gain and power. There is no such thing as a minor or justified atrocity, or act of terrorism: but, as wrong as Palestinian suicide bombings are against the Israelis, and as immoral and cowardly as the acts of 9/11 were, they pale in comparison to the atrocities committed by the Serbs against ethnic Albanians.
… Serbian repetition of crimes against humaniy can be seen as a result of a Serbian “mentality” developed and fostered by a Mystical relationship with the Orthodox Churxh which is inseparable with the existentce of the Nation.
Since its inception in the later part of the 13th century, there has Never been a time in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church that it has defended the Humanitarian Rights of anyone, but the Serbs themselves!
.. When you study Serbian history, you will come to undertsand that for Serbs, religion is not governing their daily ways of life, and they rarely attend church on a regular basis. Unlike Albanians, and others…they believe that if their “Church” is destroyed, they wil cease to exist. And, it is this belief that is effectively manipulated by Serbian religious and political leaders. The Serbian Orthodox Church becomes the motivation to sustain aggression, violence and atrocities against the others.”
*
The painful history of Serb repression in Kosova, where the victims were the Albanians, is fully documented. I will submit only two documents dated in 1919 and in 1999:
1) Paris Peace Conference,1919,vol.XII,PPC, 184.018/ 3
The Secretary of State to Mr. A.J.Balfour (British Foreign Minister),Paris,April 18,1919
“…British Embassy at Washington has informed the Department of State as following regarding the alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro:” Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova, Podjour, and Roshji have been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region…” Very truly yours, Robert Lansing, (Secretary of State)
2) Explaining the reason for NATO intervention , President W.J.Clinton had this to say:
“…We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosova from a mounting military offensive…Milosevic stripped Kosova of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed. Now, they started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their bodies. We have seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets. Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and their sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. Its is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people, whose leaders have already agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative…” (March 1999, Federal Document Clearing House)
(Research indicates that 174 Albanian families in Kosova were locked in their houses and burned alive by Serbian troops, men women and children!)
It is, therefore, utterly insane to think that “Moslem” Albanian demands for an indepen-dent Kosova would receive the favorable reception we witness today, if their aims were to build an “Islamic”,”terrorist” state, “to affirm…an ideology that uses violence …(with) the intent to create a religious and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian State…” The inter-national community that support Albanians in Kosova is predominantly Christian-not Moslem- from the U.S. of America to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy , the European Union, the overwhelming academic world, intelectuals, analysts, diplomats, “think tanks”, and human rights organizations. The civilized world preseves intact the horrible images of the Serb aggression in Kosova during the 1998-1999 years- the long columns of refugees expelled…on foot, horse wagons, and especially the long trains reminiscent of the Nazi transportations convoys to the extermination camps during WW II. “This is another Holocaust in Europe, and we are not going to allow it” declared in 1999, Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister.
*
Congressman Franks, in your interview, you made this unfortunate remark:…This Serbian situation is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring the Jews….”
The story of the Jews in Albanian lands is beginning to unfold: it’s a splendid example of religious tolerance, humanity and civil courage. Not one single, solitary, Jew was handed back to the Nazis. It’s a unique case in Europe. This is a fact now being corroborated by researches at the US.Holocaust Musem, in Washington,D.C., only a few steps from your Capitol office. Your distingusihed colleague at the House, the Honorable Tom Lantos, the only Holocaust survivor of the U.S.House of Representatives can attest and confirm it for you. I will limit myself to the following excerpts from a statement by Mrs. Johanna <><>Neumann, of the US Holocaut Musem, made at the end of December 2006, during a Moslem-Jew joint appearance:
“…My parents and I spent the war years in Albania with Muslim families, various families, but in particular one family who actually saved our lives. My parents were imprisoned for about four days, and our wonderful friend, a gentleman by the name of Pilku – whose familiy is inscribed here at the Museum, as well as in Yad Vashem, as among The Righeous Among the Nations- was able to have them released after four days, saved my father by hiding him once the Germans occupied Albania, and my mother and I were introduced as family members of the household. And we were not touched.
The population in Albania was 85 percent Muslim, and 15 pervent of other religious orientations. Everybody knew who we were, and nobody would ever, or even had the thought of denouncing us. Not at all. As a matter of fact, when Germany occupied Yugoslavia, the Albanian people opened their borders, and allowed them (the Jews) to come in. And, when Germans demanded that these people be returned, for some reasons they knew exactly who it was who had crossed the border, they simply said:” We looked for Jews, we didn’t find any. We know only Albanians, We do not know any Jews”. And they had hidden them in the villages, in families, in hospitals that they declared were quarantined because of typhoid fever. Nobody was handed back over to Germans. And those people deserved every respect that anybody can give them. And these were our friends. The story is a long one but this is the essence of it. They saved us and these were good human beings, and as I said before, the majority of them were Muslims, and we have nothing but the highest respect for these people….”
Congressman Franks, I leave the final judgement to you, as I do hope that deep in your conscience you will take into serious consideration the information I suppied today.
Sincerely yours,
Sami Repishti, Ph.D.
City University of New York (retired)
Former political prisoners in Communist Albania (1946-56)
and Communist Yugoslavia (1960-61)
Human rights activist
30 March 2007
Solana and Olli Rehn
I love Peace
Brussels, 29 March 2007
S113/07
Summary note on the joint report by
Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
and Olli REHN, EU Commissioner for Enlargement,
on the state of preparations of
the future EU and international presence in Kosovo
The joint report, which builds on the previous joint papers on the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo, submitted to the Council by Mr Solana and Mr Rehn, will be presented to foreign ministers at their informal meeting in Bremen on Friday.
Context
The paper analyses the conditions for an effective future EU role in Kosovo and provides an update on the state of transition and implementation preparations. EU coherence will be crucial during both the final stage of the status process and the implementation phase. Local ownership and partnership with the international community are key principles for the implementation of the Status settlement.
Transition Preparations
Following a settlement of Kosovo's future status, the authorities of Kosovo will face a double challenge: to take on competencies passed from UNMIK in accordance with the settlement; and to take the necessary steps to implement the substantive reforms outlined in the comprehensive proposal of the UN Special Envoy. Since October 2006, the ICO/EUSR Preparation Team has been co-chairing a structure designed to deal with questions relating to the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities following a UN Security Council Resolution.
Preparing for the International Civilian Office/EUSR and the ESDP mission
The Status settlement envisages an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR). He/she is envisaged as carrying certain powers and authorities to enable him/her to ensure adherence to the letter and spirit of the Status settlement. The ICO will include and be supported by other partners, including the United States.
The future ESDP Rule-of-Law mission will be designed to support implementation of the Kosovo status settlement and assist Kosovo's judicial and law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.
These tasks will be carried out in full co-operation and coherence with the Commission. In accordance with the Status settlement proposal, the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the EU to establish a Rule of Law mission to support the implementation of the settlement and promote the development of the police and justice sectors in Kosovo and to decide that the mission will have executive powers in the judiciary sector (prosecution of major and organised crime, property rights, correctional services), in the police (organised crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, financial investigations, anti-corruption, border control, crowd and riot control) and in security-related and customs- compliance issues). Member states have expressed agreement with this mandate.
Kosovo's European Perspective
A tangible European perspective based on the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 will reinforce the EU's leverage as a partner of the local institutions and enhance Kosovo's integration in the wider region. Concrete steps should therefore be taken to enable Kosovo to make further progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process after status is settled.
This would mean adopting a Council decision on a European Partnership for Kosovo, which would spell out the priorities for action for Kosovo to move closer to the EU, taking into account the essential requirements of the Status settlement. This should be accompanied by an enhanced technical and political dialogue as well as sufficient financial assistance.
EU approximation is a two-way process. Kosovo needs to meet the same conditions as the rest of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Kosovo should feel that the EU is committed to engage in contractual relations, foster regional cooperation and provide the same opportunities already available to the rest of the region. Strengthening good neighbourly relations will help rebuild trust, foster respect of cultural and religious differences and lay the basis for the reconciliation of future generations.
The European Commission will, at the appropriate time and when the conditions are met, be ready to prepare a feasibility study to examine Kosovo's readiness to engage in contractual relations along the lines of those in the Western Balkan region. This should be conditional on Kosovo's implementation of the Status settlement and key European Partnership priorities, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, good governance and public administration reform.
This will be supported inter alia by EC financial assistance; some €200 million have been allocated to Kosovo over the next three years.
Financial Needs
The International Community needs to ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement the Status settlement and support the development of a democratic, stable, and sustainable Kosovo. The EU has a particular responsibility to facilitate the conditions for a successful intervention, since it will take over the leadership of the future international presence.
Once the different costing elements are known more precisely, the Commission will prepare an overall financial package to be pledged at a donors' conference. EU Member States and our international community partners will need to contribute as well.
Following status, we can expect financing needs to arise in relation to:
1. Kosovo's share of the Yugoslav debt in the wake of status;
2. Expenditure as a result of the status requirements;
3. Kosovo's economic development needs (including institution building and capital investments); and
4. The cost of the international presence
Division of responsibilities
The division of responsibilities between the ICO, ESDP and the Commission will be clear and mutually reinforcing. Whereas the ICO and ESDP mission will support the local authorities to ensure settlement implementation and the consolidation of the area of rule of law, the Commission's role will focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective.
Previous Commission/Council documents on Kosovo:
Commission Communication "A European Future for Kosovo", approved by the College on 20 April 2005.[1]
A European Future for Kosovo - IP/05/450
First joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 14 June 2005 (as requested by the Council in February 2005).
Summary note 14.6.2005
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244, published on 9 November 2005.[2]
2005 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/05/412
Second joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 9 December 2005 (as requested by the Council in November 2005).
Summary note 9.12.2005
The European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, January 2006
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244
Third joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 July 2006 (as requested by the General Affairs and External Relations Council 12 December 2005).
MEMO/06/286
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 published on 8 November 2006. [3]
2006 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/06/412
[1] COM (2005) 156
[2] SEC (2005) 1423
[3] COM (2006) 649 final
Brussels, 29 March 2007
S113/07
Summary note on the joint report by
Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
and Olli REHN, EU Commissioner for Enlargement,
on the state of preparations of
the future EU and international presence in Kosovo
The joint report, which builds on the previous joint papers on the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo, submitted to the Council by Mr Solana and Mr Rehn, will be presented to foreign ministers at their informal meeting in Bremen on Friday.
Context
The paper analyses the conditions for an effective future EU role in Kosovo and provides an update on the state of transition and implementation preparations. EU coherence will be crucial during both the final stage of the status process and the implementation phase. Local ownership and partnership with the international community are key principles for the implementation of the Status settlement.
Transition Preparations
Following a settlement of Kosovo's future status, the authorities of Kosovo will face a double challenge: to take on competencies passed from UNMIK in accordance with the settlement; and to take the necessary steps to implement the substantive reforms outlined in the comprehensive proposal of the UN Special Envoy. Since October 2006, the ICO/EUSR Preparation Team has been co-chairing a structure designed to deal with questions relating to the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities following a UN Security Council Resolution.
Preparing for the International Civilian Office/EUSR and the ESDP mission
The Status settlement envisages an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR). He/she is envisaged as carrying certain powers and authorities to enable him/her to ensure adherence to the letter and spirit of the Status settlement. The ICO will include and be supported by other partners, including the United States.
The future ESDP Rule-of-Law mission will be designed to support implementation of the Kosovo status settlement and assist Kosovo's judicial and law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.
These tasks will be carried out in full co-operation and coherence with the Commission. In accordance with the Status settlement proposal, the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the EU to establish a Rule of Law mission to support the implementation of the settlement and promote the development of the police and justice sectors in Kosovo and to decide that the mission will have executive powers in the judiciary sector (prosecution of major and organised crime, property rights, correctional services), in the police (organised crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, financial investigations, anti-corruption, border control, crowd and riot control) and in security-related and customs- compliance issues). Member states have expressed agreement with this mandate.
Kosovo's European Perspective
A tangible European perspective based on the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 will reinforce the EU's leverage as a partner of the local institutions and enhance Kosovo's integration in the wider region. Concrete steps should therefore be taken to enable Kosovo to make further progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process after status is settled.
This would mean adopting a Council decision on a European Partnership for Kosovo, which would spell out the priorities for action for Kosovo to move closer to the EU, taking into account the essential requirements of the Status settlement. This should be accompanied by an enhanced technical and political dialogue as well as sufficient financial assistance.
EU approximation is a two-way process. Kosovo needs to meet the same conditions as the rest of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Kosovo should feel that the EU is committed to engage in contractual relations, foster regional cooperation and provide the same opportunities already available to the rest of the region. Strengthening good neighbourly relations will help rebuild trust, foster respect of cultural and religious differences and lay the basis for the reconciliation of future generations.
The European Commission will, at the appropriate time and when the conditions are met, be ready to prepare a feasibility study to examine Kosovo's readiness to engage in contractual relations along the lines of those in the Western Balkan region. This should be conditional on Kosovo's implementation of the Status settlement and key European Partnership priorities, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, good governance and public administration reform.
This will be supported inter alia by EC financial assistance; some €200 million have been allocated to Kosovo over the next three years.
Financial Needs
The International Community needs to ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement the Status settlement and support the development of a democratic, stable, and sustainable Kosovo. The EU has a particular responsibility to facilitate the conditions for a successful intervention, since it will take over the leadership of the future international presence.
Once the different costing elements are known more precisely, the Commission will prepare an overall financial package to be pledged at a donors' conference. EU Member States and our international community partners will need to contribute as well.
Following status, we can expect financing needs to arise in relation to:
1. Kosovo's share of the Yugoslav debt in the wake of status;
2. Expenditure as a result of the status requirements;
3. Kosovo's economic development needs (including institution building and capital investments); and
4. The cost of the international presence
Division of responsibilities
The division of responsibilities between the ICO, ESDP and the Commission will be clear and mutually reinforcing. Whereas the ICO and ESDP mission will support the local authorities to ensure settlement implementation and the consolidation of the area of rule of law, the Commission's role will focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective.
Previous Commission/Council documents on Kosovo:
Commission Communication "A European Future for Kosovo", approved by the College on 20 April 2005.[1]
A European Future for Kosovo - IP/05/450
First joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 14 June 2005 (as requested by the Council in February 2005).
Summary note 14.6.2005
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244, published on 9 November 2005.[2]
2005 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/05/412
Second joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 9 December 2005 (as requested by the Council in November 2005).
Summary note 9.12.2005
The European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, January 2006
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244
Third joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 July 2006 (as requested by the General Affairs and External Relations Council 12 December 2005).
MEMO/06/286
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 published on 8 November 2006. [3]
2006 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/06/412
[1] COM (2005) 156
[2] SEC (2005) 1423
[3] COM (2006) 649 final
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