Fjala e Veton Surroit në takimin e Badenit

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Zonja dhe zotërinj, Zoti President, Zoti Kryeministër Ekselencë, Isha shumë i befasuar, në fakt i mbetur pa fjalë, kur dëgjova sot nga dy juristë të njohur nga ana tjetër e tavolinës formulimin se rezoluta 1244 është aq e qartë sa nuk ka nevojë për interpretim, apo jo zoti Fleiner? Po shoh se po pohoni. E pra, ekziston vetëm një sistem ku ligjet nuk janë çështje e interpretueshme e ai është sistemi diktatorial. Në të gjitha demokracitë ligjet janë subjekt i interpretimeve. Është bazament i ndërtimit të sistemit juridik. Janë të paramenduara për të qenë të interpretuara përndryshe do të ishin vendime të prera te një sistemi diktatorial. Në rezolutën 1244, dhe nuk do të ndalem shumë në të, sepse mendoj se duhet një sqarim me i detajuar nga zoti Shala. Por kur përmendët artikullin 11 të rezolutës 1244 e përdorët në favorin tuaj. Tani më lejoni t’u tregoj interpretimin i cili mund të përdoret në favor të palës tjetër. Ju thoni se çdo zgjidhje duhet bazohet në autonomi substanciale, por autonomia substanciale në këtë rezolute, në artikullin 11, parashihet si fazë e ndërmjetme e cila i paraprinë - dhe këtu po citojë - “zgjidhjes finale te statusit”, e unë do te përdorja fjalën zgjidhje e përhershme. Dhe kjo në thelb, legalisht, logjikisht apo si të doni, thotë se autonomia substanciale nuk është zgjidhje e paragjykuar. Po e përdorni rezolutën 1244 si formulë për paragjykim derisa 1244 është gjendja në të cilën jemi sot. Jemi duke diskutuar statusin bazuar në premisat e rezolutës 1244 e cila thotë se duhet të ketë një proces në të cilin bisedohet për zgjidhjen e finale të statusit. Ne kemi diskutuar për statusin, ne nuk i jemi shmangur diskutimit për status, kemi diskutuar për statusin në formën në të cilën ne e shohim statusin. Për ne statusi është pavarësia ndërsa për ju është format tjetër i statusit. Por, megjithëse kemi biseduar në dy kanale të ndryshme të komunikimit, nuk kemi arritur pajtim për sa i përket formateve, koncepteve dhe modeleve tjera. Kemi insistuar që nga takimi i parë dhe po insistojmë sot në takimin e fundit se nuk ka zgjidhje për Kosovën e cila parasheh subordinimin e Kosovës ne sistemin juridik serb. Ne nuk e duam dhe nuk do ta kemi. Ne dëshirojmë të kemi partneritet dhe duam të kemi një marrëveshje të bazuar në partneritet. Jemi bashkëpunues ndërsa varet nga ju se a do ta pranoni apo jo këtë gatishmëri. Më lejoni t’ju tregoj se nga po vijmë dhe se ku po pretendojmë të shkojmë. Nga takimi i fundit kemi pasur një deklaratë nga presidenti Tadiq për personat e zhdukur, në të cilën merret përgjegjësia e shtetit serb. Mendoj se kjo është një qasje që si delegacion do përshëndetur. Personat e zhdukur është një çështje të cilën e ndajmë së bashku dhe është dhimbje të cilën duhet ta ndajmë dhe ta posedojmë. Është dhimbje e cila duhet shfrytëzuar për përmirësimin e marrëdhënieve tona. Nëse më tutje vazhdojmë me këtë lloj gjuhe, atëherë arrijmë të përkushtimi i përbashkët për një moment, apo një datë, në të cilët dy palët deklarojnë se është qëllim i yni që kjo gjë të mos përsëritet, sepse ne kurrë më, nuk duhet të lejojmë që të arrijmë tek situata e cila krijon persona të zhdukur. Që nga takimi i Brukselit po ashtu po dëgjoj deklarata dhe një deklaratë të veçantë të thënë fillimisht nga zoti Koshtunica dhe të përsëritur nga zoti Tadiq më pas se, oferta nga Serbia është ofertë, e cila mund të pranohet sot për tu tejkaluar si periudhë transitore 20 vjeçare dhe pas kësaj periudhe do të duhej të uleshim prapë për të diskutuar se, a është adekuat ky model i aranzhimit të statusit. Në një mënyrë paradoksale po arrijmë tek një pikë konsensusi në këtë çështje sepse është interesante por propozimi jonë dhe ajo që ju po thoni është pak a shumë e njëjtë, sepse nuk shohim mundësi që të arrijmë marrëveshje për status të përhershëm formë të negociatave. Kur thoni t’i kemi 20 vjet te një statusi dhe me pas te bisedojmë për një status tjetër, atëherë po propozoni edhe një fazë të ndërmjetme ndërsa ne po themi se nuk duam procese të ndërmjetme. Dhe nëse kjo është oferta juaj, ne duhet tu përgjigjemi se, kjo është një ofertë të cilën nuk mund ta pranojmë. Por isha i impresionuar me deklaratën e zotit Koshtunica sepse mendoj se prekë thelbin e çështjeve të cilat i trajtojmë si probleme por edhe mund të përdoret si zgjidhje në të ardhmen. Kemi dëgjuar përgjatë procesit të Ahtisarit pjesë të ndara të këtij qëndrimi nga elokuenca e zotit Jakshiq, por asnjëherë me aq konkretësi siç e bëri kryeministri Koshtunica. Dhe baza e saj është të ballafaquarit me konceptin e serbizmit, dhe kjo është çështje të cilën do të duhej ta trajtonim në këtë konferencë. Ka të bëjë me identitetin e popullit serb, historinë e tij, jetët e qytetarëve serb dhe trashëgiminë kulturore të Kishës Ortodokse Serbe. Dallimi qëndron në deklaratën e bërë nga zoti Koshtunica sepse - nëse më kujtohen saktë fjalët - e keni përdorur formulimin i cili kërkon pronësi ndaj Manastirit të Deçanit apo atij të Graçanicës apo identiteti serb ne tërësi. “Është përgjegjësi e shtetit serb që të udhëheqë me Graçanicën dhe Deçanin për shkak të identitetit serb” thuhej pak a shumë në deklaratë. Pozicioni ynë nuk është ai i pronësisë. Ne nuk besojmë në pronësinë e Deçanit apo Graçanicës dhe këtë u munduam ta sqarojmë në takimin me Treshen. Të marrim një shembull të thjeshtë siç është Deçani. Manastiri i Deçanit është diçka të cilën nuk mund ta posedosh si shtet. I përket në aspekt kulturor botës si qendër e trashëgimisë, në aspekt fetar i përket Kishës Ortodokse Serbe dhe ju zotërinj nuk jeni te titulluar ta udhëhiqni atë, në aspekt kulturor po ashtu Manastiri i Deçanit shërben si urë lidhëse në mes dy formave të krishterimit. Është ndërtuar si kishë me model arkitektonik perëndimor ndërsa ka shërbesën e kishës lindore. Është simbol i cili duhet jetë i përbashkët, i ndarë nga të gjithë. Është diçka që ilustron projektimet tona për të ardhmen. Familja ime vjen nga Prizreni dhe ju e përmendët zoti kryeministër Kishën e Bogorodicës. Në Prizren ekziston po ashtu kisha e Shën Premtes. Shën Premtja ilustron Kosovën dhe kuptimin e saj. Në një pikë historike ky vend ishte tempull parakrishter, u shndërrua në kishë katolike tani është kishë ortodokse serbe ndërsa në një periudhë të sundimit osman ishte xhami dhe quhej Xhuma Xhami apo Xhamia e së premtes dhe kremtonte të premten si ditë të veçantë për kulturën islame. Andaj është diçka të cilin as ju as ne nuk mund ta posedojmë, por është diçka që mund ta ndajmë së bashku. Dhe ky është qëllimi ynë, që të ndajmë bashkërisht kulturën tonë dhe atë tuajën, duam të shohim mënyrat se si ti ndërtojmë, mbrojmë dhe komunikojmë së bashku. Si mundemi që bashkërisht të kontribuojmë në mbrojtjen e identitetit serb në Kosovë. Si bashkërisht të krijojmë ambient të sigurt për serbët që jetojnë në Kosovë dhe për ata që dëshirojnë të kthehen dhe si bashkërisht të kontribuojmë në mbrojtjen e identitetit të serbëve të Kosovës si pjesë e identitetit të përbashkët kosovar. Dhe u kemi propozuar një traktat dhe nuk jam i sigurt se ju është shpërndarë të gjithëve në delegacionin tuaj. Do të ishim të lumtur nëse i lëshoni një sy. Mos paragjykoni. Fakti se ju e pranoni apo jo, nuk çon peshë në aspektin e pranimit formal si propozim negociator. Pranojeni së paku si një propozim jozyrtar. Dhe nëse doni ia hiqni edhe kopertinën për shkak se në titull thuhet “traktat në mes shtetesh” dhe ju nuk dëshironi ta pranoni atë formulim. Shikoni përmbajtjen. Shikoni se cilat janë ato pika të cilat mendoni se janë të dobishme apo mendoni se duhet hequr. Na informoni për këtë e kemi edhe një pasdite për të biseduar. Më lejoni, në fund të prezantoj se kush jemi ne, sepse nuk kemi pasur rast deri tani në këto dy vjet negociatash Ta prezantoj delegacionin e Kosovës. Që të pesë anëtarët e Ekipit të Unitetit kemi ardhur këtu me histori të ndryshme. Zoti Kolë Berisha ishte marrë nga forcat serbe në një natë të vitit 1989 ishte dërguar në burg. Dhjet policë në njërën anë dhe dhjetë në anën tjetër e rrihnin atë duke hyrë në dhomën e burgut. Ai nuk pajtohej me aranzhimet kushtetuese të propozuara dhe të imponuara nga zoti Millosheviq. Ai mendonte se gjerat duhet të rrjedhin në kah tjetër. Ai ka kaluar 18 vite të jetës duke luftuar që gjërat të ndryshojnë, duke u përpjekur të luftoj për dinjitetin e familjes së tij, për dinjitetin e tij dhe popullit te tij. Kryeministri Çeku ka luftuar dy luftëra. Në një ditë të marsit apo prillit të vitit 99 fshati i tij ishte rrethuar, njerëzit nga ishin marrë nga forcat serbe ndërsa komandanti i policisë kishte pyetur se kush është babai i gjeneralit Çeku. Ai ishte nxjerrë nga masa dhe ishte ekzekutuar. Kryeministri gjatë tetë viteve të fundit po përpiqet të kërkojë një jetë me dinjitet për familjen dhe popullin e tij. Kryetari Sejdiu dhe unë morëm pjesë në demonstrata dora e tij i ishte thyer nga dhuna e policisë serbe, po ashtu edhe krahu im. Ishim kundër luftës që po zhvillohej kundër civilëve në Kosovë. Ishim kundër vrasjes së njerëzve për të imponuar aranzhmanet kushtetuese. Zoti Thaçi. Kur krejt ky proces filloi, zoti Thaçi ishte student. Ai ishte nxjerr jashtë me forcë nga fakulteti i tij. Ai luftoi, luftoi me studimet e tij , luftoj me armët e tij. Luftoj për dinjitetin e tij dhe të popullit të tij. Të gjithë ne, të pestit, nuk kemi ardhur këtu me urrejtje, por përkundrazi, me dinjitet. Dinjitet të cilin dëshirojmë ta ndajmë duke dëshiruar një zgjidhje të dinjitetshme. Një zgjidhje që do të ndihmoj, do tu ndihmoj edhe juve, një zgjidhje që do të mbrojë identitetin serb në Kosovë për ç‘gjë edhe ju po përpiqeni. Kjo është thelbi i asaj që dëshirojmë të marrim me vete sot. Ju faleminderit!

Kosovo Talks Stall as Deadline Nears

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Serbian and Kosovo officials on Tuesday, Nov. 20, failed to break a deadlock over the future status of the breakaway province. Both sides stuck to their previous positions but agreed to hold intensive talks next week.

Meeting in Brussels under the auspices of the EU-US-Russia troika, Serbian and Kosovo delegations were unable to make progress on finding a solution for the future status of the Serbian breakaway province. According to a statement issued by European, US and Russian mediators, negotiators for Kosovo rejected a Serb offer of broad autonomy and insisted that nothing short of an EU-supervised independence would be acceptable.
"Yet again, I cannot report any progress due to the intransigence of the Serbian delegation," said Skender Hyseni, spokesman for the Kosovo delegation.

Hyseni rejected Serbia's latest proposal which would turn Kosovo into an autonomous province modeled on Aland, a Swedish-speaking archipelago belonging to Finland, saying there was "nothing new" to it. He also said Kosovo had endured a long period of "harsh occupation" and that it had become a "de facto independent" state awaiting recognition from the international community.


Kostunica (l.) blamed the Kosovars for the impasse
Serbia's delegation, led by President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, rejected Kosovo's demands for independence and accused their counterparts of wasting time ahead of a Dec. 10 deadline set by the United Nations for an agreement to be reached.

"Serbia is always looking for compromises. If someone is wasting time, it's not Serbia," Kostunica said.

Final chance for compromise? Kostunica (l.) blamed the Kosovars for the
impasse

Kosovo's prime minister-in-waiting, Hashim Thaci, said he was willing to consult with the United States and the European Union before proclaiming his province's independence from Serbia.

"We will take a decision on Kosovo after Dec. 10, together with the US and EU," Thaci said.

Serbian President Tadic dismissed imposed solutions as unhelpful and said unilateral announcements of independence by Kosovo would stand in the way of an agreement.

A last-ditch attempt to find a compromise is slated to take place in Austria on Nov. 26-28, the troika said in its statement.
The predominantly ethnic-Albanian province of two million people is aspiring to become independent and to eventually join the EU and NATO. But the EU, which is split over whether to recognize the new country, has urged its leaders not to be too hasty in declaring independence.
Russia, which is backing Serbia on the issue, has already threatened to veto a deal granting Kosovo independence, which was put forward by UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari.

Thaci is focused on independence for Kosovo

"No negotiations -- self determination"

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"No negotiations -- self determination," reads this Pristina graffiti

These graffities are everywhere on Kosovo, written by activists of Self determination Organization, leaded by Albin Kurti.

RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES

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The following piece was written by former US Ambassador to Belgrade
WIlliam Montgomery and will appear in this Saturday's edition of the
Belgrade daily DANAS. It is very timely, troubling and accurate.



RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES

Serbia today has a ruling coalition which is radically
divided in its priorities and underlying political philosophies. G17+
wants to improve the country's international financial position and
its overall economic underpinnings. DS is trying to move Serbia
towards full integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions and more
importantly, have Serbia perceived as a normal European country,
sharing a common system of values. DSS remains focused on Serbian
national questions such as Kosovo and Bosnia . The rivalries and
animosity among these three parties is far stronger and more evident
than towards either the Socialist or Radical Parties, which would
logically be their political and philosophical opposition.

The end result is a government with major internal
contradictions; "fiefdoms" exclusively controlled by individual
parties; a patronage system where party loyalty rates far higher than
competence, honesty or effectiveness; stalled reforms; and lack of
coordination in public statements which results in contradictory
messages to the outside world.

Despite all of above, the government under normal conditions
could most likely stumble along, because none of the participating
parties are eager for new elections. They have adeptly avoided
confronting any issue which would make a split inevitable.

That is probably about to change. At least twenty members of
the EU now seem prepared to join the United States in recognizing a
unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians. It is
unclear exactly when various steps will take place, but the starting
date will certainly be around December 10, the date when the troika of
negotiators is due to submit their report to the UN. Serbian
politicians are confronted with two fundamental and related questions.

The first is what additional last-minute steps can be taken
to either delay or discourage key members of the EU from supporting
this unilateral action. The second is what steps Serbia should take in
the event that the worst case scenario actually happens and Kosovo in
December starts down the independence road.

The DSS is prepared to take far stronger measures both in
advance of December 10 to prevent any declaration of independence and
also far stronger reactive measures if it does happen. The problem,
however, is that many of the measures would adversely impact on the
key goals of their coalition partners. The result is that the gap
between the coalition partners is growing and will continue to do so
as the DSS raises the ante on Kosovo.

The DSS has already taken steps to demonstrate that there
will be serious regional repercussions in the event of Kosovo
independence. A major initiative in this regard was to link the date
of elections for the Serbian President to events in Kosovo. In other
words, the DSS has deliberately taken steps which make it far more
possible that the next President of Serbia will be from the Radical
Party. They are sending a message to the International Community that
this is one of the potential downsides of unilateral recognition of
Kosovo Independence .

This is a fascinating gambit in a number of ways. It shows
clearly the actual state of relations between Prime Minister Kostunica
and President Tadic. Secondly, as in the case of the DSS vote for a
Radical as President of Parliament during the coalition negotiations
several months ago, it shows that the DSS does not have the same
degree of discomfort with the Radical Party that other parties in the
governmental coalition and much of the International Community share.
Thirdly, it magnifies once again the issue of Kosovo on the Serbian
political scene, as the DSS wants to do. Fourthly, it could have the
tactical impact of delaying action in Kosovo. This however, would only
be for a short period and only if there was a date certain for the
Serbian elections within the next two months. But finally, it has to
raise questions about what sort of future the DSS envisions for Serbia
if it is willing to facilitate a Radical as President with the
implications this would have for Serbia 's image in much of the world.
The strong reaction of the EU to the potential for a Right Wing
Nationalist Party sharing power in Austria a few years ago comes to
mind in this regard.

The second step which the Prime Minister and his party has
taken is to support aggressively the Bosnian Serb leadership in its
protests over measures taken by the High Representative to facilitate
the work of the Bosnian Parliament and Council of Ministers. This was
accompanied by a coordinated media campaign reminiscent of the
Milosevic years. This was intentionally done to present a case of the
International Community mistreating Serbs not only in Kosovo, but also
in Bosnia . The end result was to solidify, at least in the minds of
the Serbs, a definite linkage between the two cases. It raises the
possibility that any unilateral declaration by the Kosovo Albanians of
independence could lead either to further Bosnian Serb challenges to
the authority of the High Representative or even an effort to stage a
referendum on independence for the Republika Srpska. The intent, once
again, is to convince the International Community that supporting
unilateral independence for Kosovo will create more problems than it
would solve.

Thirdly, the DSS has taken the lead in visibly cozying up to
Russia. This includes claims that the West's purpose in supporting
Kosovo Albanian independence is to create a " NATO State " in the
Balkans and other NATO bashing. The obvious intent is to show that the
end result of Kosovo independence would be a Serbia far, far closer to
Russia and more distant from the EU.

Finally, even though the government has been careful to
avoid any overt signs of support, the announced formation of a "St.
Tsar Lazar Guard" composed of Serbian volunteers to fight to defend
Kosovo in the event of an unilateral declaration of independence is
obviously designed to raise the possibility of paramilitary units
going into Kosovo as they did in Bosnia and Croatia in 1990-95.

The hope of the DSS is that these threats and actions will
be sufficient to scare key EU countries such as Germany so that they
defer any action on Kosovo. At least as of today, however, it appears
as if the majority of EU countries (including all of the "heavy
hitters" with the support and encouragement of the United States has
decided to proceed regardless of the potential consequences. In fact,
it unfortunately seems that many in the West are beginning to view
Serbia, as during the Milosevic years, as a destabilizing factor in
the region. The "honeymoon" following the downfall of Milosevic is
definitely over.

The question then becomes, exactly what will Serbia do in
the event of unilateral independence. My best guess is as follows:

a) A contingency plan has already been worked out with Kosovo Serbs so
that they will react immediately in rejecting any unilateral
declaration of independence. Serbian-controlled areas will be
established in Kosovo similar to those set up in Bosnia and Croatia
sixteen years ago.

b) At least some "volunteers" from Serbia proper will go to help the
Kosovo Serbs. The government will take a hands-off position and claim
that it had nothing to do with it.

c) The Bosnian Serbs will be encouraged to further challenge the High
Representative, possibly even with a referendum initiative.

d) Large protest rallies will be staged in many cities in Serbia .

e) Efforts will be made in Parliament and in the media to
significantly downgrade relations with countries which recognize
Kosovo independence.

f) Serbia will renounce any responsibility for its debts in Kosovo
with international financial institutions.

g) Serbia will close its boundaries with Kosovo for all traffic other
than Serbs.

h) Serbia will consider cutting off its supply of electrical energy to Kosovo.

i) Serbia even now will encourage Russia to use the renewal of the
EUFOR Mission in Bosnia in the UN Security, which is scheduled for
December, to extract unacceptable concessions in exchange for its
support.

As these events unfold, the potential for violence and
pressure for additional measures will be very high. Relations with the
United States and the EU will deteriorate sharply. The coalition
partners of the DSS will see much of their work and their goals
evaporating in front of them and will be confronted with either
leaving the government or accepting responsibility for actions which
will take them further from their professed reasons for joining the
government in the first place. The problem is that although I see this
train wreck comely clearly down the line, I just don't see how it will
be stopped

Unofficial Election Results

Taken from : Coalition Democracy in Action.

Kosovo Election

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Election monitors have confirmed that the opposition Democratic Party of former ethnic Albanian guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci won the November 17 parliamentary elections in Serbia's Kosovo province.
The election monitoring group "Democracy in Action" says that with votes from 90 percent of polling stations counted, Thaci's PDK is leading with 34 percent, beating the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) into second place with 22 percent.

The election result puts Thaci in a position to form a coalition government.

He has vowed that if he becomes prime minister, he intends to declare Kosovo independent from Serbia after December 10 -- the deadline for international mediators to report back to the United Nations on the progress of negotiations to resolve the dispute over Kosovo's future status.

The vote was boycotted by Kosovo's Serbian minority, which strongly rejects the ethnic Albanian plan for independence.

The United States has praised the peaceful conduct of the elections, but criticized the Serbian boycott of the vote.

Are you sure you want to vote Pacolli?

NO COMMENT......... :(


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KOSOVO ELECTIONS 2007/ A NEW REFERENDUM ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO

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The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Drago Flis, an albanologist and member of the IFIMES International Institute, has presented the current situation before the general and local elections in Kosovo which will be held on 17. November 2007. His article entitled "Kosovo elections 2007 – A new referendum on the independence of Kosovo" is published in full.


Drago FLIS
Albanologist and
Member of the IFIMES International Institute


KOSOVO ELECTIONS 2007

A NEW REFERENDUM ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO


Kosovo's parliamentary elections scheduled for 17 November 2007, which will be held together with the local elections, are the third elections since the international community introduced its civil and military administration in Kosovo. The third democratic elections since 1999 will thus round off the political context for the independence of Kosovo. The concept of controlled independence is envisaged already by Ahtisaari's plan which remains the only viable political roadmap for Kosovo in the international community regardless of eventual difficulties in its implementation.

Ever since it became an international protectorate the West has granted Kosovo the right to its own elections within the existing borders, while it never took a position on the possibility of another referendum on independence, although such referenda have had quite a long tradition in Kosovo. The Constitutional Framework (Korniza kushtetuese) of 15 May 2001 provisionally replacing the constitution contains no provisions on referendum either. Nevertheless Korniza acknowledges certain elements of administrative self-government. It provides for direct elections to the parliament while it remains restrictive regarding the elections of the president who is not elected directly but by the qualified majority of the parliament.

The provisional Constitutional Framework is based on the UN Resolution No. 1244, which has left the issue of sovereignty formally open pending the final solution of the status of Kosovo. All previous elections have been organized separately from the Serbian elections although the minority has occasionally held its own elections.

The 2001 and 2004 parliamentary elections were organized by the international community. In this year's elections the role of international organizations has diminished substantially to the level of observing and advising, as envisaged by Ahtisaari, and the realization of the elections is the responsibility of the Central Election Commission (KQZ) headed by Kosovo's officials.


INDEPENDENCE – THE FOCAL TOPIC OF ELECTIONS

The 2007 elections have practically no other topic except for the focal issue of independence. Regardless of their political differences and personal rivalries, all majority parties present independence as their sine qua non goal. This goal has been promoted also by some minority parties except for the Serbian ones. Most minority parties are already looking for the possibilities of forming coalitions with certain Albanian parties. Serbian minority is still skeptical about the elections since it rejects independence. The official Belgrade has repeatedly called the Serbian minority to boycott the elections, as has the Raška-Prizren Orthodox Metropolite Artemije. By doing so the Serbian minority in Kosovo would deprive itself of the possibility to ensure its own position in the future Kosovo state through participation at the elections as one of the signs of loyalty. The Serbian minority and Belgrade authorities have decided to take another road, although that can not prevent the realization of elections but only aggravate the position of the Serbian community after the elections and the solution of the final status.


ANOTHER DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Should it be necessary the political representatives of Kosovo majority are ready to organize another referendum on independence while still fully respecting the agenda envisaged by the international community which neither stipulates nor prohibits such possibility. The international community is still withholding its decision on the final status and insists on always new and new negotiation rounds. Even in the negotiating process no positions have been assumed on the previous and eventual future decisions on independence taken by the Kosovo leadership. Nevertheless, the latter announced a new declaration of independence without stating the date. The former Kosovo leadership announced the independent republic of Kosovo already in July 1990, which was not recognized by the international community. Regardless of that they continued the sovereignty process, proclaiming the new constitution in September 1990 and rounding off the process with the referendum on independence in 1991.

In addition to independence as the focal point the pre-election campaign has introduced some novelties in the probable post-election structure of authority. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaçi stands out as the country's central party which will most probably form the coalition government.

The present government has been based on the division of power between the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the former party of Ibrahim Rugova which appoints the President of Kosovo, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) headed by the incumbent Prime Minister. AAK had lost Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj who resigned immediately following the indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently his position was assumed by Agim Çeku.

The pre-election campaign is taking place in parallel with direct negotiations between Belgrade and Priština on the final status of Kosovo, organized alternately in Vienna and Brussels. Until now the negotiations have borne no tangible results. Despite enormous efforts by the international community to bring the two sides closer together, the gap between them is still deepening Notwithstanding the obligations of the pre-election fight the Kosovo side fully respects the desire of the international community to participate at the negotiations which are to last until the end of November.
In view of the obligations assumed by Kosovar politicians during the election campaign, the declaration of independence is inevitably going to take place after 10 December 2007 together with the appeal to the international community to remain in Kosovo and recognize its independence.

Even if the international community further postponed the recognition, the Kosovo Parliament will, in the framework of its efforts to achieve international recognition, initiate the procedure for the adoption of the new constitution based on Ahtisaari's plan.

The third set of tasks for the newly elected government will be the regulation of relations with the neighboring countries. Although this will be a time-consuming and complex process no one can doom it to fail. The initial period of blockades may be replaced by a process of gradual and practical approximation and eventual peaceful settlement of relations between Kosovo and its South Slavic neighbors.


EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS?

The international community has been postponing long enough the recognition of Kosovo as the independent state. In the international community, the Serbian lobby has been permanently rejecting independence regardless of the self-determination principle. The Serbian lobby relies on traditional allies, especially Russia and some other states, as well as on the customary distrusting attitude of the international community towards the Albanians. That attitude is also present in the newly emerged states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since their political mentality had developed under the strong influence of Belgrade. This accounts for their reserved and hesitating expression of positions when it comes to the issue of Kosovo and consequently their postponed decisions on its independence.

The traditional antagonism between Serbs and Albanians in the area of West Balkans can not be overcome without the recognition of Kosovo's independence which is the precondition for eventual reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians living together.

The Serbian lobby among other claims that the independence of Kosovo would lead Serbia to a collapse, although there are no reasons for such fears. Another example of political fiction was the idea on annexing the Bosnian Republic of Srpska to Serbia should the international community decide to recognize Kosovo's independence. Serbia has simply no possibility to achieve this.
Kosovo's odyssey to independence may thus end with a peculiar political paradox: the country which has suffered so many wars and devastations in its own and neighboring territories will eventually enter its independence in a peaceful manner.
Ljubljana, November 14, 2007
International Institute for Middle-East
and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) - Ljubljana
Director: Bakhtyar Aljaf

Back Again!!!

I love Peace

Well seams I took a long break.... even though there was a lot to say and a lot of things going on.... but this is how life is, we start something, then we jump in something that we think is more important and then we get back to where we been and we see that things were moving and the situation is not same...

I was very busy during all this time, preparing documents for scholarships, new job, helping one of my professor to prepare the election campaign, implementing different projects of NGO and having a lot of debates with candidates and forgetting about the books in TOTAL....

Anyway, I didn't done to much. After failing to get any scholarship for studying abroad I sow that being graduated doesn't give you an easy way but in contrary it leads you to more difficult challenges and you need to be prepared for failures, questions that people think you should know answers and this made me get back on "earth" and think of what a hell I want to do in next coming year... So, I created a plan where keeping to write in blog is part of it.... so here I am...

thanks god elections are almost finishing, at least I'm done with campaign :) also with debates of NGO and know I have time to read (I started to read something about Diplomacy-H.Kissinger) and also paying more attention to situation in Kosovo, final status- the question that still remains in Kosovars minds and harts, promises of creating a paradise after elections, analyzing international declarations about Kosovo status and reading, reading and reading...

Well it's nice to be back... see yaaa later......