I love Peace
Brussels, 29 March 2007
S113/07
Summary note on the joint report by
Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
and Olli REHN, EU Commissioner for Enlargement,
on the state of preparations of
the future EU and international presence in Kosovo
The joint report, which builds on the previous joint papers on the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo, submitted to the Council by Mr Solana and Mr Rehn, will be presented to foreign ministers at their informal meeting in Bremen on Friday.
Context
The paper analyses the conditions for an effective future EU role in Kosovo and provides an update on the state of transition and implementation preparations. EU coherence will be crucial during both the final stage of the status process and the implementation phase. Local ownership and partnership with the international community are key principles for the implementation of the Status settlement.
Transition Preparations
Following a settlement of Kosovo's future status, the authorities of Kosovo will face a double challenge: to take on competencies passed from UNMIK in accordance with the settlement; and to take the necessary steps to implement the substantive reforms outlined in the comprehensive proposal of the UN Special Envoy. Since October 2006, the ICO/EUSR Preparation Team has been co-chairing a structure designed to deal with questions relating to the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities following a UN Security Council Resolution.
Preparing for the International Civilian Office/EUSR and the ESDP mission
The Status settlement envisages an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR). He/she is envisaged as carrying certain powers and authorities to enable him/her to ensure adherence to the letter and spirit of the Status settlement. The ICO will include and be supported by other partners, including the United States.
The future ESDP Rule-of-Law mission will be designed to support implementation of the Kosovo status settlement and assist Kosovo's judicial and law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.
These tasks will be carried out in full co-operation and coherence with the Commission. In accordance with the Status settlement proposal, the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the EU to establish a Rule of Law mission to support the implementation of the settlement and promote the development of the police and justice sectors in Kosovo and to decide that the mission will have executive powers in the judiciary sector (prosecution of major and organised crime, property rights, correctional services), in the police (organised crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, financial investigations, anti-corruption, border control, crowd and riot control) and in security-related and customs- compliance issues). Member states have expressed agreement with this mandate.
Kosovo's European Perspective
A tangible European perspective based on the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 will reinforce the EU's leverage as a partner of the local institutions and enhance Kosovo's integration in the wider region. Concrete steps should therefore be taken to enable Kosovo to make further progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process after status is settled.
This would mean adopting a Council decision on a European Partnership for Kosovo, which would spell out the priorities for action for Kosovo to move closer to the EU, taking into account the essential requirements of the Status settlement. This should be accompanied by an enhanced technical and political dialogue as well as sufficient financial assistance.
EU approximation is a two-way process. Kosovo needs to meet the same conditions as the rest of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Kosovo should feel that the EU is committed to engage in contractual relations, foster regional cooperation and provide the same opportunities already available to the rest of the region. Strengthening good neighbourly relations will help rebuild trust, foster respect of cultural and religious differences and lay the basis for the reconciliation of future generations.
The European Commission will, at the appropriate time and when the conditions are met, be ready to prepare a feasibility study to examine Kosovo's readiness to engage in contractual relations along the lines of those in the Western Balkan region. This should be conditional on Kosovo's implementation of the Status settlement and key European Partnership priorities, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, good governance and public administration reform.
This will be supported inter alia by EC financial assistance; some €200 million have been allocated to Kosovo over the next three years.
Financial Needs
The International Community needs to ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement the Status settlement and support the development of a democratic, stable, and sustainable Kosovo. The EU has a particular responsibility to facilitate the conditions for a successful intervention, since it will take over the leadership of the future international presence.
Once the different costing elements are known more precisely, the Commission will prepare an overall financial package to be pledged at a donors' conference. EU Member States and our international community partners will need to contribute as well.
Following status, we can expect financing needs to arise in relation to:
1. Kosovo's share of the Yugoslav debt in the wake of status;
2. Expenditure as a result of the status requirements;
3. Kosovo's economic development needs (including institution building and capital investments); and
4. The cost of the international presence
Division of responsibilities
The division of responsibilities between the ICO, ESDP and the Commission will be clear and mutually reinforcing. Whereas the ICO and ESDP mission will support the local authorities to ensure settlement implementation and the consolidation of the area of rule of law, the Commission's role will focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective.
Previous Commission/Council documents on Kosovo:
Commission Communication "A European Future for Kosovo", approved by the College on 20 April 2005.[1]
A European Future for Kosovo - IP/05/450
First joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 14 June 2005 (as requested by the Council in February 2005).
Summary note 14.6.2005
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244, published on 9 November 2005.[2]
2005 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/05/412
Second joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 9 December 2005 (as requested by the Council in November 2005).
Summary note 9.12.2005
The European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, January 2006
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244
Third joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 July 2006 (as requested by the General Affairs and External Relations Council 12 December 2005).
MEMO/06/286
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 published on 8 November 2006. [3]
2006 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/06/412
[1] COM (2005) 156
[2] SEC (2005) 1423
[3] COM (2006) 649 final
30 March 2007
27 March 2007
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
I love Peace
Security Council Distr.: General 26 March 2007 Original: English
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51), by which the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo’s future status, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey herewith the report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status and, in an addendum, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1) prepared by my Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.
Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Ban Ki-moon
07-27223 (E) 230307
*0727223*
Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community
1 In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status.
2 Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences — almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress could be achieved.
3 My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.
4 Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.
5 The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.
S/2007/168
Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option
1 A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.
2 For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply not tenable.
Continued international administration is not sustainable
1 While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration.
2 Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.
Independence with international supervision is the only viable option
1 Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia.
2 While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life.
3 Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests.
4 I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.
5 Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.
Conclusion
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.
S/2007/168
16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.
Annex
Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
I. General
1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.
II. Provisions of the Settlement
1 Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.
2 Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.
3 Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the
S/2007/168
areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.
1 Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.
2 Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.
3 Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.
4 Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.
9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that
the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.
5 Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.
6 International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.
7 European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.
8 International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.
9 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.
III. Implementation
1 Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.
2 During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.
S/2007/168
1 At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.
2 Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.
Security Council Distr.: General 26 March 2007 Original: English
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51), by which the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo’s future status, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey herewith the report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status and, in an addendum, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1) prepared by my Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.
Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Ban Ki-moon
07-27223 (E) 230307
*0727223*
Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community
1 In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status.
2 Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences — almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress could be achieved.
3 My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.
4 Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.
5 The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.
S/2007/168
Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option
1 A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.
2 For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply not tenable.
Continued international administration is not sustainable
1 While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration.
2 Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.
Independence with international supervision is the only viable option
1 Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia.
2 While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life.
3 Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests.
4 I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.
5 Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.
Conclusion
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.
S/2007/168
16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.
Annex
Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
I. General
1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.
II. Provisions of the Settlement
1 Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.
2 Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.
3 Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the
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areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.
1 Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.
2 Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.
3 Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.
4 Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.
9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that
the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.
5 Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.
6 International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.
7 European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.
8 International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.
9 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.
III. Implementation
1 Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.
2 During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.
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1 At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.
2 Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.
Proposals for Kosovo Statuse
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Press StatementTom Casey, Deputy SpokesmanWashington, DCMarch 26, 2007
Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status
After over a year of negotiations, UN Special Envoy and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari has delivered to the UN Secretary General his proposals for Kosovo's future status. We are grateful to President Ahtisaari for his patient, skillful and balanced work leading the Kosovo status process.
The United States welcomes and supports his recommendations.
The UN Special Envoy's proposals will give the people of Kosovo clarity about their future for the first time in many years. They contain far-reaching guarantees to protect the rights and security of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities. President Ahtisaari has also proposed that Kosovo become independent, subject to a period of international supervision.
The Kosovo status process is entering its final and decisive phase. As the UN Security Council prepares to review President Ahtisaari's recommendations, we will be engaged in full and intensive consultations with our Security Council partners and the parties.
The resolution of Kosovo's status should be seen in the historical context of the tragic circumstances of the break-up of Yugoslavia, which began in the 1990s. The UN Security Council, which in 1999 passed a resolution that placed Kosovo under UN administration and envisioned a political process to determine status, has long treated Kosovo as a special case.
Since the crisis in this region began sixteen years ago, President George W. Bush and his two predecessors have worked to realize a vision of a Europe, whole, free and at peace. We believe that President Ahtisaari's proposals will allow the region to move beyond the conflicts of the 1990s and towards a brighter Euro-Atlantic future.
2007/230 Released on March 26, 2007
Press StatementTom Casey, Deputy SpokesmanWashington, DCMarch 26, 2007
Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status
After over a year of negotiations, UN Special Envoy and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari has delivered to the UN Secretary General his proposals for Kosovo's future status. We are grateful to President Ahtisaari for his patient, skillful and balanced work leading the Kosovo status process.
The United States welcomes and supports his recommendations.
The UN Special Envoy's proposals will give the people of Kosovo clarity about their future for the first time in many years. They contain far-reaching guarantees to protect the rights and security of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities. President Ahtisaari has also proposed that Kosovo become independent, subject to a period of international supervision.
The Kosovo status process is entering its final and decisive phase. As the UN Security Council prepares to review President Ahtisaari's recommendations, we will be engaged in full and intensive consultations with our Security Council partners and the parties.
The resolution of Kosovo's status should be seen in the historical context of the tragic circumstances of the break-up of Yugoslavia, which began in the 1990s. The UN Security Council, which in 1999 passed a resolution that placed Kosovo under UN administration and envisioned a political process to determine status, has long treated Kosovo as a special case.
Since the crisis in this region began sixteen years ago, President George W. Bush and his two predecessors have worked to realize a vision of a Europe, whole, free and at peace. We believe that President Ahtisaari's proposals will allow the region to move beyond the conflicts of the 1990s and towards a brighter Euro-Atlantic future.
2007/230 Released on March 26, 2007
11 March 2007
Kosovo's Road to Independence
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By Morton Abramowitz7 March 2007The Wall Street JournalKosovo, still trying to emerge from Belgrade's longand difficult rule and more recently frominternational control, has a long way to go toestablish a viable, stable state. But its slow,halting progress is being impeded by its former Serbmasters, backed in the United Nations by Russia.Once the poorest and mostly forgotten part of theformer Yugoslavia, Kosovo still suffers from massiveunemployment, weak political institutions, and muchcorruption. But it is an increasingly vital place, andits energetic people are looking for a new burst ofactivity when independence finally arrives. Meanwhile, Serbia's glory has dimmed. It could becomea dynamic state, as evidenced by recent market reformsand an uptick in economic activity. But it is nolonger a political leader or the hub of the WesternBalkans, and it is unlikely to resume its formerprominence. For some 15 years its people have enduredSlobodan Milosevic, war, international isolation,declining living standards and Belgrade'smismanagement. And if its leaders persist in fightingto the end to hold Kosovo -- and even after defeat totry to undermine an independent Kosovo -- that willnot change much. Kosovo independence is very muchabout Serbia's future.Persistence seems to be the order of the day inBelgrade. The Serb political class, led by PrimeMinister Vojislav Kostunica, is risking the future oftheir country in a desperate attempt to hold on to aterritory they do not control, for a people who wantno part of Serbia, and whom Serbia does not want aspart of its polity. Indeed Kosovo has already beensevered from Serbia.Mr. Kostunica has spent the past year doing his bestto belittle the U.N. secretary-general' s special envoyfor a Kosovo settlement, former Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari, and to resolutely oppose hisproposal for the final status of the territory. Thatproposal provides for what is commonly called"supervised independence, " heavy protection for anunderstandably frightened Serb population and Orthodoxreligious sites, and an EU mission with significantpower over the new state.Mr. Kostunica also spent the year trying to delaymovement on Mr. Ahtisaari's proposal, hopeful thatdelay would enable him to generate support for Serbiansovereignty in a wavering Europe and perhaps sparkviolent behavior from the Kosovo Albanians. Inpursuing delay, Mr. Kostunica crafted and won (in amuch questioned referendum last October) a newconstitution whose preamble proclaims Kosovo aninalienable part of Serbia. He recently threateneddire if unspecified action against any staterecognizing Kosovo's independence. And now there iseven much talk in Belgrade of partitioning Kosovo,which the West has resolutely opposed.Mr. Ahtisaari is expected make his recommendations forKosovo's final status this week, which the U.N.Security Council will take up later this month. TheU.S. and EU countries will accept them and supportrepeal of its resolution 1244 of 1999, that providesfor Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. This will ineffect endorse Kosovo's path to declaringindependence. Mr. Kostunica is pinning his hopes onRussia vetoing any such action, thus leaving 1244intact.Moscow presently asserts that both parties must agreeto any Kosovo settlement, in effect endorsingcontinued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Russia,which has contributed little to the Balkans the past20 years, is threatening to upend the settlement longsought by the West, which has invested enormousresources to bring a measure of stability to the area.Whether in the end Russia vetoes a new U.N. resolutionremains to be seen. Much depends on the determinationof the West to proceed. If the West can not get theRussians to at least abstain on a new resolution, anessentially regional issue becomes a far messierproblem with wider geopolitical concerns. In thatevent the U.S. and EU countries will have to find thefortitude to recognize Kosovo's independence withoutthe stamp of legitimacy of a new U.N. resolution.The Security Council faces a dilemma. Breaking up acountry is a rare event. A number of countries want alegal basis for Kosovo independence, and may proveunwilling to recognize an independent Kosovo withoutone. But many countries also realize that Serbia haslost Kosovo, and that Kosovo independence is essentialto reduce uncertainty in the Balkans and remove amajor cause of instability. Moreover, the chance ofboth Serbia and Kosovo to prosper and be integratedinto the EU requires a resolution of Kosovo's status.Nor does independence necessarily end the Kosovoproblem. Kosovo is not Montenegro, whose separationfrom Serbia was also fiercely resisted by Mr.Kostunica. Many Serbs have a deep emotional attachmentto Kosovo which is easy for foreigners to discount.Serbia's leaders have to decide whether they want toaccept the verdict of the West, to cooperate inshaping a new Balkans, including an independentKosovo, and to pursue seriously membership in the EU.Or do they search for every means to destabilize thenew Kosovo and their neighborhood? The answer is notapparent. Serbia's progress lies in its leaders'hands.Mr. Abramowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, isa senior fellow at the Century Foundation.
By Morton Abramowitz7 March 2007The Wall Street JournalKosovo, still trying to emerge from Belgrade's longand difficult rule and more recently frominternational control, has a long way to go toestablish a viable, stable state. But its slow,halting progress is being impeded by its former Serbmasters, backed in the United Nations by Russia.Once the poorest and mostly forgotten part of theformer Yugoslavia, Kosovo still suffers from massiveunemployment, weak political institutions, and muchcorruption. But it is an increasingly vital place, andits energetic people are looking for a new burst ofactivity when independence finally arrives. Meanwhile, Serbia's glory has dimmed. It could becomea dynamic state, as evidenced by recent market reformsand an uptick in economic activity. But it is nolonger a political leader or the hub of the WesternBalkans, and it is unlikely to resume its formerprominence. For some 15 years its people have enduredSlobodan Milosevic, war, international isolation,declining living standards and Belgrade'smismanagement. And if its leaders persist in fightingto the end to hold Kosovo -- and even after defeat totry to undermine an independent Kosovo -- that willnot change much. Kosovo independence is very muchabout Serbia's future.Persistence seems to be the order of the day inBelgrade. The Serb political class, led by PrimeMinister Vojislav Kostunica, is risking the future oftheir country in a desperate attempt to hold on to aterritory they do not control, for a people who wantno part of Serbia, and whom Serbia does not want aspart of its polity. Indeed Kosovo has already beensevered from Serbia.Mr. Kostunica has spent the past year doing his bestto belittle the U.N. secretary-general' s special envoyfor a Kosovo settlement, former Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari, and to resolutely oppose hisproposal for the final status of the territory. Thatproposal provides for what is commonly called"supervised independence, " heavy protection for anunderstandably frightened Serb population and Orthodoxreligious sites, and an EU mission with significantpower over the new state.Mr. Kostunica also spent the year trying to delaymovement on Mr. Ahtisaari's proposal, hopeful thatdelay would enable him to generate support for Serbiansovereignty in a wavering Europe and perhaps sparkviolent behavior from the Kosovo Albanians. Inpursuing delay, Mr. Kostunica crafted and won (in amuch questioned referendum last October) a newconstitution whose preamble proclaims Kosovo aninalienable part of Serbia. He recently threateneddire if unspecified action against any staterecognizing Kosovo's independence. And now there iseven much talk in Belgrade of partitioning Kosovo,which the West has resolutely opposed.Mr. Ahtisaari is expected make his recommendations forKosovo's final status this week, which the U.N.Security Council will take up later this month. TheU.S. and EU countries will accept them and supportrepeal of its resolution 1244 of 1999, that providesfor Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. This will ineffect endorse Kosovo's path to declaringindependence. Mr. Kostunica is pinning his hopes onRussia vetoing any such action, thus leaving 1244intact.Moscow presently asserts that both parties must agreeto any Kosovo settlement, in effect endorsingcontinued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Russia,which has contributed little to the Balkans the past20 years, is threatening to upend the settlement longsought by the West, which has invested enormousresources to bring a measure of stability to the area.Whether in the end Russia vetoes a new U.N. resolutionremains to be seen. Much depends on the determinationof the West to proceed. If the West can not get theRussians to at least abstain on a new resolution, anessentially regional issue becomes a far messierproblem with wider geopolitical concerns. In thatevent the U.S. and EU countries will have to find thefortitude to recognize Kosovo's independence withoutthe stamp of legitimacy of a new U.N. resolution.The Security Council faces a dilemma. Breaking up acountry is a rare event. A number of countries want alegal basis for Kosovo independence, and may proveunwilling to recognize an independent Kosovo withoutone. But many countries also realize that Serbia haslost Kosovo, and that Kosovo independence is essentialto reduce uncertainty in the Balkans and remove amajor cause of instability. Moreover, the chance ofboth Serbia and Kosovo to prosper and be integratedinto the EU requires a resolution of Kosovo's status.Nor does independence necessarily end the Kosovoproblem. Kosovo is not Montenegro, whose separationfrom Serbia was also fiercely resisted by Mr.Kostunica. Many Serbs have a deep emotional attachmentto Kosovo which is easy for foreigners to discount.Serbia's leaders have to decide whether they want toaccept the verdict of the West, to cooperate inshaping a new Balkans, including an independentKosovo, and to pursue seriously membership in the EU.Or do they search for every means to destabilize thenew Kosovo and their neighborhood? The answer is notapparent. Serbia's progress lies in its leaders'hands.Mr. Abramowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, isa senior fellow at the Century Foundation.
U.N. Hopes Ex-Rebels Will Buy Into Kosovo Peace Deal
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By NICHOLAS WOOD NYTVITINA, Kosovo, March 8 — Hajriz Jakupi is not happy.Over the past few weeks Mr. Jakupi, a former guerrillafighter, has been learning the details of a settlementthat most of the ethnic Albanians who dominate Kosovo say should lead to an independent state. That is adream that he and the other Albanians have long been a waiting. It is the quid pro quo that angers him: that therelatively few Serbs living in Kosovo would havecontrol over certain pockets that include a number ofAlbanian villages, one of which is his own, justoutside this town. “It’s an offense,” Mr. Jakupi said, raising his voice.“It is our territory, it is our land,” he said,speaking of the ethnic Albanians who because of theplanned boundaries would become a minority in themunicipality he comes from.How former fighters like Mr. Jakupi behave in the nextweeks and months will be crucial to the success of theplan devised by the United Nations, which would enablethe Albanians to seek recognition as an independentstate. For now, Mr. Jakupi said, he will express hisopposition “in a peaceful manner.”The calculation of the United Nations is that peoplelike Mr. Jakupi and other former fighters in theAlbanian rebel group called the Kosovo Liberation Armywill accept the deal, since it gives the Albanianpopulation considerable independence, though with adose of international supervision. The United Nations hopes to scale back amultibillion- dollar exercise in which it has beenengaged for nearly eight years, tying down thousandsof peacekeeping troops. Its proposals, which havetaken more than a year to prepare, are expected to goto the Security Council for a vote by June. But as planning proceeds, there is also a worry thatthings might go wrong, and not only among people likeMr. Jakupi, who have been quick to fight before. Mr. Jakupi, 35, leads a group of former fighters fromthe Kosovo Liberation Army, which waged an insurgencyagainst Serbian security forces from 1997 to 1999, aconflict that took 10,000 lives and ultimately forcedNATO to intervene. Some of his colleagues were at thecenter of two other insurgencies, in Macedonia andsouthern Serbia, in 2001. Much also depends on Serbia. It is loath to loseKosovo, a province it controlled for most of the 20thcentury and regards as central to its history andidentity. Many Serbs living in Kosovo are weighingwhether to leave. There is also worry that Serbia willsimply hold on to that northern part of Kosovo wherethe Serbs are centered, splitting the province and notrecognizing the new arrangements on the ground. TheUnited Nations and NATO have never been able to exertdominance in that area. That could provoke renewed conflict, top UnitedNations officials and regional experts warn, fromarmed ethnic Albanians determined to retain Kosovo’scurrent boundaries. Another player in addressing the issue is Russia,which has hinted that it might veto the settlement inthe Security Council. “If independence is not recognized, I think peoplewill take up arms,” Mr. Jakupi said. “It is theminimum we can accept. This is what our heroes gavetheir lives for in the war.”Even if things go well, international and localofficials say, ethnic divisions will not allow thequick exit of peacekeepers and administrators thatother countries involved in the planning hope for. Europe and the United States will need to play therole of arbitrator in the divided and economicallybackward region for years, according to this view,having some oversight over the new government and anability to amend laws and remove public officials. Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June1999, after a 78-day NATO-led bombing campaign forcedout the Serbian security forces accused of atrocitiesagainst ethnic Albanians.Years later there is little doubt among United Nationsofficials that their time here should come to an end,allowing the European Union to take the lead, thoughwith responsibilities much reduced from those theUnited Nations had and with most decision-makingpowers in the hands of the Albanian-led government.Ethnic Albanians are increasingly impatient to controltheir own affairs and have taken their anger outagainst the United Nations. There are frequentprotests against the United Nations in Pristina, theregional capital, most recently on Saturday, whenseveral thousand people marched past the UnitedNations headquarters shouting, “U.N. out.” Under proposals by the United Nations’ chiefnegotiator for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, the UnitedNations would be replaced by a European Union-ledmission with limited but real powers, but Kosovo wouldrun considerable operations on its own. Controls would be put in place to protect minorities.Serbian areas would control their own affairs inhealth and education in five new municipalities, withsome funds from the Serbian government. The EuropeanCommission has allocated 120 million euros (about $158million) over three years to help the minoritycommunities adjust. For the Serbs, “this is attractive, if they engage,”said Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the European Union officialin charge of planning for the next administration.But Serbia’s record of engagement in Kosovo suggeststhat ordinary Serbs may not interact with the newgovernment as much as European officials might wish. For six years Serbia has been putting pressure onSerbs living in Kosovo to keep them from cooperatingwith international or Albanian institutions here,threatening to dock the pay of government workers liketeachers or hospital workers or to cut off theirpensions.Serbia’s prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, anationalist, has said his government will neverrecognize an independent Kosovo. “It will be very hard to implement if the Serbiangovernment is against it,” said Oliver Ivanovic, oneof a handful of Serbian politicians who take part inethnic-Albanian- dominated institutions in Kosovo. Others are also worried that things not will proceedby the book, most notably in the Serbian-dominatednorth of Kosovo.“Here we are just a few months from settlement day andwe don’t know how or what to do,” said Kim Vetting, anadviser with the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe. “How do we maintain controlthere? Nobody is coming up with any answer.”
By NICHOLAS WOOD NYTVITINA, Kosovo, March 8 — Hajriz Jakupi is not happy.Over the past few weeks Mr. Jakupi, a former guerrillafighter, has been learning the details of a settlementthat most of the ethnic Albanians who dominate Kosovo say should lead to an independent state. That is adream that he and the other Albanians have long been a waiting. It is the quid pro quo that angers him: that therelatively few Serbs living in Kosovo would havecontrol over certain pockets that include a number ofAlbanian villages, one of which is his own, justoutside this town. “It’s an offense,” Mr. Jakupi said, raising his voice.“It is our territory, it is our land,” he said,speaking of the ethnic Albanians who because of theplanned boundaries would become a minority in themunicipality he comes from.How former fighters like Mr. Jakupi behave in the nextweeks and months will be crucial to the success of theplan devised by the United Nations, which would enablethe Albanians to seek recognition as an independentstate. For now, Mr. Jakupi said, he will express hisopposition “in a peaceful manner.”The calculation of the United Nations is that peoplelike Mr. Jakupi and other former fighters in theAlbanian rebel group called the Kosovo Liberation Armywill accept the deal, since it gives the Albanianpopulation considerable independence, though with adose of international supervision. The United Nations hopes to scale back amultibillion- dollar exercise in which it has beenengaged for nearly eight years, tying down thousandsof peacekeeping troops. Its proposals, which havetaken more than a year to prepare, are expected to goto the Security Council for a vote by June. But as planning proceeds, there is also a worry thatthings might go wrong, and not only among people likeMr. Jakupi, who have been quick to fight before. Mr. Jakupi, 35, leads a group of former fighters fromthe Kosovo Liberation Army, which waged an insurgencyagainst Serbian security forces from 1997 to 1999, aconflict that took 10,000 lives and ultimately forcedNATO to intervene. Some of his colleagues were at thecenter of two other insurgencies, in Macedonia andsouthern Serbia, in 2001. Much also depends on Serbia. It is loath to loseKosovo, a province it controlled for most of the 20thcentury and regards as central to its history andidentity. Many Serbs living in Kosovo are weighingwhether to leave. There is also worry that Serbia willsimply hold on to that northern part of Kosovo wherethe Serbs are centered, splitting the province and notrecognizing the new arrangements on the ground. TheUnited Nations and NATO have never been able to exertdominance in that area. That could provoke renewed conflict, top UnitedNations officials and regional experts warn, fromarmed ethnic Albanians determined to retain Kosovo’scurrent boundaries. Another player in addressing the issue is Russia,which has hinted that it might veto the settlement inthe Security Council. “If independence is not recognized, I think peoplewill take up arms,” Mr. Jakupi said. “It is theminimum we can accept. This is what our heroes gavetheir lives for in the war.”Even if things go well, international and localofficials say, ethnic divisions will not allow thequick exit of peacekeepers and administrators thatother countries involved in the planning hope for. Europe and the United States will need to play therole of arbitrator in the divided and economicallybackward region for years, according to this view,having some oversight over the new government and anability to amend laws and remove public officials. Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June1999, after a 78-day NATO-led bombing campaign forcedout the Serbian security forces accused of atrocitiesagainst ethnic Albanians.Years later there is little doubt among United Nationsofficials that their time here should come to an end,allowing the European Union to take the lead, thoughwith responsibilities much reduced from those theUnited Nations had and with most decision-makingpowers in the hands of the Albanian-led government.Ethnic Albanians are increasingly impatient to controltheir own affairs and have taken their anger outagainst the United Nations. There are frequentprotests against the United Nations in Pristina, theregional capital, most recently on Saturday, whenseveral thousand people marched past the UnitedNations headquarters shouting, “U.N. out.” Under proposals by the United Nations’ chiefnegotiator for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, the UnitedNations would be replaced by a European Union-ledmission with limited but real powers, but Kosovo wouldrun considerable operations on its own. Controls would be put in place to protect minorities.Serbian areas would control their own affairs inhealth and education in five new municipalities, withsome funds from the Serbian government. The EuropeanCommission has allocated 120 million euros (about $158million) over three years to help the minoritycommunities adjust. For the Serbs, “this is attractive, if they engage,”said Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the European Union officialin charge of planning for the next administration.But Serbia’s record of engagement in Kosovo suggeststhat ordinary Serbs may not interact with the newgovernment as much as European officials might wish. For six years Serbia has been putting pressure onSerbs living in Kosovo to keep them from cooperatingwith international or Albanian institutions here,threatening to dock the pay of government workers liketeachers or hospital workers or to cut off theirpensions.Serbia’s prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, anationalist, has said his government will neverrecognize an independent Kosovo. “It will be very hard to implement if the Serbiangovernment is against it,” said Oliver Ivanovic, oneof a handful of Serbian politicians who take part inethnic-Albanian- dominated institutions in Kosovo. Others are also worried that things not will proceedby the book, most notably in the Serbian-dominatednorth of Kosovo.“Here we are just a few months from settlement day andwe don’t know how or what to do,” said Kim Vetting, anadviser with the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe. “How do we maintain controlthere? Nobody is coming up with any answer.”
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