22 July 2007

Kosovo: A Short History, by Noel Malcolm

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If we needed any reminder of what is at stake in the present crisis over Kosovo, Noel Malcolm offers us, on the first page of his new history, a chilling forecast. "It is arguably the area with the worst human-rights abuses in the whole of Europe, and certainly the place where, if war does break out, the killing and destruction will be more intense than anything hitherto witnessed in the region." A grim prospect, indeed, especially coming on the heels of the war in Bosnia, the origins of which Malcolm has already outlined for us in his admirable Bosnia: A Short History.

As with his earlier study, Malcolm opens his historical account with the migration of the Slavs into the Balkans in the declining years of the Roman Empire. The Roman hegemony was succeeded by that of Byzantium, at least in name, for the Serbs, Albanians, and Vlachs were a turbulent people, not readily subjugated. One of the great obstacles that Malcolm runs up against is the absolute dearth of historical material about events in Kosovo from the ninth to the fourteenth century--five hundred years, of which virtually nothing is known other than the extension of Serbian control over Kosovo in the early thirteenth century.

The veil begins to lift in the late fourteenth century--by which time the Serbian state itself was breaking up--with the semi-mythical battle of Kosovo Polje, a few miles northwest of Prishtina, in 1389, when a combined Serbian-Bosnian army was defeated by an Ottoman force under the command of Sultan Murat I. Almost nothing is known for certain about the battle, apart from the fact that both Murat and the Serbian commander were slain; yet the Serbs persist to this day in celebrating it as one of the glorious moments in their history. Malcolm has an enjoyable time examining and exposing as fraudulent the myths the Serbs have woven around Kosovo Polje over the centuries, an exposure which will doubtless be accorded a surly reception in Belgrade.

The last vestiges of Serbian control over Kosovo vanished in the middle of the fifteenth century, after the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Thereafter Kosovo remained an Ottoman possession for four and a half centuries. Signs of discontent, even sporadic rebellions, were manifested from time to time; but the Kosovars in general remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. Even the so-called League of Prizren, set up in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to press for greater local autonomy, was essentially a Muslim religious movement which did not question the Sultan's ultimate authority. Even so, it did not escape retribution from Constantinople. The Sublime Porte acted quickly to suppress the League, and the Kosovars remained quiet and well-behaved for the next thirty years.

Turkish rule over Kosovo ended in 1912, when Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro all went to war with the Ottoman Empire. The Serbians quickly overran Kosovo, and over the next two years, by a policy of systematic butchery and destruction of property, they gave the Albanian inhabitants a foretaste of what was to be their lot under Serbian rule in the years ahead. A respite was afforded the Kosovars by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, when the Austrians occupied the northern half of the country, and the Bulgarians the southern. But the postwar settlement placed the Kosovars once more under the rule of Belgrade, when the province was incorporated in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thousands of Serbian and Montenegrin colonists were settled in the province, riding roughshod, in most cases, over the Albanians' property as well as their civil rights.

Much the same fate befell Kosovo during the Second World War. After the German invasion of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 the province was divided between Italy and Bulgaria, the lion's share going to the Italians, who were then more or less in control of Albania. In the course of the war the bulk of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the country fled or were driven out. Only a minority of them returned after 1945, making up around 12 per cent of the population. By 1991 they accounted for only 11 per cent, while the Kosovar Albanians accounted for 82 per cent, a discrepancy due in large measure to the Albanians' higher birth rate. (Serbia, by way of contrast, boasted--if that is the right word--the highest abortion rate in Europe.)

Malcolm does not believe that Tito treated Kosovo too badly. Perhaps, being a Croat, Tito had some sympathy for non-Serbian minorities. All the same, his years as dictator saw the implementation of a deliberate anti-Islamic policy in Kosovo: madrasas (Koranic schools) were closed down, the shari'ah courts were suppressed, and the Dervish orders were outlawed. Yugoslavia had been reconstituted after 1945 as a federation of six republics. Kosovo was declared an "autonomous region," although remaining a constituent part of Serbia. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo a status almost equivalent to that of the six republics, though not quite. To have categorized Kosovo as a republic might well have opened the road to secession, perhaps even to the unification of Kosovo with Albania. So it remained constitutionally part of Serbia, the Kosovars being classified as a nationality, not a nation.

The screws were turned on Kosovo after the death of Tito. Serbian propaganda in the 1980s depicted the Kosovars as a mob of ruffians and rapists who were making life unbearable for the Serbian colonists in their midst. This alleged persecution of the Kosovar Serbs provided the theme that Slobodan Milosevic, then seeking an issue that might help propel him into the presidency of Yugoslavia, lost little time in appropriating. It served him well. After winning the presidency he moved to amend the Serbian constitution in the spring of 1989 so as to reduce Kosovo's autonomy and to invest Serbia with control over the region's judicial system, as well as ultimate authority over its social, economic, and educational institutions. A year later the provincial assembly and government were dissolved by order of Belgrade, most of the Albanian Kosovars holding government posts were dismissed, and the majority of Albanian doctors practicing in the provincial hospitals were discharged. To add to these various insults the Serbs embarked upon a propaganda campaign at the time of the Serbian attack on Bosnia in the spring of 1992, conjuring up the specter of a vast Muslim conspiracy to undermine the Yugoslav federation. For the Muslim Albanians of Kosovo it was the last straw.

It has to be confessed that Noel Malcolm's book is not an easy read--for this reviewer, at least--which makes one look a little askance at the praise which has been bestowed upon it by numerous reviewers in the British press. (The exception, which must have caused Malcolm some amusement, was a sour appraisal by Douglas Hurd, the Conservative former foreign secretary, who had been roasted by Malcolm in his earlier book for his, Hurd's, limp-wristed approach to the Bosnian conflict.) Although Kosovo is a work of considerable scholarship, it is not without some minor flaws, more particularly in its references to Islamic institutions. For instance, it is not correct to speak of Muslim "clergy" or Islamic "theology"; and the shari'ah is more a system or codification of law, tout court, than of religious or canon law. But these are small errors in a work on Balkan history, mere slips of the pen which do not detract in any substantial way from the overall worth of Malcolm's book.

Mr. Kelly is an historian of the modern Middle East.

COPYRIGHT 1998 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group

15 July 2007

Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves

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Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves

Pergatiti: L.Komani

Disa artikuj interesante mund te lexohen ne edicionet e dy diteve te fundit te disa gazetave te rendesishme te huaja. Po e sjellim si vijon esencen e secilit prej tyre. Shquajme cka thene z.Veton Surroi lidhur me Planin B qe eshte ne shqyrtim e siper dhe e vendosim dhe si titull per kete permbledhje.

Gazeta NY Times flet mbi mundesine e nje vendimi jashte OKB-se per pavaresine e Kosoves duke iu referuar fjaleve te ambasadorit amerikan prane OKB-se, z.Zalmay Khalilzad.
Gazeta austriake Die Presse nxirrte ne pah fjalet e ministrit te jashtem francez, z.Bernard Kouchner ne adrese te qeverise serbe, sipas se cilave Serbia nuk mund t’i kundervihet nje plani perendimor per pavaresine e Kosoves e njekohesisht te pretendoje pranimin ne BE. Sipas tij eshte e pamundur per nje shtet te hyje ne BE me nje konflikt etnik brenda vetes. Gazeta Der Standard i referohej z.Veton Surroi, sipas te cilit rruga deri tek pavaresia permes OKB-se eshte deshmuar si rruge qorre. Plani A ka deshtuar dhe tani po punohet per planin B. Dhe per kete plan nuk jane te nevojshme bisedime me Rusine.
Gazeta Le Monde ka sjelle dje nje artikull nga Denis MacShane, ish-minister britanik per Evropen, ku thuren mes te tjerash lavde per Serbine dhe popullin serb dhe ku shtrohet pyetja mbi kush vendos per politiken e jashtme BE-se, Bashkimi Evropian apo Rusia. Ne artikull argumentohet ne menyre te tille qe ne fund te mberrihet ne ceshtjen kyce: a do ta lejoje veten BE qe te kushtezohet nga Rusia cka do te conte ne thellimin e ndasive me SHBA-ne? A nuk do t’i jepte kjo shkas forcave militante te Kosoves qe tashme durimi I politikaneve te zgjedhur te zevendesohet me aksione me te forta. Sipas ish-ministrit zgjidhja e lojes eshte si vijon: nje Serbi e liruar nga Kosova qe ribashkohet me Kroacine dhe Sllovenine ne nje Bashkim Evropian dhe nje NATO qe mund te sjellin prosperitet dhe siguri ne Ballkan. Evropa dhe jo Rusia duhet te vendose per te ardhmen e rajonit.



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Ne vazhdim per lexim individual artikujt nga NY Times dhe nga Le Monde:


U.S. May Bypass the U.N. for Kosovo Independence

By WARREN HOGE
Published: July 14, 2007

UNITED NATIONS, July 13 — Declaring the need for a timely decision on Kosovo’s desire for independence from Serbia, the United States threatened Friday to seek a solution outside the United Nations if Russia persisted in blocking Security Council action.
“We are determined to move forward, either within the Council or otherwise,” Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, said in a conference call with news agency reporters.
Russia supports Serbia’s determination to prevent Kosovo, Serbia’s breakaway western province, from becoming independent and has threatened to use its veto if the matter comes to a vote.
“The noises that we hear from Moscow are not encouraging, but we have not heard the final word from Moscow, and it is up to Russia whether the Council plays a role in deciding the next stage in regard to Kosovo or not,” Mr. Khalilzad said.
On Friday, the United States and its European allies circulated a new Kosovo resolution with the latest of a half-dozen revisions aimed at overcoming Russian objections.
Kosovo, with a population that is 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbian, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign in 1999 that pushed Serbian forces from the province.
The original resolution called for a managed independence under the aegis of the European Union, with built-in protections for the Serbs.
It endorsed a plan laid out by Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations special envoy, after 13 months of direct talks between Serbia and Kosovo that he said in March had produced an impasse. Russia had said it would not agree to any measure that resulting in Kosovo independence.
The latest version of the resolution calls for 120 days of new negotiations that, contrary to an earlier formulation, would not result in an automatic return to the Ahtisaari model in the event the talks failed.
Mr. Khalilzad indicated the latest revision might be the last and said he would push Monday for a decision on whether and when to schedule a vote.
“The core of what we are proposing is in there and is not subject to further changes,” he said, except what he called “the wording at the margins.”
Striking a balance that will satisfy Moscow is sure to provoke the leaders of Kosovo, who have threatened to declare unilateral independence if the United Nations does not act.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s secretary general, warned in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday that there was a danger of going from a “controlled to an uncontrolled” outcome unless both sides showed restraint.




Point de vue
Poutine, l'Europe et les Balkans, par Denis MacShane

Qui décide aujourd'hui de la politique étrangère de l'Union européenne, les nations européennes ou le Kremlin ? Tandis que les europhobes à Paris et Londres ont toujours à coeur de dénoncer Bruxelles comme source d'interférence avec les Etats européens souverains, Moscou en profite pour dire à l'Europe ce qui peut ou ne peut pas être fait en matière de politique étrangère.

Les problèmes sont connus, que ce soit la question de la défense antimissile, la guerre cybernétique contre les Etats baltes ou le meurtre d'Alexandre Litvinenko à Londres. Mais la Russie semble, en outre, convaincue que c'est elle, et non l'UE, qui décidera de l'avenir des Balkans. La Slovénie est déjà dans l'Union européenne, et la Croatie en route vers l'accession. L'enjeu réel pour la paix et la stabilité dans la région est donc incarné par la Serbie. Les Serbes sont la nation dominante des Balkans, et Belgrade leur capitale. Le peuple serbe est intelligent, éduqué, multilingue, membre d'une société postindustrielle ; il est prêt, une fois que la Serbie sera membre de l'UE, à entraîner la région entière vers son rendez-vous avec la modernité.

Un obstacle de taille subsiste cependant : le refus de Belgrade de comprendre que l'époque de son contrôle du Kosovo a pris fin. Les connexions historiques, religieuses et culturelles entre la Serbie et le Kosovo ne peuvent être discutées. Elles sont aussi fortes que les liens qui existaient entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande à la veille de l'indépendance irlandaise. Mais le Kosovo s'est libéré de manière pacifique du joug serbe dans les années 1980 et 1990, avant que sa population ne s'oppose, au cours d'une guerre armée cruelle, à la brutalité des milices de Milosevic. L'Europe et les Etats-Unis ont alors enfin décidé d'intervenir afin de mettre fin aux massacres. Mais ils ont ensuite laissé le Kosovo dans les limbes, certes sous contrôle des Nations unies mais toujours légalement territoire serbe. Des émissaires puissants furent envoyés sans succès à Pristina, dont le nouveau ministre français des affaires étrangères, Bernard Kouchner.
Tant qu'un accord de paix ne sera pas conclu, le peuple kosovar et son Etat putatif n'auront ni la reconnaissance ni la responsabilité nécessaires pour agir en leur propre nom.

La non-indépendance et la non-reconnaissance du Kosovo ne font plus sens. Le Kosovo doit être libéré de la tutelle serbe, précisément afin de permettre à la Serbie de rejoindre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN. En privé, tous les responsables et dirigeants politiques serbes sérieux, à l'exception des ultranationalistes et des derniers fidèles de Milosevic, acceptent que le Kosovo ne sera plus jamais contrôlé par Belgrade. En public, personne à Belgrade n'a le courage de le dire.

A la demande des Nations unies, l'ancien président finlandais Martii Ahtisaari vient de proposer un plan d'action pour sortir de la crise qui permet une indépendance conditionnelle du Kosovo sous la supervision de l'UE. Ce plan de bon sens a été accepté par les Américains et les Européens.

Mais il ne satisfait pas la Russie, qui se montre plus serbe que les Serbes et a annoncé sa décision d'utiliser son droit de veto au conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Apparemment, sa justification principale est que Pristina et Belgrade doivent se mettre d'accord elles-mêmes. En réalité, étant donné que les Serbes refuseront l'indépendance même conditionnelle du Kosovo, la position de Moscou est malhonnête et témoigne de la volonté russe de n'accepter aucun règlement final du conflit. L'ambition de Moscou est davantage la balkanisation de l'Europe que l'européanisation des Balkans.

L'Union européenne est donc face à un choix décisif. Autorisera-t-elle la prise en otage par le Kremlin de sa politique étrangère dans les Balkans, ce qui pourrait conduire à un renforcement des divisions entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis ? Cela ne risquerait-il pas de convaincre les militants têtes brûlées du Kosovo que le pacifisme et la patience des dirigeants élus du Kosovo doivent désormais être remplacés par des actions plus fortes ?

La fin de partie est claire. Il ne peut s'agir que d'une Serbie libérée du Kosovo, rejoignant la Croatie et la Slovénie dans une Union européenne et une OTAN qui puissent apporter prospérité et sécurité aux Balkans. L'Europe, et non la Russie, devrait décider de l'avenir de la région.

14 July 2007

Kosovo is back in the headlines

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Kosovo must be independen by Former Foreign Ministers


Kosovo is back in the headlines. President George W. Bush says that it should become independent soon. President Vladimir Putin of Russia opposes independence and prefers time for more talks. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has suggested that we move forward, with a six-month delay.

This has a familiar ring to it. Eight years ago, many of us - then foreign ministers - put in place an international process to decide who should govern Kosovo. We believe that the only viable option is for Kosovo to become independent under strict supervision. That is the proposal that is currently before the UN Security Council and is part of the process that the Council, including Russia, agreed upon and has implemented since 1999.

Kosovo is the last substantial territorial issue remaining from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. In 2005, as called for by decisions of the Security Council, the UN secretary general appointed a special envoy - former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland - to achieve a political settlement.

After 14 months of negotiations with the leaderships of Serbia and Kosovo, Ahtisaari announced that the irreconcilable positions of the two parties had made consensus unattainable and that no amount of additional talks would overcome the impasse. In lieu of a negotiated agreement by all sides, Ahtisaari proposed that Kosovo receive independence supervised by the international community (primarily the European Union and NATO) and provide strong guarantees for the Serbs who live in Kosovo.

Now is the time to act. Tensions are likely to rise, and they certainly will not cool. Moreover, without a resolution on Kosovo's final status, the future of Serbia and Kosovo will remain uncertain.

Some may say that Russia would prefer this limbo to a situation where Serbia and Kosovo join the European Union and NATO. Serbs and Kosovars should prefer otherwise. They deserve to be in the European Union. And Kosovo cannot develop as things stand. It has been unable to gain access to international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy, or attract the political capital it needs to address its widespread unemployment and poverty.

Russia has complained of not being included in talks. It should participate, but constructively and not just to block it. What may be needed is a formulation that allows Russia to acquiesce without having to break openly with Serbia. Russia can reassure Serbs and emphasize that Kosovo is a unique situation, without precedent for other regions.

The Ahtisaari plan has several advantages. It gives rights to Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs to manage their own affairs within a democratic Kosovo, which will be protected and monitored by the international community. It also requires protection for Orthodox and Serbian cultural and religious sites. Finally, it provides for an international presence that will oversee Kosovo's institutions and monitor the settlement's implementation. It also places Kosovo on the road toward EU integration.

The European Union has agreed to supervise Kosovo during the transition period and deploy a police mission alongside the current NATO peacekeeping force. An indefinite delay caused by continued confusion over Kosovo's status could jeopardize a smooth transition to European oversight.

Kosovo is a unique situation that has required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 in response to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, it laid the groundwork for a political process that would ultimately determine Kosovo's future.

We know that all decisions on Kosovo are difficult. Some of us kicked the issue down the road eight years ago. Today, the international community faces the hardest issue of all. But the decision is necessary, and it is the result of eight years of international collaboration.

Serbia must recognize, however, that greater stability in the Balkans promoted by the Ahtisaari plan will allow it to use its location, resources and talent to become a major regional player and a constructive force in European politics. The Serb people deserve a legitimate place in Europe and Serbia could also begin to move towards possible EU membership.

Our goal remains a Europe whole and free, with all the people of the western Balkans participating fully as EU members. The benefits of a concerted EU effort in Kosovo, backed by the UN and NATO, are enormous. As such, Russia and the other UN Security Council members should follow through on the promise that the Council made in 1999 and agree to complete the process of self-governance in Kosovo. This is the best option at this stage of a very difficult history of the whole region. Viable alternatives do not exist.

Madeleine Albright, United States

Lloyd Axworthy, Canada

Jan Eliasson, Sweden

Gareth Evans, Australia

Joschka Fischer, Germany

Bronislaw Geremek, Poland

Niels Helveg Petersen, Denmark

Lydie Polfer, Luxembourg

Jozias van Artsen, Netherlands

Hubert Vedrine, France