RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES

I love Peace

The following piece was written by former US Ambassador to Belgrade
WIlliam Montgomery and will appear in this Saturday's edition of the
Belgrade daily DANAS. It is very timely, troubling and accurate.



RED LINES, ULTIMATUMS, THREATS, AND PROMISES

Serbia today has a ruling coalition which is radically
divided in its priorities and underlying political philosophies. G17+
wants to improve the country's international financial position and
its overall economic underpinnings. DS is trying to move Serbia
towards full integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions and more
importantly, have Serbia perceived as a normal European country,
sharing a common system of values. DSS remains focused on Serbian
national questions such as Kosovo and Bosnia . The rivalries and
animosity among these three parties is far stronger and more evident
than towards either the Socialist or Radical Parties, which would
logically be their political and philosophical opposition.

The end result is a government with major internal
contradictions; "fiefdoms" exclusively controlled by individual
parties; a patronage system where party loyalty rates far higher than
competence, honesty or effectiveness; stalled reforms; and lack of
coordination in public statements which results in contradictory
messages to the outside world.

Despite all of above, the government under normal conditions
could most likely stumble along, because none of the participating
parties are eager for new elections. They have adeptly avoided
confronting any issue which would make a split inevitable.

That is probably about to change. At least twenty members of
the EU now seem prepared to join the United States in recognizing a
unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians. It is
unclear exactly when various steps will take place, but the starting
date will certainly be around December 10, the date when the troika of
negotiators is due to submit their report to the UN. Serbian
politicians are confronted with two fundamental and related questions.

The first is what additional last-minute steps can be taken
to either delay or discourage key members of the EU from supporting
this unilateral action. The second is what steps Serbia should take in
the event that the worst case scenario actually happens and Kosovo in
December starts down the independence road.

The DSS is prepared to take far stronger measures both in
advance of December 10 to prevent any declaration of independence and
also far stronger reactive measures if it does happen. The problem,
however, is that many of the measures would adversely impact on the
key goals of their coalition partners. The result is that the gap
between the coalition partners is growing and will continue to do so
as the DSS raises the ante on Kosovo.

The DSS has already taken steps to demonstrate that there
will be serious regional repercussions in the event of Kosovo
independence. A major initiative in this regard was to link the date
of elections for the Serbian President to events in Kosovo. In other
words, the DSS has deliberately taken steps which make it far more
possible that the next President of Serbia will be from the Radical
Party. They are sending a message to the International Community that
this is one of the potential downsides of unilateral recognition of
Kosovo Independence .

This is a fascinating gambit in a number of ways. It shows
clearly the actual state of relations between Prime Minister Kostunica
and President Tadic. Secondly, as in the case of the DSS vote for a
Radical as President of Parliament during the coalition negotiations
several months ago, it shows that the DSS does not have the same
degree of discomfort with the Radical Party that other parties in the
governmental coalition and much of the International Community share.
Thirdly, it magnifies once again the issue of Kosovo on the Serbian
political scene, as the DSS wants to do. Fourthly, it could have the
tactical impact of delaying action in Kosovo. This however, would only
be for a short period and only if there was a date certain for the
Serbian elections within the next two months. But finally, it has to
raise questions about what sort of future the DSS envisions for Serbia
if it is willing to facilitate a Radical as President with the
implications this would have for Serbia 's image in much of the world.
The strong reaction of the EU to the potential for a Right Wing
Nationalist Party sharing power in Austria a few years ago comes to
mind in this regard.

The second step which the Prime Minister and his party has
taken is to support aggressively the Bosnian Serb leadership in its
protests over measures taken by the High Representative to facilitate
the work of the Bosnian Parliament and Council of Ministers. This was
accompanied by a coordinated media campaign reminiscent of the
Milosevic years. This was intentionally done to present a case of the
International Community mistreating Serbs not only in Kosovo, but also
in Bosnia . The end result was to solidify, at least in the minds of
the Serbs, a definite linkage between the two cases. It raises the
possibility that any unilateral declaration by the Kosovo Albanians of
independence could lead either to further Bosnian Serb challenges to
the authority of the High Representative or even an effort to stage a
referendum on independence for the Republika Srpska. The intent, once
again, is to convince the International Community that supporting
unilateral independence for Kosovo will create more problems than it
would solve.

Thirdly, the DSS has taken the lead in visibly cozying up to
Russia. This includes claims that the West's purpose in supporting
Kosovo Albanian independence is to create a " NATO State " in the
Balkans and other NATO bashing. The obvious intent is to show that the
end result of Kosovo independence would be a Serbia far, far closer to
Russia and more distant from the EU.

Finally, even though the government has been careful to
avoid any overt signs of support, the announced formation of a "St.
Tsar Lazar Guard" composed of Serbian volunteers to fight to defend
Kosovo in the event of an unilateral declaration of independence is
obviously designed to raise the possibility of paramilitary units
going into Kosovo as they did in Bosnia and Croatia in 1990-95.

The hope of the DSS is that these threats and actions will
be sufficient to scare key EU countries such as Germany so that they
defer any action on Kosovo. At least as of today, however, it appears
as if the majority of EU countries (including all of the "heavy
hitters" with the support and encouragement of the United States has
decided to proceed regardless of the potential consequences. In fact,
it unfortunately seems that many in the West are beginning to view
Serbia, as during the Milosevic years, as a destabilizing factor in
the region. The "honeymoon" following the downfall of Milosevic is
definitely over.

The question then becomes, exactly what will Serbia do in
the event of unilateral independence. My best guess is as follows:

a) A contingency plan has already been worked out with Kosovo Serbs so
that they will react immediately in rejecting any unilateral
declaration of independence. Serbian-controlled areas will be
established in Kosovo similar to those set up in Bosnia and Croatia
sixteen years ago.

b) At least some "volunteers" from Serbia proper will go to help the
Kosovo Serbs. The government will take a hands-off position and claim
that it had nothing to do with it.

c) The Bosnian Serbs will be encouraged to further challenge the High
Representative, possibly even with a referendum initiative.

d) Large protest rallies will be staged in many cities in Serbia .

e) Efforts will be made in Parliament and in the media to
significantly downgrade relations with countries which recognize
Kosovo independence.

f) Serbia will renounce any responsibility for its debts in Kosovo
with international financial institutions.

g) Serbia will close its boundaries with Kosovo for all traffic other
than Serbs.

h) Serbia will consider cutting off its supply of electrical energy to Kosovo.

i) Serbia even now will encourage Russia to use the renewal of the
EUFOR Mission in Bosnia in the UN Security, which is scheduled for
December, to extract unacceptable concessions in exchange for its
support.

As these events unfold, the potential for violence and
pressure for additional measures will be very high. Relations with the
United States and the EU will deteriorate sharply. The coalition
partners of the DSS will see much of their work and their goals
evaporating in front of them and will be confronted with either
leaving the government or accepting responsibility for actions which
will take them further from their professed reasons for joining the
government in the first place. The problem is that although I see this
train wreck comely clearly down the line, I just don't see how it will
be stopped