I love Peace
Well seams I took a long break.... even though there was a lot to say and a lot of things going on.... but this is how life is, we start something, then we jump in something that we think is more important and then we get back to where we been and we see that things were moving and the situation is not same...
I was very busy during all this time, preparing documents for scholarships, new job, helping one of my professor to prepare the election campaign, implementing different projects of NGO and having a lot of debates with candidates and forgetting about the books in TOTAL....
Anyway, I didn't done to much. After failing to get any scholarship for studying abroad I sow that being graduated doesn't give you an easy way but in contrary it leads you to more difficult challenges and you need to be prepared for failures, questions that people think you should know answers and this made me get back on "earth" and think of what a hell I want to do in next coming year... So, I created a plan where keeping to write in blog is part of it.... so here I am...
thanks god elections are almost finishing, at least I'm done with campaign :) also with debates of NGO and know I have time to read (I started to read something about Diplomacy-H.Kissinger) and also paying more attention to situation in Kosovo, final status- the question that still remains in Kosovars minds and harts, promises of creating a paradise after elections, analyzing international declarations about Kosovo status and reading, reading and reading...
Well it's nice to be back... see yaaa later......
14 November 2007
22 July 2007
Kosovo: A Short History, by Noel Malcolm
I love Peace
If we needed any reminder of what is at stake in the present crisis over Kosovo, Noel Malcolm offers us, on the first page of his new history, a chilling forecast. "It is arguably the area with the worst human-rights abuses in the whole of Europe, and certainly the place where, if war does break out, the killing and destruction will be more intense than anything hitherto witnessed in the region." A grim prospect, indeed, especially coming on the heels of the war in Bosnia, the origins of which Malcolm has already outlined for us in his admirable Bosnia: A Short History.
As with his earlier study, Malcolm opens his historical account with the migration of the Slavs into the Balkans in the declining years of the Roman Empire. The Roman hegemony was succeeded by that of Byzantium, at least in name, for the Serbs, Albanians, and Vlachs were a turbulent people, not readily subjugated. One of the great obstacles that Malcolm runs up against is the absolute dearth of historical material about events in Kosovo from the ninth to the fourteenth century--five hundred years, of which virtually nothing is known other than the extension of Serbian control over Kosovo in the early thirteenth century.
The veil begins to lift in the late fourteenth century--by which time the Serbian state itself was breaking up--with the semi-mythical battle of Kosovo Polje, a few miles northwest of Prishtina, in 1389, when a combined Serbian-Bosnian army was defeated by an Ottoman force under the command of Sultan Murat I. Almost nothing is known for certain about the battle, apart from the fact that both Murat and the Serbian commander were slain; yet the Serbs persist to this day in celebrating it as one of the glorious moments in their history. Malcolm has an enjoyable time examining and exposing as fraudulent the myths the Serbs have woven around Kosovo Polje over the centuries, an exposure which will doubtless be accorded a surly reception in Belgrade.
The last vestiges of Serbian control over Kosovo vanished in the middle of the fifteenth century, after the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Thereafter Kosovo remained an Ottoman possession for four and a half centuries. Signs of discontent, even sporadic rebellions, were manifested from time to time; but the Kosovars in general remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. Even the so-called League of Prizren, set up in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to press for greater local autonomy, was essentially a Muslim religious movement which did not question the Sultan's ultimate authority. Even so, it did not escape retribution from Constantinople. The Sublime Porte acted quickly to suppress the League, and the Kosovars remained quiet and well-behaved for the next thirty years.
Turkish rule over Kosovo ended in 1912, when Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro all went to war with the Ottoman Empire. The Serbians quickly overran Kosovo, and over the next two years, by a policy of systematic butchery and destruction of property, they gave the Albanian inhabitants a foretaste of what was to be their lot under Serbian rule in the years ahead. A respite was afforded the Kosovars by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, when the Austrians occupied the northern half of the country, and the Bulgarians the southern. But the postwar settlement placed the Kosovars once more under the rule of Belgrade, when the province was incorporated in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thousands of Serbian and Montenegrin colonists were settled in the province, riding roughshod, in most cases, over the Albanians' property as well as their civil rights.
Much the same fate befell Kosovo during the Second World War. After the German invasion of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 the province was divided between Italy and Bulgaria, the lion's share going to the Italians, who were then more or less in control of Albania. In the course of the war the bulk of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the country fled or were driven out. Only a minority of them returned after 1945, making up around 12 per cent of the population. By 1991 they accounted for only 11 per cent, while the Kosovar Albanians accounted for 82 per cent, a discrepancy due in large measure to the Albanians' higher birth rate. (Serbia, by way of contrast, boasted--if that is the right word--the highest abortion rate in Europe.)
Malcolm does not believe that Tito treated Kosovo too badly. Perhaps, being a Croat, Tito had some sympathy for non-Serbian minorities. All the same, his years as dictator saw the implementation of a deliberate anti-Islamic policy in Kosovo: madrasas (Koranic schools) were closed down, the shari'ah courts were suppressed, and the Dervish orders were outlawed. Yugoslavia had been reconstituted after 1945 as a federation of six republics. Kosovo was declared an "autonomous region," although remaining a constituent part of Serbia. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo a status almost equivalent to that of the six republics, though not quite. To have categorized Kosovo as a republic might well have opened the road to secession, perhaps even to the unification of Kosovo with Albania. So it remained constitutionally part of Serbia, the Kosovars being classified as a nationality, not a nation.
The screws were turned on Kosovo after the death of Tito. Serbian propaganda in the 1980s depicted the Kosovars as a mob of ruffians and rapists who were making life unbearable for the Serbian colonists in their midst. This alleged persecution of the Kosovar Serbs provided the theme that Slobodan Milosevic, then seeking an issue that might help propel him into the presidency of Yugoslavia, lost little time in appropriating. It served him well. After winning the presidency he moved to amend the Serbian constitution in the spring of 1989 so as to reduce Kosovo's autonomy and to invest Serbia with control over the region's judicial system, as well as ultimate authority over its social, economic, and educational institutions. A year later the provincial assembly and government were dissolved by order of Belgrade, most of the Albanian Kosovars holding government posts were dismissed, and the majority of Albanian doctors practicing in the provincial hospitals were discharged. To add to these various insults the Serbs embarked upon a propaganda campaign at the time of the Serbian attack on Bosnia in the spring of 1992, conjuring up the specter of a vast Muslim conspiracy to undermine the Yugoslav federation. For the Muslim Albanians of Kosovo it was the last straw.
It has to be confessed that Noel Malcolm's book is not an easy read--for this reviewer, at least--which makes one look a little askance at the praise which has been bestowed upon it by numerous reviewers in the British press. (The exception, which must have caused Malcolm some amusement, was a sour appraisal by Douglas Hurd, the Conservative former foreign secretary, who had been roasted by Malcolm in his earlier book for his, Hurd's, limp-wristed approach to the Bosnian conflict.) Although Kosovo is a work of considerable scholarship, it is not without some minor flaws, more particularly in its references to Islamic institutions. For instance, it is not correct to speak of Muslim "clergy" or Islamic "theology"; and the shari'ah is more a system or codification of law, tout court, than of religious or canon law. But these are small errors in a work on Balkan history, mere slips of the pen which do not detract in any substantial way from the overall worth of Malcolm's book.
Mr. Kelly is an historian of the modern Middle East.
COPYRIGHT 1998 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group
If we needed any reminder of what is at stake in the present crisis over Kosovo, Noel Malcolm offers us, on the first page of his new history, a chilling forecast. "It is arguably the area with the worst human-rights abuses in the whole of Europe, and certainly the place where, if war does break out, the killing and destruction will be more intense than anything hitherto witnessed in the region." A grim prospect, indeed, especially coming on the heels of the war in Bosnia, the origins of which Malcolm has already outlined for us in his admirable Bosnia: A Short History.
As with his earlier study, Malcolm opens his historical account with the migration of the Slavs into the Balkans in the declining years of the Roman Empire. The Roman hegemony was succeeded by that of Byzantium, at least in name, for the Serbs, Albanians, and Vlachs were a turbulent people, not readily subjugated. One of the great obstacles that Malcolm runs up against is the absolute dearth of historical material about events in Kosovo from the ninth to the fourteenth century--five hundred years, of which virtually nothing is known other than the extension of Serbian control over Kosovo in the early thirteenth century.
The veil begins to lift in the late fourteenth century--by which time the Serbian state itself was breaking up--with the semi-mythical battle of Kosovo Polje, a few miles northwest of Prishtina, in 1389, when a combined Serbian-Bosnian army was defeated by an Ottoman force under the command of Sultan Murat I. Almost nothing is known for certain about the battle, apart from the fact that both Murat and the Serbian commander were slain; yet the Serbs persist to this day in celebrating it as one of the glorious moments in their history. Malcolm has an enjoyable time examining and exposing as fraudulent the myths the Serbs have woven around Kosovo Polje over the centuries, an exposure which will doubtless be accorded a surly reception in Belgrade.
The last vestiges of Serbian control over Kosovo vanished in the middle of the fifteenth century, after the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Thereafter Kosovo remained an Ottoman possession for four and a half centuries. Signs of discontent, even sporadic rebellions, were manifested from time to time; but the Kosovars in general remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. Even the so-called League of Prizren, set up in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to press for greater local autonomy, was essentially a Muslim religious movement which did not question the Sultan's ultimate authority. Even so, it did not escape retribution from Constantinople. The Sublime Porte acted quickly to suppress the League, and the Kosovars remained quiet and well-behaved for the next thirty years.
Turkish rule over Kosovo ended in 1912, when Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro all went to war with the Ottoman Empire. The Serbians quickly overran Kosovo, and over the next two years, by a policy of systematic butchery and destruction of property, they gave the Albanian inhabitants a foretaste of what was to be their lot under Serbian rule in the years ahead. A respite was afforded the Kosovars by the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, when the Austrians occupied the northern half of the country, and the Bulgarians the southern. But the postwar settlement placed the Kosovars once more under the rule of Belgrade, when the province was incorporated in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thousands of Serbian and Montenegrin colonists were settled in the province, riding roughshod, in most cases, over the Albanians' property as well as their civil rights.
Much the same fate befell Kosovo during the Second World War. After the German invasion of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 the province was divided between Italy and Bulgaria, the lion's share going to the Italians, who were then more or less in control of Albania. In the course of the war the bulk of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the country fled or were driven out. Only a minority of them returned after 1945, making up around 12 per cent of the population. By 1991 they accounted for only 11 per cent, while the Kosovar Albanians accounted for 82 per cent, a discrepancy due in large measure to the Albanians' higher birth rate. (Serbia, by way of contrast, boasted--if that is the right word--the highest abortion rate in Europe.)
Malcolm does not believe that Tito treated Kosovo too badly. Perhaps, being a Croat, Tito had some sympathy for non-Serbian minorities. All the same, his years as dictator saw the implementation of a deliberate anti-Islamic policy in Kosovo: madrasas (Koranic schools) were closed down, the shari'ah courts were suppressed, and the Dervish orders were outlawed. Yugoslavia had been reconstituted after 1945 as a federation of six republics. Kosovo was declared an "autonomous region," although remaining a constituent part of Serbia. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo a status almost equivalent to that of the six republics, though not quite. To have categorized Kosovo as a republic might well have opened the road to secession, perhaps even to the unification of Kosovo with Albania. So it remained constitutionally part of Serbia, the Kosovars being classified as a nationality, not a nation.
The screws were turned on Kosovo after the death of Tito. Serbian propaganda in the 1980s depicted the Kosovars as a mob of ruffians and rapists who were making life unbearable for the Serbian colonists in their midst. This alleged persecution of the Kosovar Serbs provided the theme that Slobodan Milosevic, then seeking an issue that might help propel him into the presidency of Yugoslavia, lost little time in appropriating. It served him well. After winning the presidency he moved to amend the Serbian constitution in the spring of 1989 so as to reduce Kosovo's autonomy and to invest Serbia with control over the region's judicial system, as well as ultimate authority over its social, economic, and educational institutions. A year later the provincial assembly and government were dissolved by order of Belgrade, most of the Albanian Kosovars holding government posts were dismissed, and the majority of Albanian doctors practicing in the provincial hospitals were discharged. To add to these various insults the Serbs embarked upon a propaganda campaign at the time of the Serbian attack on Bosnia in the spring of 1992, conjuring up the specter of a vast Muslim conspiracy to undermine the Yugoslav federation. For the Muslim Albanians of Kosovo it was the last straw.
It has to be confessed that Noel Malcolm's book is not an easy read--for this reviewer, at least--which makes one look a little askance at the praise which has been bestowed upon it by numerous reviewers in the British press. (The exception, which must have caused Malcolm some amusement, was a sour appraisal by Douglas Hurd, the Conservative former foreign secretary, who had been roasted by Malcolm in his earlier book for his, Hurd's, limp-wristed approach to the Bosnian conflict.) Although Kosovo is a work of considerable scholarship, it is not without some minor flaws, more particularly in its references to Islamic institutions. For instance, it is not correct to speak of Muslim "clergy" or Islamic "theology"; and the shari'ah is more a system or codification of law, tout court, than of religious or canon law. But these are small errors in a work on Balkan history, mere slips of the pen which do not detract in any substantial way from the overall worth of Malcolm's book.
Mr. Kelly is an historian of the modern Middle East.
COPYRIGHT 1998 National Review, Inc.
COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group
15 July 2007
Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves
I love Peace
Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves
Pergatiti: L.Komani
Disa artikuj interesante mund te lexohen ne edicionet e dy diteve te fundit te disa gazetave te rendesishme te huaja. Po e sjellim si vijon esencen e secilit prej tyre. Shquajme cka thene z.Veton Surroi lidhur me Planin B qe eshte ne shqyrtim e siper dhe e vendosim dhe si titull per kete permbledhje.
Gazeta NY Times flet mbi mundesine e nje vendimi jashte OKB-se per pavaresine e Kosoves duke iu referuar fjaleve te ambasadorit amerikan prane OKB-se, z.Zalmay Khalilzad.
Gazeta austriake Die Presse nxirrte ne pah fjalet e ministrit te jashtem francez, z.Bernard Kouchner ne adrese te qeverise serbe, sipas se cilave Serbia nuk mund t’i kundervihet nje plani perendimor per pavaresine e Kosoves e njekohesisht te pretendoje pranimin ne BE. Sipas tij eshte e pamundur per nje shtet te hyje ne BE me nje konflikt etnik brenda vetes. Gazeta Der Standard i referohej z.Veton Surroi, sipas te cilit rruga deri tek pavaresia permes OKB-se eshte deshmuar si rruge qorre. Plani A ka deshtuar dhe tani po punohet per planin B. Dhe per kete plan nuk jane te nevojshme bisedime me Rusine.
Gazeta Le Monde ka sjelle dje nje artikull nga Denis MacShane, ish-minister britanik per Evropen, ku thuren mes te tjerash lavde per Serbine dhe popullin serb dhe ku shtrohet pyetja mbi kush vendos per politiken e jashtme BE-se, Bashkimi Evropian apo Rusia. Ne artikull argumentohet ne menyre te tille qe ne fund te mberrihet ne ceshtjen kyce: a do ta lejoje veten BE qe te kushtezohet nga Rusia cka do te conte ne thellimin e ndasive me SHBA-ne? A nuk do t’i jepte kjo shkas forcave militante te Kosoves qe tashme durimi I politikaneve te zgjedhur te zevendesohet me aksione me te forta. Sipas ish-ministrit zgjidhja e lojes eshte si vijon: nje Serbi e liruar nga Kosova qe ribashkohet me Kroacine dhe Sllovenine ne nje Bashkim Evropian dhe nje NATO qe mund te sjellin prosperitet dhe siguri ne Ballkan. Evropa dhe jo Rusia duhet te vendose per te ardhmen e rajonit.
===
Ne vazhdim per lexim individual artikujt nga NY Times dhe nga Le Monde:
U.S. May Bypass the U.N. for Kosovo Independence
By WARREN HOGE
Published: July 14, 2007
UNITED NATIONS, July 13 — Declaring the need for a timely decision on Kosovo’s desire for independence from Serbia, the United States threatened Friday to seek a solution outside the United Nations if Russia persisted in blocking Security Council action.
“We are determined to move forward, either within the Council or otherwise,” Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, said in a conference call with news agency reporters.
Russia supports Serbia’s determination to prevent Kosovo, Serbia’s breakaway western province, from becoming independent and has threatened to use its veto if the matter comes to a vote.
“The noises that we hear from Moscow are not encouraging, but we have not heard the final word from Moscow, and it is up to Russia whether the Council plays a role in deciding the next stage in regard to Kosovo or not,” Mr. Khalilzad said.
On Friday, the United States and its European allies circulated a new Kosovo resolution with the latest of a half-dozen revisions aimed at overcoming Russian objections.
Kosovo, with a population that is 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbian, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign in 1999 that pushed Serbian forces from the province.
The original resolution called for a managed independence under the aegis of the European Union, with built-in protections for the Serbs.
It endorsed a plan laid out by Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations special envoy, after 13 months of direct talks between Serbia and Kosovo that he said in March had produced an impasse. Russia had said it would not agree to any measure that resulting in Kosovo independence.
The latest version of the resolution calls for 120 days of new negotiations that, contrary to an earlier formulation, would not result in an automatic return to the Ahtisaari model in the event the talks failed.
Mr. Khalilzad indicated the latest revision might be the last and said he would push Monday for a decision on whether and when to schedule a vote.
“The core of what we are proposing is in there and is not subject to further changes,” he said, except what he called “the wording at the margins.”
Striking a balance that will satisfy Moscow is sure to provoke the leaders of Kosovo, who have threatened to declare unilateral independence if the United Nations does not act.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s secretary general, warned in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday that there was a danger of going from a “controlled to an uncontrolled” outcome unless both sides showed restraint.
Point de vue
Poutine, l'Europe et les Balkans, par Denis MacShane
Qui décide aujourd'hui de la politique étrangère de l'Union européenne, les nations européennes ou le Kremlin ? Tandis que les europhobes à Paris et Londres ont toujours à coeur de dénoncer Bruxelles comme source d'interférence avec les Etats européens souverains, Moscou en profite pour dire à l'Europe ce qui peut ou ne peut pas être fait en matière de politique étrangère.
Les problèmes sont connus, que ce soit la question de la défense antimissile, la guerre cybernétique contre les Etats baltes ou le meurtre d'Alexandre Litvinenko à Londres. Mais la Russie semble, en outre, convaincue que c'est elle, et non l'UE, qui décidera de l'avenir des Balkans. La Slovénie est déjà dans l'Union européenne, et la Croatie en route vers l'accession. L'enjeu réel pour la paix et la stabilité dans la région est donc incarné par la Serbie. Les Serbes sont la nation dominante des Balkans, et Belgrade leur capitale. Le peuple serbe est intelligent, éduqué, multilingue, membre d'une société postindustrielle ; il est prêt, une fois que la Serbie sera membre de l'UE, à entraîner la région entière vers son rendez-vous avec la modernité.
Un obstacle de taille subsiste cependant : le refus de Belgrade de comprendre que l'époque de son contrôle du Kosovo a pris fin. Les connexions historiques, religieuses et culturelles entre la Serbie et le Kosovo ne peuvent être discutées. Elles sont aussi fortes que les liens qui existaient entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande à la veille de l'indépendance irlandaise. Mais le Kosovo s'est libéré de manière pacifique du joug serbe dans les années 1980 et 1990, avant que sa population ne s'oppose, au cours d'une guerre armée cruelle, à la brutalité des milices de Milosevic. L'Europe et les Etats-Unis ont alors enfin décidé d'intervenir afin de mettre fin aux massacres. Mais ils ont ensuite laissé le Kosovo dans les limbes, certes sous contrôle des Nations unies mais toujours légalement territoire serbe. Des émissaires puissants furent envoyés sans succès à Pristina, dont le nouveau ministre français des affaires étrangères, Bernard Kouchner.
Tant qu'un accord de paix ne sera pas conclu, le peuple kosovar et son Etat putatif n'auront ni la reconnaissance ni la responsabilité nécessaires pour agir en leur propre nom.
La non-indépendance et la non-reconnaissance du Kosovo ne font plus sens. Le Kosovo doit être libéré de la tutelle serbe, précisément afin de permettre à la Serbie de rejoindre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN. En privé, tous les responsables et dirigeants politiques serbes sérieux, à l'exception des ultranationalistes et des derniers fidèles de Milosevic, acceptent que le Kosovo ne sera plus jamais contrôlé par Belgrade. En public, personne à Belgrade n'a le courage de le dire.
A la demande des Nations unies, l'ancien président finlandais Martii Ahtisaari vient de proposer un plan d'action pour sortir de la crise qui permet une indépendance conditionnelle du Kosovo sous la supervision de l'UE. Ce plan de bon sens a été accepté par les Américains et les Européens.
Mais il ne satisfait pas la Russie, qui se montre plus serbe que les Serbes et a annoncé sa décision d'utiliser son droit de veto au conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Apparemment, sa justification principale est que Pristina et Belgrade doivent se mettre d'accord elles-mêmes. En réalité, étant donné que les Serbes refuseront l'indépendance même conditionnelle du Kosovo, la position de Moscou est malhonnête et témoigne de la volonté russe de n'accepter aucun règlement final du conflit. L'ambition de Moscou est davantage la balkanisation de l'Europe que l'européanisation des Balkans.
L'Union européenne est donc face à un choix décisif. Autorisera-t-elle la prise en otage par le Kremlin de sa politique étrangère dans les Balkans, ce qui pourrait conduire à un renforcement des divisions entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis ? Cela ne risquerait-il pas de convaincre les militants têtes brûlées du Kosovo que le pacifisme et la patience des dirigeants élus du Kosovo doivent désormais être remplacés par des actions plus fortes ?
La fin de partie est claire. Il ne peut s'agir que d'une Serbie libérée du Kosovo, rejoignant la Croatie et la Slovénie dans une Union européenne et une OTAN qui puissent apporter prospérité et sécurité aux Balkans. L'Europe, et non la Russie, devrait décider de l'avenir de la région.
Plani B per pavaresine e Kosoves
Pergatiti: L.Komani
Disa artikuj interesante mund te lexohen ne edicionet e dy diteve te fundit te disa gazetave te rendesishme te huaja. Po e sjellim si vijon esencen e secilit prej tyre. Shquajme cka thene z.Veton Surroi lidhur me Planin B qe eshte ne shqyrtim e siper dhe e vendosim dhe si titull per kete permbledhje.
Gazeta NY Times flet mbi mundesine e nje vendimi jashte OKB-se per pavaresine e Kosoves duke iu referuar fjaleve te ambasadorit amerikan prane OKB-se, z.Zalmay Khalilzad.
Gazeta austriake Die Presse nxirrte ne pah fjalet e ministrit te jashtem francez, z.Bernard Kouchner ne adrese te qeverise serbe, sipas se cilave Serbia nuk mund t’i kundervihet nje plani perendimor per pavaresine e Kosoves e njekohesisht te pretendoje pranimin ne BE. Sipas tij eshte e pamundur per nje shtet te hyje ne BE me nje konflikt etnik brenda vetes. Gazeta Der Standard i referohej z.Veton Surroi, sipas te cilit rruga deri tek pavaresia permes OKB-se eshte deshmuar si rruge qorre. Plani A ka deshtuar dhe tani po punohet per planin B. Dhe per kete plan nuk jane te nevojshme bisedime me Rusine.
Gazeta Le Monde ka sjelle dje nje artikull nga Denis MacShane, ish-minister britanik per Evropen, ku thuren mes te tjerash lavde per Serbine dhe popullin serb dhe ku shtrohet pyetja mbi kush vendos per politiken e jashtme BE-se, Bashkimi Evropian apo Rusia. Ne artikull argumentohet ne menyre te tille qe ne fund te mberrihet ne ceshtjen kyce: a do ta lejoje veten BE qe te kushtezohet nga Rusia cka do te conte ne thellimin e ndasive me SHBA-ne? A nuk do t’i jepte kjo shkas forcave militante te Kosoves qe tashme durimi I politikaneve te zgjedhur te zevendesohet me aksione me te forta. Sipas ish-ministrit zgjidhja e lojes eshte si vijon: nje Serbi e liruar nga Kosova qe ribashkohet me Kroacine dhe Sllovenine ne nje Bashkim Evropian dhe nje NATO qe mund te sjellin prosperitet dhe siguri ne Ballkan. Evropa dhe jo Rusia duhet te vendose per te ardhmen e rajonit.
===
Ne vazhdim per lexim individual artikujt nga NY Times dhe nga Le Monde:
U.S. May Bypass the U.N. for Kosovo Independence
By WARREN HOGE
Published: July 14, 2007
UNITED NATIONS, July 13 — Declaring the need for a timely decision on Kosovo’s desire for independence from Serbia, the United States threatened Friday to seek a solution outside the United Nations if Russia persisted in blocking Security Council action.
“We are determined to move forward, either within the Council or otherwise,” Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, said in a conference call with news agency reporters.
Russia supports Serbia’s determination to prevent Kosovo, Serbia’s breakaway western province, from becoming independent and has threatened to use its veto if the matter comes to a vote.
“The noises that we hear from Moscow are not encouraging, but we have not heard the final word from Moscow, and it is up to Russia whether the Council plays a role in deciding the next stage in regard to Kosovo or not,” Mr. Khalilzad said.
On Friday, the United States and its European allies circulated a new Kosovo resolution with the latest of a half-dozen revisions aimed at overcoming Russian objections.
Kosovo, with a population that is 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent Serbian, has been administered by the United Nations since a NATO bombing campaign in 1999 that pushed Serbian forces from the province.
The original resolution called for a managed independence under the aegis of the European Union, with built-in protections for the Serbs.
It endorsed a plan laid out by Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations special envoy, after 13 months of direct talks between Serbia and Kosovo that he said in March had produced an impasse. Russia had said it would not agree to any measure that resulting in Kosovo independence.
The latest version of the resolution calls for 120 days of new negotiations that, contrary to an earlier formulation, would not result in an automatic return to the Ahtisaari model in the event the talks failed.
Mr. Khalilzad indicated the latest revision might be the last and said he would push Monday for a decision on whether and when to schedule a vote.
“The core of what we are proposing is in there and is not subject to further changes,” he said, except what he called “the wording at the margins.”
Striking a balance that will satisfy Moscow is sure to provoke the leaders of Kosovo, who have threatened to declare unilateral independence if the United Nations does not act.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO’s secretary general, warned in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday that there was a danger of going from a “controlled to an uncontrolled” outcome unless both sides showed restraint.
Point de vue
Poutine, l'Europe et les Balkans, par Denis MacShane
Qui décide aujourd'hui de la politique étrangère de l'Union européenne, les nations européennes ou le Kremlin ? Tandis que les europhobes à Paris et Londres ont toujours à coeur de dénoncer Bruxelles comme source d'interférence avec les Etats européens souverains, Moscou en profite pour dire à l'Europe ce qui peut ou ne peut pas être fait en matière de politique étrangère.
Les problèmes sont connus, que ce soit la question de la défense antimissile, la guerre cybernétique contre les Etats baltes ou le meurtre d'Alexandre Litvinenko à Londres. Mais la Russie semble, en outre, convaincue que c'est elle, et non l'UE, qui décidera de l'avenir des Balkans. La Slovénie est déjà dans l'Union européenne, et la Croatie en route vers l'accession. L'enjeu réel pour la paix et la stabilité dans la région est donc incarné par la Serbie. Les Serbes sont la nation dominante des Balkans, et Belgrade leur capitale. Le peuple serbe est intelligent, éduqué, multilingue, membre d'une société postindustrielle ; il est prêt, une fois que la Serbie sera membre de l'UE, à entraîner la région entière vers son rendez-vous avec la modernité.
Un obstacle de taille subsiste cependant : le refus de Belgrade de comprendre que l'époque de son contrôle du Kosovo a pris fin. Les connexions historiques, religieuses et culturelles entre la Serbie et le Kosovo ne peuvent être discutées. Elles sont aussi fortes que les liens qui existaient entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande à la veille de l'indépendance irlandaise. Mais le Kosovo s'est libéré de manière pacifique du joug serbe dans les années 1980 et 1990, avant que sa population ne s'oppose, au cours d'une guerre armée cruelle, à la brutalité des milices de Milosevic. L'Europe et les Etats-Unis ont alors enfin décidé d'intervenir afin de mettre fin aux massacres. Mais ils ont ensuite laissé le Kosovo dans les limbes, certes sous contrôle des Nations unies mais toujours légalement territoire serbe. Des émissaires puissants furent envoyés sans succès à Pristina, dont le nouveau ministre français des affaires étrangères, Bernard Kouchner.
Tant qu'un accord de paix ne sera pas conclu, le peuple kosovar et son Etat putatif n'auront ni la reconnaissance ni la responsabilité nécessaires pour agir en leur propre nom.
La non-indépendance et la non-reconnaissance du Kosovo ne font plus sens. Le Kosovo doit être libéré de la tutelle serbe, précisément afin de permettre à la Serbie de rejoindre l'Union européenne et l'OTAN. En privé, tous les responsables et dirigeants politiques serbes sérieux, à l'exception des ultranationalistes et des derniers fidèles de Milosevic, acceptent que le Kosovo ne sera plus jamais contrôlé par Belgrade. En public, personne à Belgrade n'a le courage de le dire.
A la demande des Nations unies, l'ancien président finlandais Martii Ahtisaari vient de proposer un plan d'action pour sortir de la crise qui permet une indépendance conditionnelle du Kosovo sous la supervision de l'UE. Ce plan de bon sens a été accepté par les Américains et les Européens.
Mais il ne satisfait pas la Russie, qui se montre plus serbe que les Serbes et a annoncé sa décision d'utiliser son droit de veto au conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Apparemment, sa justification principale est que Pristina et Belgrade doivent se mettre d'accord elles-mêmes. En réalité, étant donné que les Serbes refuseront l'indépendance même conditionnelle du Kosovo, la position de Moscou est malhonnête et témoigne de la volonté russe de n'accepter aucun règlement final du conflit. L'ambition de Moscou est davantage la balkanisation de l'Europe que l'européanisation des Balkans.
L'Union européenne est donc face à un choix décisif. Autorisera-t-elle la prise en otage par le Kremlin de sa politique étrangère dans les Balkans, ce qui pourrait conduire à un renforcement des divisions entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis ? Cela ne risquerait-il pas de convaincre les militants têtes brûlées du Kosovo que le pacifisme et la patience des dirigeants élus du Kosovo doivent désormais être remplacés par des actions plus fortes ?
La fin de partie est claire. Il ne peut s'agir que d'une Serbie libérée du Kosovo, rejoignant la Croatie et la Slovénie dans une Union européenne et une OTAN qui puissent apporter prospérité et sécurité aux Balkans. L'Europe, et non la Russie, devrait décider de l'avenir de la région.
14 July 2007
Kosovo is back in the headlines
I love Peace
Kosovo must be independen by Former Foreign Ministers
Kosovo is back in the headlines. President George W. Bush says that it should become independent soon. President Vladimir Putin of Russia opposes independence and prefers time for more talks. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has suggested that we move forward, with a six-month delay.
This has a familiar ring to it. Eight years ago, many of us - then foreign ministers - put in place an international process to decide who should govern Kosovo. We believe that the only viable option is for Kosovo to become independent under strict supervision. That is the proposal that is currently before the UN Security Council and is part of the process that the Council, including Russia, agreed upon and has implemented since 1999.
Kosovo is the last substantial territorial issue remaining from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. In 2005, as called for by decisions of the Security Council, the UN secretary general appointed a special envoy - former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland - to achieve a political settlement.
After 14 months of negotiations with the leaderships of Serbia and Kosovo, Ahtisaari announced that the irreconcilable positions of the two parties had made consensus unattainable and that no amount of additional talks would overcome the impasse. In lieu of a negotiated agreement by all sides, Ahtisaari proposed that Kosovo receive independence supervised by the international community (primarily the European Union and NATO) and provide strong guarantees for the Serbs who live in Kosovo.
Now is the time to act. Tensions are likely to rise, and they certainly will not cool. Moreover, without a resolution on Kosovo's final status, the future of Serbia and Kosovo will remain uncertain.
Some may say that Russia would prefer this limbo to a situation where Serbia and Kosovo join the European Union and NATO. Serbs and Kosovars should prefer otherwise. They deserve to be in the European Union. And Kosovo cannot develop as things stand. It has been unable to gain access to international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy, or attract the political capital it needs to address its widespread unemployment and poverty.
Russia has complained of not being included in talks. It should participate, but constructively and not just to block it. What may be needed is a formulation that allows Russia to acquiesce without having to break openly with Serbia. Russia can reassure Serbs and emphasize that Kosovo is a unique situation, without precedent for other regions.
The Ahtisaari plan has several advantages. It gives rights to Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs to manage their own affairs within a democratic Kosovo, which will be protected and monitored by the international community. It also requires protection for Orthodox and Serbian cultural and religious sites. Finally, it provides for an international presence that will oversee Kosovo's institutions and monitor the settlement's implementation. It also places Kosovo on the road toward EU integration.
The European Union has agreed to supervise Kosovo during the transition period and deploy a police mission alongside the current NATO peacekeeping force. An indefinite delay caused by continued confusion over Kosovo's status could jeopardize a smooth transition to European oversight.
Kosovo is a unique situation that has required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 in response to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, it laid the groundwork for a political process that would ultimately determine Kosovo's future.
We know that all decisions on Kosovo are difficult. Some of us kicked the issue down the road eight years ago. Today, the international community faces the hardest issue of all. But the decision is necessary, and it is the result of eight years of international collaboration.
Serbia must recognize, however, that greater stability in the Balkans promoted by the Ahtisaari plan will allow it to use its location, resources and talent to become a major regional player and a constructive force in European politics. The Serb people deserve a legitimate place in Europe and Serbia could also begin to move towards possible EU membership.
Our goal remains a Europe whole and free, with all the people of the western Balkans participating fully as EU members. The benefits of a concerted EU effort in Kosovo, backed by the UN and NATO, are enormous. As such, Russia and the other UN Security Council members should follow through on the promise that the Council made in 1999 and agree to complete the process of self-governance in Kosovo. This is the best option at this stage of a very difficult history of the whole region. Viable alternatives do not exist.
Madeleine Albright, United States
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada
Jan Eliasson, Sweden
Gareth Evans, Australia
Joschka Fischer, Germany
Bronislaw Geremek, Poland
Niels Helveg Petersen, Denmark
Lydie Polfer, Luxembourg
Jozias van Artsen, Netherlands
Hubert Vedrine, France
Kosovo must be independen by Former Foreign Ministers
Kosovo is back in the headlines. President George W. Bush says that it should become independent soon. President Vladimir Putin of Russia opposes independence and prefers time for more talks. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has suggested that we move forward, with a six-month delay.
This has a familiar ring to it. Eight years ago, many of us - then foreign ministers - put in place an international process to decide who should govern Kosovo. We believe that the only viable option is for Kosovo to become independent under strict supervision. That is the proposal that is currently before the UN Security Council and is part of the process that the Council, including Russia, agreed upon and has implemented since 1999.
Kosovo is the last substantial territorial issue remaining from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. In 2005, as called for by decisions of the Security Council, the UN secretary general appointed a special envoy - former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland - to achieve a political settlement.
After 14 months of negotiations with the leaderships of Serbia and Kosovo, Ahtisaari announced that the irreconcilable positions of the two parties had made consensus unattainable and that no amount of additional talks would overcome the impasse. In lieu of a negotiated agreement by all sides, Ahtisaari proposed that Kosovo receive independence supervised by the international community (primarily the European Union and NATO) and provide strong guarantees for the Serbs who live in Kosovo.
Now is the time to act. Tensions are likely to rise, and they certainly will not cool. Moreover, without a resolution on Kosovo's final status, the future of Serbia and Kosovo will remain uncertain.
Some may say that Russia would prefer this limbo to a situation where Serbia and Kosovo join the European Union and NATO. Serbs and Kosovars should prefer otherwise. They deserve to be in the European Union. And Kosovo cannot develop as things stand. It has been unable to gain access to international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy, or attract the political capital it needs to address its widespread unemployment and poverty.
Russia has complained of not being included in talks. It should participate, but constructively and not just to block it. What may be needed is a formulation that allows Russia to acquiesce without having to break openly with Serbia. Russia can reassure Serbs and emphasize that Kosovo is a unique situation, without precedent for other regions.
The Ahtisaari plan has several advantages. It gives rights to Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs to manage their own affairs within a democratic Kosovo, which will be protected and monitored by the international community. It also requires protection for Orthodox and Serbian cultural and religious sites. Finally, it provides for an international presence that will oversee Kosovo's institutions and monitor the settlement's implementation. It also places Kosovo on the road toward EU integration.
The European Union has agreed to supervise Kosovo during the transition period and deploy a police mission alongside the current NATO peacekeeping force. An indefinite delay caused by continued confusion over Kosovo's status could jeopardize a smooth transition to European oversight.
Kosovo is a unique situation that has required a creative solution. It should not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 in response to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, it laid the groundwork for a political process that would ultimately determine Kosovo's future.
We know that all decisions on Kosovo are difficult. Some of us kicked the issue down the road eight years ago. Today, the international community faces the hardest issue of all. But the decision is necessary, and it is the result of eight years of international collaboration.
Serbia must recognize, however, that greater stability in the Balkans promoted by the Ahtisaari plan will allow it to use its location, resources and talent to become a major regional player and a constructive force in European politics. The Serb people deserve a legitimate place in Europe and Serbia could also begin to move towards possible EU membership.
Our goal remains a Europe whole and free, with all the people of the western Balkans participating fully as EU members. The benefits of a concerted EU effort in Kosovo, backed by the UN and NATO, are enormous. As such, Russia and the other UN Security Council members should follow through on the promise that the Council made in 1999 and agree to complete the process of self-governance in Kosovo. This is the best option at this stage of a very difficult history of the whole region. Viable alternatives do not exist.
Madeleine Albright, United States
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada
Jan Eliasson, Sweden
Gareth Evans, Australia
Joschka Fischer, Germany
Bronislaw Geremek, Poland
Niels Helveg Petersen, Denmark
Lydie Polfer, Luxembourg
Jozias van Artsen, Netherlands
Hubert Vedrine, France
16 June 2007
How to improve interethnic dialogue in Balkans?
I love Peace
“The reality today is that we are all interdependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue”. - Dalai Lama
Looking back on Balkan’s history; war seems to be part of its life. The aim of Balkan’s states and nations was the destruction of enemies (neighbors), and when achieved it was called a victory. There was a relevance to violence and war. This created a hateful collective memory of people of Balkans which unfortunately is still present. This memory is created by fake historians which couldn’t get out of their nationalism and tell the truth to a future generations that all these wars and terrible things happened because there was no cooperation, no dialogue and that happened because the envy of each other and the aim to be the stronger, which prevailed over the peace and normal life. And the other reason is that on Balkan’s was not born any Nelson Mandela or Abraham Lincoln, but the only hero’s are the ones that died fighting on wars. And the history got repeated over and over again.
Unfortunately, Balkan’s region didn’t get to keep up with other European countries which used to cooperate and compete to succeed each other in other forms of control (by developing economically, technologically, intellectually) even if they were rivals on all kind of aspects and the example of cooperation between French and German after World War II and the result of this cooperation gives a perfect example to Balkan’s states on what they need to focus on.
But did the Balkan countries today achieved that intellectual development to get out of hateful collective memory and are the people of Balkan’s ready to move toward dialogue and integration?
I think today when we face a problem or disagreements; we achieved to understand that the only way to come up with any solution is through dialogue. But the dialog doesn’t mean making the bunch of words and meetings without getting a solution. When the dialog starts both sides must be aware that there should be a willing to change. Balkan’s states and people must know that effective dialogue is the only appropriate method. We must understand that one sided victory is no longer objective and we don’t need to destroy our neighbors; we don’t need to ignore their interests; mark: we need to cooperate.
How we may achieve this? Not by erasing or rewriting history because that’s impossible, not by forgetting the past because I cannot forget the loved once killed, and not by revenge. Revenge is something that will lead to same history and events; all what is necessary to achieve better dialog and cooperation between Balkan’s nations and states, is an official apology from a people that used to support the criminals and regret for what they did which will result on bringing criminals in front of justice. From the other side a respect to those people and honest cooperation to move and create mutual objectives for peace an better life. When this faze is achieved then the other way is more easy.
For improving the dialogue between Balkan’s another important way is the economical development and cooperation. The economical cooperation will get this people near each other especially will bring the trust and a modern competition which is an precaution for this region to move toward integration. The CEFTA agreement is an good start and is a light for a hope that this region started to improve on economical cooperation. The free trade and free movement will integrate people.
In the other hand the cultural and intellectual meetings is another way to get near each other. Summer universities, regional competitions in every kind of cultural or intellectual accepts will help these countries and nations to share and compete with the best they have, and at the same time will help them to expound their intellectual horizon of knowledge and seek for same objectives.
Doing so, these countries will have more easy to get integrated on Europe and on the world of globalization; the world where borders are only in paper where the sovereignty and land concepts takes another meaning and becomes out dated.
Therefore the conclusion will lead us to concept that violence and hegemony is unsuitable and the nonviolence and dialog are the appropriate methods of dealing with difficulties and differences and I believe that people of Balkan’s will understand it and it will become an ideology (instead of their nationalism); the ideology of moving the civilization toward peace and normal life.
--------
This is final essay submitted to virtual school of dialogue, graduating at VI generation....
“The reality today is that we are all interdependent and have to co-exist on this small planet. Therefore, the only sensible and intelligent way of resolving differences and clashes of interests, whether between individuals or nations, is through dialogue”. - Dalai Lama
Looking back on Balkan’s history; war seems to be part of its life. The aim of Balkan’s states and nations was the destruction of enemies (neighbors), and when achieved it was called a victory. There was a relevance to violence and war. This created a hateful collective memory of people of Balkans which unfortunately is still present. This memory is created by fake historians which couldn’t get out of their nationalism and tell the truth to a future generations that all these wars and terrible things happened because there was no cooperation, no dialogue and that happened because the envy of each other and the aim to be the stronger, which prevailed over the peace and normal life. And the other reason is that on Balkan’s was not born any Nelson Mandela or Abraham Lincoln, but the only hero’s are the ones that died fighting on wars. And the history got repeated over and over again.
Unfortunately, Balkan’s region didn’t get to keep up with other European countries which used to cooperate and compete to succeed each other in other forms of control (by developing economically, technologically, intellectually) even if they were rivals on all kind of aspects and the example of cooperation between French and German after World War II and the result of this cooperation gives a perfect example to Balkan’s states on what they need to focus on.
But did the Balkan countries today achieved that intellectual development to get out of hateful collective memory and are the people of Balkan’s ready to move toward dialogue and integration?
I think today when we face a problem or disagreements; we achieved to understand that the only way to come up with any solution is through dialogue. But the dialog doesn’t mean making the bunch of words and meetings without getting a solution. When the dialog starts both sides must be aware that there should be a willing to change. Balkan’s states and people must know that effective dialogue is the only appropriate method. We must understand that one sided victory is no longer objective and we don’t need to destroy our neighbors; we don’t need to ignore their interests; mark: we need to cooperate.
How we may achieve this? Not by erasing or rewriting history because that’s impossible, not by forgetting the past because I cannot forget the loved once killed, and not by revenge. Revenge is something that will lead to same history and events; all what is necessary to achieve better dialog and cooperation between Balkan’s nations and states, is an official apology from a people that used to support the criminals and regret for what they did which will result on bringing criminals in front of justice. From the other side a respect to those people and honest cooperation to move and create mutual objectives for peace an better life. When this faze is achieved then the other way is more easy.
For improving the dialogue between Balkan’s another important way is the economical development and cooperation. The economical cooperation will get this people near each other especially will bring the trust and a modern competition which is an precaution for this region to move toward integration. The CEFTA agreement is an good start and is a light for a hope that this region started to improve on economical cooperation. The free trade and free movement will integrate people.
In the other hand the cultural and intellectual meetings is another way to get near each other. Summer universities, regional competitions in every kind of cultural or intellectual accepts will help these countries and nations to share and compete with the best they have, and at the same time will help them to expound their intellectual horizon of knowledge and seek for same objectives.
Doing so, these countries will have more easy to get integrated on Europe and on the world of globalization; the world where borders are only in paper where the sovereignty and land concepts takes another meaning and becomes out dated.
Therefore the conclusion will lead us to concept that violence and hegemony is unsuitable and the nonviolence and dialog are the appropriate methods of dealing with difficulties and differences and I believe that people of Balkan’s will understand it and it will become an ideology (instead of their nationalism); the ideology of moving the civilization toward peace and normal life.
--------
This is final essay submitted to virtual school of dialogue, graduating at VI generation....
04 May 2007
Kosova these days
I love Peace
Political events on Kosova are getting very interesting and difficult because now the ball is outside the Kosova field and internationals are playing for us. What I’m trying to say is that now the Kosova status matter becomes an international problem which needs to be resolved on an international level on this case on Security Council by approving the new resolution for Kosova.
The Ahtisar’s plan supposed to be the base of this resolution but Russia does not agree with it. These days we have and commission from UN with ambassadors of lot of places in leaded by Belgium ambassador and they visited the Kosova and Serbia to get facts about the present situations. The specific of this commission was that they used to visit many places to see how people live not like other delegations that visit only institutions but not other places.
Seams that this visit was useful for many ambassadors but not for Russian ambassador Mr. Churkin. Russians are still trying to enforce the dialog between Serbia and Kosovo for finding any solution accepted by two groups.
I’m sure that if we ask Russians if they know if that solution exists they wouldn’t know it. Anyway, the America and Europe seams to agree that Ahtisari’s plan is the only plan that will bring the long term stability for Kosovo and as well the better life for Serbian minority.
This month America will lead the Security Council and will try to enforce the resolution for Kosova but in case the Russian will take veto on these resolution then Kosova institutions needs to declare self independence. This will lead to tensions between Serbian minority and Albanian majority and what will happened next can lead to Croatia scenery, to any separation of Kosova territory which will lead to any other war or to any other conception of Albanians requests…
Hope new resolution of Security Council will pass because this will give Kosova independence, will give Serbian minority the biggest rights that and minority got on any place and will give the green light to EU to invest on Kosovo.
At this time, Kosova doesn’t need new turmoil but needs peace and safe road to an develop economy and legal state.
Political events on Kosova are getting very interesting and difficult because now the ball is outside the Kosova field and internationals are playing for us. What I’m trying to say is that now the Kosova status matter becomes an international problem which needs to be resolved on an international level on this case on Security Council by approving the new resolution for Kosova.
The Ahtisar’s plan supposed to be the base of this resolution but Russia does not agree with it. These days we have and commission from UN with ambassadors of lot of places in leaded by Belgium ambassador and they visited the Kosova and Serbia to get facts about the present situations. The specific of this commission was that they used to visit many places to see how people live not like other delegations that visit only institutions but not other places.
Seams that this visit was useful for many ambassadors but not for Russian ambassador Mr. Churkin. Russians are still trying to enforce the dialog between Serbia and Kosovo for finding any solution accepted by two groups.
I’m sure that if we ask Russians if they know if that solution exists they wouldn’t know it. Anyway, the America and Europe seams to agree that Ahtisari’s plan is the only plan that will bring the long term stability for Kosovo and as well the better life for Serbian minority.
This month America will lead the Security Council and will try to enforce the resolution for Kosova but in case the Russian will take veto on these resolution then Kosova institutions needs to declare self independence. This will lead to tensions between Serbian minority and Albanian majority and what will happened next can lead to Croatia scenery, to any separation of Kosova territory which will lead to any other war or to any other conception of Albanians requests…
Hope new resolution of Security Council will pass because this will give Kosova independence, will give Serbian minority the biggest rights that and minority got on any place and will give the green light to EU to invest on Kosovo.
At this time, Kosova doesn’t need new turmoil but needs peace and safe road to an develop economy and legal state.
29 April 2007
U.S. says Kosovo to be independent with or without U.N.
I love Peace
By Paul Taylor
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Kosovo will be independent with or without a United Nations resolution, and Russia should back an agreement to protect the Kosovo Serb minority, the United States said on Saturday.
Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried said it was possible the latest Russian criticism of U.N. mediator Marti Ahtisaari's plan for the final status of the breakaway Serbian province meant Moscow intended to block a resolution.
"We hope that Russia understands that Kosovo is going to be independent one way or another," Fried told Reuters in an interview at a Brussels Forum on transatlantic relations.
"It will either be done in a controlled, supervised way that provides for the well-being of the Serbian people, or it will take place in an uncontrolled way and the Kosovo Serbs will suffer the most, which would be terrible."
Moscow has repeatedly said it will not accept a solution which is unacceptable to Serbia, which is adamantly opposed to any form of independence for Kosovo.
A U.N. Security Council fact-finding mission, which visited Kosovo at Russia's suggestion, wrapped up its visit on Saturday saying they would deliberate on the proposal for its independence without setting deadlines.
"Deciding on important issues should never be hostage to predetermined deadlines," Belgian ambassador and mission head Johan Verbeke told a news conference in Pristina.
Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, proposes supervised independence with a strong role for an international presence to protect minority rights.
Fried acknowledged the European Union could be split over whether or not to recognise Kosovo if there was no U.N. resolution and Kosovo's overwhelming Albanian majority declared independence unilaterally.
"I see absolutely no advantage to doing this any other way than through a Security Council resolution. I see merely disadvantages," Fried said. "The alternatives are all worse.
"A divided Europe is a bad thing in general and a terrible thing in this particular case."
A resolution would provide legal authority to protect the Kosovo Serbs and help the Europeans to unite, he said.
Kosovo has been an international protectorate since NATO waged an air war in 1999 to drive out Serbian forces and end ethnic cleansing. Some 90 percent of the province's 2 million population are Albanians.
"Kosovo is in the list of problems that do not improve with age and neglect. The situation there is not inherently stable," said Fried.
Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke told the Brussels Forum the next few weeks would be a fundamental test of Russian President Vladimir Putin's view of his role in the world.
"If he vetoes the Ahtisaari plan in the Security Council, there will be a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The United States will recognise them, I hope the same day ... Some of the EU will, some won't," Holbrooke said.
"There will probably be violence on the ground and it will be Russia's fault."
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt told the Forum he expected a period of "diplomatic trench warfare" over Kosovo at the United Nations and suggested the EU should take the lead in seeking a compromise solution, which would take time.
Asked about Holbrooke's scenario of unilateral independence, he said: "That is playing with fire."
(Additional reporting by Mark John)
By Paul Taylor
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Kosovo will be independent with or without a United Nations resolution, and Russia should back an agreement to protect the Kosovo Serb minority, the United States said on Saturday.
Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried said it was possible the latest Russian criticism of U.N. mediator Marti Ahtisaari's plan for the final status of the breakaway Serbian province meant Moscow intended to block a resolution.
"We hope that Russia understands that Kosovo is going to be independent one way or another," Fried told Reuters in an interview at a Brussels Forum on transatlantic relations.
"It will either be done in a controlled, supervised way that provides for the well-being of the Serbian people, or it will take place in an uncontrolled way and the Kosovo Serbs will suffer the most, which would be terrible."
Moscow has repeatedly said it will not accept a solution which is unacceptable to Serbia, which is adamantly opposed to any form of independence for Kosovo.
A U.N. Security Council fact-finding mission, which visited Kosovo at Russia's suggestion, wrapped up its visit on Saturday saying they would deliberate on the proposal for its independence without setting deadlines.
"Deciding on important issues should never be hostage to predetermined deadlines," Belgian ambassador and mission head Johan Verbeke told a news conference in Pristina.
Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, proposes supervised independence with a strong role for an international presence to protect minority rights.
Fried acknowledged the European Union could be split over whether or not to recognise Kosovo if there was no U.N. resolution and Kosovo's overwhelming Albanian majority declared independence unilaterally.
"I see absolutely no advantage to doing this any other way than through a Security Council resolution. I see merely disadvantages," Fried said. "The alternatives are all worse.
"A divided Europe is a bad thing in general and a terrible thing in this particular case."
A resolution would provide legal authority to protect the Kosovo Serbs and help the Europeans to unite, he said.
Kosovo has been an international protectorate since NATO waged an air war in 1999 to drive out Serbian forces and end ethnic cleansing. Some 90 percent of the province's 2 million population are Albanians.
"Kosovo is in the list of problems that do not improve with age and neglect. The situation there is not inherently stable," said Fried.
Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke told the Brussels Forum the next few weeks would be a fundamental test of Russian President Vladimir Putin's view of his role in the world.
"If he vetoes the Ahtisaari plan in the Security Council, there will be a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The United States will recognise them, I hope the same day ... Some of the EU will, some won't," Holbrooke said.
"There will probably be violence on the ground and it will be Russia's fault."
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt told the Forum he expected a period of "diplomatic trench warfare" over Kosovo at the United Nations and suggested the EU should take the lead in seeking a compromise solution, which would take time.
Asked about Holbrooke's scenario of unilateral independence, he said: "That is playing with fire."
(Additional reporting by Mark John)
20 April 2007
Improving International Peacebuilding Efforts: The Example of Human Rights Culture in Kosovo.
I love Peace
here is nice article about improving the international peacebuilding efforts-Kosovo. I'm very sorry that i couldn't find the whole essay but it's worthy to read even a part of it...
Julie Mertus
Kosovo today is a house of cards. One false move and the house will fall down. Should the international troops--in particular the U.S. and British troops--pull out of Kosovo, it will collapse into communal violence. (1) The international security presence in Kosovo has generally succeeded in preventing the outbreak of another violent armed conflict but has accomplished little else beyond that. This is not surprising. Militaries can help prevent war, but they alone cannot build a sustainable peace. (2) The cessation of hostilities through the use of military force does not, in and of itself, resolve the strategic dilemmas, structural imbalances, and open wounds of unaddressed abuses and interpersonal hostilities. As David Lake and Donald Rothschild stress in their exhaustive study of ethnic conflict, a "stable peace can arise only as effective institutions of government are reestablished, the state begins again to mediate between distrustful ethnic groups, and the parties slowly gain confidence in the safeguards contained in the new ethnic contracts." (3) Peacebuilding requires the efforts of a host of civilian actors focused on institution building, interpersonal reconciliation, and social transformation over the long term. More than 250 well-intentioned nongovernmental and governmental organizations have flooded into Kosovo offering a range of resources and promises. (4) Elections have been held, (5) homes have been rebuilt, schools have reopened, and roads have been repaved. Police and judges have been trained, and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is well under way in its investigations into war crimes committed in Kosovo. Nonetheless, not one of the larger international goals that brought the international community to Kosovo in the first place has been reached. Kosovo is decidedly not a multiethnic and secure society, and equal access to basic human rights protections remains illusory. (6) Local police and administrative and judicial systems are still unable to operate independent of international oversight and, instead of joining government, many of the "best and brightest" in Kosovo have withdrawn from participation altogether. That the citizenry of Kosovo--Serb and Albanian alike--perceive no legitimate governance structure and process only magnifies pervasive feelings of insecurity and unfairness. As the international community looks toward new nation-building challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the struggle for "lessons learned" from Kosovo is acute. The experience of Kosovo suggests that there must be more and better attempts to incorporate local actors and experiences and to draw on them in building human rights cultures. I divide my argument into four parts: (1) an explanation of the use of the term human rights culture and the introduction of a framework for understanding and analyzing the local impact of human rights norms in post-conflict societies; (2) a discussion of the nature of the human rights culture in Kosovar society prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing in 1999; (3) an exploration of the impact of postagreement civil intervention on human rights culture; and (4) suggestions for improvement, with specific attention to human rights education. Toward a Framework for Analyzing "Human Rights Culture" The notion of human rights refers to two fundamental precepts. The first of these precepts is the "dignity principle," or the notion that each human being should be treated with dignity solely because he or she is human and not because he or she belongs to a certain group or has achieved a certain stature. (7) Full acceptance of the "dignity principle" compels the embrace of the "equality principle." This is the idea that all people have dignity. One cannot claim to believe in the idea of human rights and also believe that these rights apply to only some individuals, or that only some states have a responsibility to respect human rights. (8) The disempowered turn to human rights discourse because it so "successfully manages to articulate (evolving) political claims." (9) In Jack Donnelly's words, "Human rights is the language of the victims and the dispossessed." (10) As the disempowered shape human rights ideology and use it for their own goals, they exercise their moral agency. Over time, the individuals and groups that adopt human rights language and thinking become a human rights people. The human rights framework becomes a taken-for-granted lens through which they can view and understand the world and their role in it. (11) Human rights cultures exist when human rights are one of "the forms through which people make sense of their lives." (12) In other words, a human rights culture is a way of seeing the world through the lens of human rights and consequent with the principles of human dignity and equality. It is through human rights culture that human rights norms take root in and influence a population. (13) However, the adoption of human rights culture is not one of simply embracing purely universal interpretations of human rights, but rather consists of the reconceptualization of culture itself through a struggle to interpret human rights norms in a cultural context. (14) Adopting human rights language is an essential step in building a human rights culture, (15) but language alone is insufficient. Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a population develops its own shared (yet contested) understanding of the prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the "frame in which people derive a sense of who they are and where they are going." (16) Central to this process is a population's own experiences of rights deprivation and rights affirmation, which often occur through storytelling. (17) Human rights storytelling serves several functions. Storytelling provides both a "sentimental education" (18) that generates the kind of sympathy necessary for the acceptance of human rights norms and for the validation of the experience of abuse and thus "represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship." (19) Human rights activists in Belgrade, for example, exposed stories about abuses against Albanians in order to garner the Serbs' sympathy for Albanians and to garner the support of the international community against Slobodan Milosevic. (20) Kosovar Albanians and anti-Milosevic Serbs strongly believe that if not for the human rights storytelling, the NATO intervention never would have occurred. (21) Human rights storytelling also facilitates a common understanding of experience (22) and in so doing promotes group cohesion. In Kosovo, the informal telling of stories in Kosovar family living rooms and the more formalized collection of stories by human rights groups served to strengthen Albanian solidarity as a united, oppressed people. (23) Similarly, Serbian stories about Albanians solidified their identity as victims at the hands of Albanians. (24) In this way, within one society, human rights storytelling was both unifying and fragmenting. A useful framework for analyzing the impact of human rights institution building on violently divided postagreement societies is suggested by the work of Christine Bell, who examines the role of human rights in peace agreements, (25) and of John Paul Lederach, who emphasizes the importance of transforming social relationships and structures that institutionalize violence. From these works, we can identify three roles for human rights culture building: an instrumental role, a constitutive role, and a transformative role. Human rights norms, once institutionalized and internalized, play an instrumental role in that they are crucial for advancing some other good. The spread of a human rights culture can lead to increased participation of citizens...
here is nice article about improving the international peacebuilding efforts-Kosovo. I'm very sorry that i couldn't find the whole essay but it's worthy to read even a part of it...
Julie Mertus
Kosovo today is a house of cards. One false move and the house will fall down. Should the international troops--in particular the U.S. and British troops--pull out of Kosovo, it will collapse into communal violence. (1) The international security presence in Kosovo has generally succeeded in preventing the outbreak of another violent armed conflict but has accomplished little else beyond that. This is not surprising. Militaries can help prevent war, but they alone cannot build a sustainable peace. (2) The cessation of hostilities through the use of military force does not, in and of itself, resolve the strategic dilemmas, structural imbalances, and open wounds of unaddressed abuses and interpersonal hostilities. As David Lake and Donald Rothschild stress in their exhaustive study of ethnic conflict, a "stable peace can arise only as effective institutions of government are reestablished, the state begins again to mediate between distrustful ethnic groups, and the parties slowly gain confidence in the safeguards contained in the new ethnic contracts." (3) Peacebuilding requires the efforts of a host of civilian actors focused on institution building, interpersonal reconciliation, and social transformation over the long term. More than 250 well-intentioned nongovernmental and governmental organizations have flooded into Kosovo offering a range of resources and promises. (4) Elections have been held, (5) homes have been rebuilt, schools have reopened, and roads have been repaved. Police and judges have been trained, and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is well under way in its investigations into war crimes committed in Kosovo. Nonetheless, not one of the larger international goals that brought the international community to Kosovo in the first place has been reached. Kosovo is decidedly not a multiethnic and secure society, and equal access to basic human rights protections remains illusory. (6) Local police and administrative and judicial systems are still unable to operate independent of international oversight and, instead of joining government, many of the "best and brightest" in Kosovo have withdrawn from participation altogether. That the citizenry of Kosovo--Serb and Albanian alike--perceive no legitimate governance structure and process only magnifies pervasive feelings of insecurity and unfairness. As the international community looks toward new nation-building challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the struggle for "lessons learned" from Kosovo is acute. The experience of Kosovo suggests that there must be more and better attempts to incorporate local actors and experiences and to draw on them in building human rights cultures. I divide my argument into four parts: (1) an explanation of the use of the term human rights culture and the introduction of a framework for understanding and analyzing the local impact of human rights norms in post-conflict societies; (2) a discussion of the nature of the human rights culture in Kosovar society prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing in 1999; (3) an exploration of the impact of postagreement civil intervention on human rights culture; and (4) suggestions for improvement, with specific attention to human rights education. Toward a Framework for Analyzing "Human Rights Culture" The notion of human rights refers to two fundamental precepts. The first of these precepts is the "dignity principle," or the notion that each human being should be treated with dignity solely because he or she is human and not because he or she belongs to a certain group or has achieved a certain stature. (7) Full acceptance of the "dignity principle" compels the embrace of the "equality principle." This is the idea that all people have dignity. One cannot claim to believe in the idea of human rights and also believe that these rights apply to only some individuals, or that only some states have a responsibility to respect human rights. (8) The disempowered turn to human rights discourse because it so "successfully manages to articulate (evolving) political claims." (9) In Jack Donnelly's words, "Human rights is the language of the victims and the dispossessed." (10) As the disempowered shape human rights ideology and use it for their own goals, they exercise their moral agency. Over time, the individuals and groups that adopt human rights language and thinking become a human rights people. The human rights framework becomes a taken-for-granted lens through which they can view and understand the world and their role in it. (11) Human rights cultures exist when human rights are one of "the forms through which people make sense of their lives." (12) In other words, a human rights culture is a way of seeing the world through the lens of human rights and consequent with the principles of human dignity and equality. It is through human rights culture that human rights norms take root in and influence a population. (13) However, the adoption of human rights culture is not one of simply embracing purely universal interpretations of human rights, but rather consists of the reconceptualization of culture itself through a struggle to interpret human rights norms in a cultural context. (14) Adopting human rights language is an essential step in building a human rights culture, (15) but language alone is insufficient. Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a population develops its own shared (yet contested) understanding of the prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the "frame in which people derive a sense of who they are and where they are going." (16) Central to this process is a population's own experiences of rights deprivation and rights affirmation, which often occur through storytelling. (17) Human rights storytelling serves several functions. Storytelling provides both a "sentimental education" (18) that generates the kind of sympathy necessary for the acceptance of human rights norms and for the validation of the experience of abuse and thus "represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship." (19) Human rights activists in Belgrade, for example, exposed stories about abuses against Albanians in order to garner the Serbs' sympathy for Albanians and to garner the support of the international community against Slobodan Milosevic. (20) Kosovar Albanians and anti-Milosevic Serbs strongly believe that if not for the human rights storytelling, the NATO intervention never would have occurred. (21) Human rights storytelling also facilitates a common understanding of experience (22) and in so doing promotes group cohesion. In Kosovo, the informal telling of stories in Kosovar family living rooms and the more formalized collection of stories by human rights groups served to strengthen Albanian solidarity as a united, oppressed people. (23) Similarly, Serbian stories about Albanians solidified their identity as victims at the hands of Albanians. (24) In this way, within one society, human rights storytelling was both unifying and fragmenting. A useful framework for analyzing the impact of human rights institution building on violently divided postagreement societies is suggested by the work of Christine Bell, who examines the role of human rights in peace agreements, (25) and of John Paul Lederach, who emphasizes the importance of transforming social relationships and structures that institutionalize violence. From these works, we can identify three roles for human rights culture building: an instrumental role, a constitutive role, and a transformative role. Human rights norms, once institutionalized and internalized, play an instrumental role in that they are crucial for advancing some other good. The spread of a human rights culture can lead to increased participation of citizens...
Open Letter to Trent FRANKS (R.Az)
I love Peace
February 5, 2006
The Honorable Trent FRANKS (R.Az)U.S. House of Reprentatives1237 Longworth House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515Fax: (202) 225.6328 Dear Congressman Franks: I have read with great dismay your “Interview” recently given to the American Legion Magazine, regarding “The Serbian Situation….”. I quote:
“…The Serbian situation is an example of the struggle between an ideology that affirms the sanctity of life and the tolerance of all religions, and an ideology that uses violence to force a majority on unwilling individuals. This is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring Jews…Much like Hezbollah, those who lay claim to Kosovo and neighboring lands have made clear their intent to create a religiously and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian state…”
As a student of Balkan affairs, I find your statements to be completely inaccurate, incendiary, and contrary to the interests of the local population, to the U.S.Government policies in the area, and to peace and political stability in the Balkans.
The religious connotation you give, and fully endorse, to the political issues regarding the sad state of affairs where Serbia finds itself today, cannot hide the terrible crimes perpetrated by the successive Serb governments, especially since 1912, and which culminated with the genocidal aggression of the war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Serbia. Since you have approached the “problem of Kosovo” from this vantage point, I would like to make the following clarifications:
The contents of your statements, as well as the tone, echo the declarations of His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova, clearly indicating His Grace’s “aloofness” for the fate of the e n t i r e unfortunate Kosova population –Moslem, Eastern Orthodox and Catholic. Sounding the alarm against “the militant Jihad and terrorism in the heart of Europe” the honorable Bishop neglects to explain why from 1389 to 1912, ALL major churches and objects of worship of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova were protected by the local Albanians, who by the end of the 17th century began their conversion to Islam.
The fear of having”…1.300 Serbian religious objects lost” is unfounded since the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, these “jewels of medieval architecture” have been protected and preserved by the local Moslem and Catholic population, often at the risk of their lives. As late as 1960 ,the late Patriarch of ther Serb Orthodox Church, Gherman, decorated the Albanian family Nikci, of Peje, for having protected the Patriarchate of Peje for generations. There was no complaint then against the Albanians, until ‘Serb politics’ fabricated the threat of annihilation of the Serb Orthodox Church. Spme of those responsible for these politics of division are now facing the
International Courtfor War Crimes in Yugoslavia, at the Hague (Netherland).
It is these “Serb politics’ that have mobilized the dark forces of the Serb Orthodox Church –including His Grace Bishop Artemije whom you met in Washington,D.C.—to declare that Kosova is”occupied” by Albanians (92 percent of the population) and that “…every state has the right to fight an occupier to liberate an occupied part of its terrirory…This is the only response worthy of the State, and the Serbian people”.
Who is the enenmy? It’s Islamic extremism among the Kosova Albanians, a theme incessantly repeated to intimidate the international community…and assiduously exploited to deceive American Christian believers.
The entire scenario turns uglier when one thinks of this “man of God”, Bishop Artemije, never raising the voice to protest the massacres of the marauding Serb “paramilitary gangs’ (Arkan,Franks etc.) as well as of the regular Serbian Army in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally in Kosova. His silence will forever remain a black stain in the history of his Church. There were few low-level Serb clergy who oppoesd the war and its destruction. “Our” Bishop was not one of them!
Historically, “…Serb nationalist doctrine emphasized the role of the Orthodox Church,- wrote Noel Malcolm, of the Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy- as an essential constituent of Serbian identity. Albanian nationalist doctrine, on the other hand, emphasized the Albanian language, accepting the religious diversity of the Albanians…Religion thus mattered, to a certain extent, in reality, because it mattered in Serbian national ideology”.
Andrew Herscher, of the University of Michigan, explains how”…recent studies of violence in anthropolgy, sociology, and political science have come to recognize the ‘ethnicity’ of violence is an abstracion, an interpretation and a staging; violence comes to be understood as ‘ethnic’ in narrations undertaken both by perpetrators and victims”. He states that”…representatives of both Albanian and Serb communities have inflicted violence against the other’s religious sites and have documented and memorialized violence against their own religious sites, in each case, in order to shape particular notions of ethnic identity- which means to be Albanian, or Serb, in Kosova”.
Writing about recent events, Professor Herscher had this to say:
“…During the counter-insurgency campaign waged by Serb forces against the Kosova Liberation Army in l998-l999, however, along with mass explusion of Albanians from Kosova, religious sites associated with Islam were targeted for destruction. Approxi-mately 200 of the more than 600 mosques in Kosova were damaged or destroyed during the 1998-1999, along with Sufi lodges and Islamic schools, archives and libraries … buildings were ruined by deliberately inflicting violence, including vandalism, arson, shelling or toppling of minarets, and the dynamiting of the building from within…” He concluded:
” Yet, the targeting of religious sites does not represent a history of “ethnic violence’ in Kosova, as mush as an ongoing attempt to inextricably enmesh ethnicity, religion, violence and history for contemporary political ends”.
It is these “political ends” that the Serbian lobby in Washington,D.C., is now serving by using the moral and political authority of the distinguished US. Congressmen.
The American scholar, Professor Serge R. Doucette,Jr. in an Essay: “Fourth of July and ’The Face of Terror’” wrote:
“…Serbia has in its recent history initiated five wars against its neighbors; all were justified by their goal of “Greater Serbia”, and all had the sanction and support of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church has consistently manipulated and distorted Christian faith in service of Serbian greed for territorial gain and power. There is no such thing as a minor or justified atrocity, or act of terrorism: but, as wrong as Palestinian suicide bombings are against the Israelis, and as immoral and cowardly as the acts of 9/11 were, they pale in comparison to the atrocities committed by the Serbs against ethnic Albanians.
… Serbian repetition of crimes against humaniy can be seen as a result of a Serbian “mentality” developed and fostered by a Mystical relationship with the Orthodox Churxh which is inseparable with the existentce of the Nation.
Since its inception in the later part of the 13th century, there has Never been a time in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church that it has defended the Humanitarian Rights of anyone, but the Serbs themselves!
.. When you study Serbian history, you will come to undertsand that for Serbs, religion is not governing their daily ways of life, and they rarely attend church on a regular basis. Unlike Albanians, and others…they believe that if their “Church” is destroyed, they wil cease to exist. And, it is this belief that is effectively manipulated by Serbian religious and political leaders. The Serbian Orthodox Church becomes the motivation to sustain aggression, violence and atrocities against the others.”
*
The painful history of Serb repression in Kosova, where the victims were the Albanians, is fully documented. I will submit only two documents dated in 1919 and in 1999:
1) Paris Peace Conference,1919,vol.XII,PPC, 184.018/ 3
The Secretary of State to Mr. A.J.Balfour (British Foreign Minister),Paris,April 18,1919
“…British Embassy at Washington has informed the Department of State as following regarding the alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro:” Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova, Podjour, and Roshji have been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region…” Very truly yours, Robert Lansing, (Secretary of State)
2) Explaining the reason for NATO intervention , President W.J.Clinton had this to say:
“…We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosova from a mounting military offensive…Milosevic stripped Kosova of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed. Now, they started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their bodies. We have seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets. Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and their sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. Its is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people, whose leaders have already agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative…” (March 1999, Federal Document Clearing House)
(Research indicates that 174 Albanian families in Kosova were locked in their houses and burned alive by Serbian troops, men women and children!)
It is, therefore, utterly insane to think that “Moslem” Albanian demands for an indepen-dent Kosova would receive the favorable reception we witness today, if their aims were to build an “Islamic”,”terrorist” state, “to affirm…an ideology that uses violence …(with) the intent to create a religious and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian State…” The inter-national community that support Albanians in Kosova is predominantly Christian-not Moslem- from the U.S. of America to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy , the European Union, the overwhelming academic world, intelectuals, analysts, diplomats, “think tanks”, and human rights organizations. The civilized world preseves intact the horrible images of the Serb aggression in Kosova during the 1998-1999 years- the long columns of refugees expelled…on foot, horse wagons, and especially the long trains reminiscent of the Nazi transportations convoys to the extermination camps during WW II. “This is another Holocaust in Europe, and we are not going to allow it” declared in 1999, Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister.
*
Congressman Franks, in your interview, you made this unfortunate remark:…This Serbian situation is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring the Jews….”
The story of the Jews in Albanian lands is beginning to unfold: it’s a splendid example of religious tolerance, humanity and civil courage. Not one single, solitary, Jew was handed back to the Nazis. It’s a unique case in Europe. This is a fact now being corroborated by researches at the US.Holocaust Musem, in Washington,D.C., only a few steps from your Capitol office. Your distingusihed colleague at the House, the Honorable Tom Lantos, the only Holocaust survivor of the U.S.House of Representatives can attest and confirm it for you. I will limit myself to the following excerpts from a statement by Mrs. Johanna <><>Neumann, of the US Holocaut Musem, made at the end of December 2006, during a Moslem-Jew joint appearance:
“…My parents and I spent the war years in Albania with Muslim families, various families, but in particular one family who actually saved our lives. My parents were imprisoned for about four days, and our wonderful friend, a gentleman by the name of Pilku – whose familiy is inscribed here at the Museum, as well as in Yad Vashem, as among The Righeous Among the Nations- was able to have them released after four days, saved my father by hiding him once the Germans occupied Albania, and my mother and I were introduced as family members of the household. And we were not touched.
The population in Albania was 85 percent Muslim, and 15 pervent of other religious orientations. Everybody knew who we were, and nobody would ever, or even had the thought of denouncing us. Not at all. As a matter of fact, when Germany occupied Yugoslavia, the Albanian people opened their borders, and allowed them (the Jews) to come in. And, when Germans demanded that these people be returned, for some reasons they knew exactly who it was who had crossed the border, they simply said:” We looked for Jews, we didn’t find any. We know only Albanians, We do not know any Jews”. And they had hidden them in the villages, in families, in hospitals that they declared were quarantined because of typhoid fever. Nobody was handed back over to Germans. And those people deserved every respect that anybody can give them. And these were our friends. The story is a long one but this is the essence of it. They saved us and these were good human beings, and as I said before, the majority of them were Muslims, and we have nothing but the highest respect for these people….”
Congressman Franks, I leave the final judgement to you, as I do hope that deep in your conscience you will take into serious consideration the information I suppied today.
Sincerely yours,
Sami Repishti, Ph.D.
City University of New York (retired)
Former political prisoners in Communist Albania (1946-56)
and Communist Yugoslavia (1960-61)
Human rights activist
February 5, 2006
The Honorable Trent FRANKS (R.Az)U.S. House of Reprentatives1237 Longworth House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515Fax: (202) 225.6328 Dear Congressman Franks: I have read with great dismay your “Interview” recently given to the American Legion Magazine, regarding “The Serbian Situation….”. I quote:
“…The Serbian situation is an example of the struggle between an ideology that affirms the sanctity of life and the tolerance of all religions, and an ideology that uses violence to force a majority on unwilling individuals. This is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring Jews…Much like Hezbollah, those who lay claim to Kosovo and neighboring lands have made clear their intent to create a religiously and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian state…”
As a student of Balkan affairs, I find your statements to be completely inaccurate, incendiary, and contrary to the interests of the local population, to the U.S.Government policies in the area, and to peace and political stability in the Balkans.
The religious connotation you give, and fully endorse, to the political issues regarding the sad state of affairs where Serbia finds itself today, cannot hide the terrible crimes perpetrated by the successive Serb governments, especially since 1912, and which culminated with the genocidal aggression of the war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Serbia. Since you have approached the “problem of Kosovo” from this vantage point, I would like to make the following clarifications:
The contents of your statements, as well as the tone, echo the declarations of His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova, clearly indicating His Grace’s “aloofness” for the fate of the e n t i r e unfortunate Kosova population –Moslem, Eastern Orthodox and Catholic. Sounding the alarm against “the militant Jihad and terrorism in the heart of Europe” the honorable Bishop neglects to explain why from 1389 to 1912, ALL major churches and objects of worship of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova were protected by the local Albanians, who by the end of the 17th century began their conversion to Islam.
The fear of having”…1.300 Serbian religious objects lost” is unfounded since the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, these “jewels of medieval architecture” have been protected and preserved by the local Moslem and Catholic population, often at the risk of their lives. As late as 1960 ,the late Patriarch of ther Serb Orthodox Church, Gherman, decorated the Albanian family Nikci, of Peje, for having protected the Patriarchate of Peje for generations. There was no complaint then against the Albanians, until ‘Serb politics’ fabricated the threat of annihilation of the Serb Orthodox Church. Spme of those responsible for these politics of division are now facing the
International Courtfor War Crimes in Yugoslavia, at the Hague (Netherland).
It is these “Serb politics’ that have mobilized the dark forces of the Serb Orthodox Church –including His Grace Bishop Artemije whom you met in Washington,D.C.—to declare that Kosova is”occupied” by Albanians (92 percent of the population) and that “…every state has the right to fight an occupier to liberate an occupied part of its terrirory…This is the only response worthy of the State, and the Serbian people”.
Who is the enenmy? It’s Islamic extremism among the Kosova Albanians, a theme incessantly repeated to intimidate the international community…and assiduously exploited to deceive American Christian believers.
The entire scenario turns uglier when one thinks of this “man of God”, Bishop Artemije, never raising the voice to protest the massacres of the marauding Serb “paramilitary gangs’ (Arkan,Franks etc.) as well as of the regular Serbian Army in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally in Kosova. His silence will forever remain a black stain in the history of his Church. There were few low-level Serb clergy who oppoesd the war and its destruction. “Our” Bishop was not one of them!
Historically, “…Serb nationalist doctrine emphasized the role of the Orthodox Church,- wrote Noel Malcolm, of the Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy- as an essential constituent of Serbian identity. Albanian nationalist doctrine, on the other hand, emphasized the Albanian language, accepting the religious diversity of the Albanians…Religion thus mattered, to a certain extent, in reality, because it mattered in Serbian national ideology”.
Andrew Herscher, of the University of Michigan, explains how”…recent studies of violence in anthropolgy, sociology, and political science have come to recognize the ‘ethnicity’ of violence is an abstracion, an interpretation and a staging; violence comes to be understood as ‘ethnic’ in narrations undertaken both by perpetrators and victims”. He states that”…representatives of both Albanian and Serb communities have inflicted violence against the other’s religious sites and have documented and memorialized violence against their own religious sites, in each case, in order to shape particular notions of ethnic identity- which means to be Albanian, or Serb, in Kosova”.
Writing about recent events, Professor Herscher had this to say:
“…During the counter-insurgency campaign waged by Serb forces against the Kosova Liberation Army in l998-l999, however, along with mass explusion of Albanians from Kosova, religious sites associated with Islam were targeted for destruction. Approxi-mately 200 of the more than 600 mosques in Kosova were damaged or destroyed during the 1998-1999, along with Sufi lodges and Islamic schools, archives and libraries … buildings were ruined by deliberately inflicting violence, including vandalism, arson, shelling or toppling of minarets, and the dynamiting of the building from within…” He concluded:
” Yet, the targeting of religious sites does not represent a history of “ethnic violence’ in Kosova, as mush as an ongoing attempt to inextricably enmesh ethnicity, religion, violence and history for contemporary political ends”.
It is these “political ends” that the Serbian lobby in Washington,D.C., is now serving by using the moral and political authority of the distinguished US. Congressmen.
The American scholar, Professor Serge R. Doucette,Jr. in an Essay: “Fourth of July and ’The Face of Terror’” wrote:
“…Serbia has in its recent history initiated five wars against its neighbors; all were justified by their goal of “Greater Serbia”, and all had the sanction and support of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church has consistently manipulated and distorted Christian faith in service of Serbian greed for territorial gain and power. There is no such thing as a minor or justified atrocity, or act of terrorism: but, as wrong as Palestinian suicide bombings are against the Israelis, and as immoral and cowardly as the acts of 9/11 were, they pale in comparison to the atrocities committed by the Serbs against ethnic Albanians.
… Serbian repetition of crimes against humaniy can be seen as a result of a Serbian “mentality” developed and fostered by a Mystical relationship with the Orthodox Churxh which is inseparable with the existentce of the Nation.
Since its inception in the later part of the 13th century, there has Never been a time in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church that it has defended the Humanitarian Rights of anyone, but the Serbs themselves!
.. When you study Serbian history, you will come to undertsand that for Serbs, religion is not governing their daily ways of life, and they rarely attend church on a regular basis. Unlike Albanians, and others…they believe that if their “Church” is destroyed, they wil cease to exist. And, it is this belief that is effectively manipulated by Serbian religious and political leaders. The Serbian Orthodox Church becomes the motivation to sustain aggression, violence and atrocities against the others.”
*
The painful history of Serb repression in Kosova, where the victims were the Albanians, is fully documented. I will submit only two documents dated in 1919 and in 1999:
1) Paris Peace Conference,1919,vol.XII,PPC, 184.018/ 3
The Secretary of State to Mr. A.J.Balfour (British Foreign Minister),Paris,April 18,1919
“…British Embassy at Washington has informed the Department of State as following regarding the alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro:” Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova, Podjour, and Roshji have been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region…” Very truly yours, Robert Lansing, (Secretary of State)
2) Explaining the reason for NATO intervention , President W.J.Clinton had this to say:
“…We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosova from a mounting military offensive…Milosevic stripped Kosova of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed. Now, they started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their bodies. We have seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets. Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and their sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. Its is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people, whose leaders have already agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative…” (March 1999, Federal Document Clearing House)
(Research indicates that 174 Albanian families in Kosova were locked in their houses and burned alive by Serbian troops, men women and children!)
It is, therefore, utterly insane to think that “Moslem” Albanian demands for an indepen-dent Kosova would receive the favorable reception we witness today, if their aims were to build an “Islamic”,”terrorist” state, “to affirm…an ideology that uses violence …(with) the intent to create a religious and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian State…” The inter-national community that support Albanians in Kosova is predominantly Christian-not Moslem- from the U.S. of America to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy , the European Union, the overwhelming academic world, intelectuals, analysts, diplomats, “think tanks”, and human rights organizations. The civilized world preseves intact the horrible images of the Serb aggression in Kosova during the 1998-1999 years- the long columns of refugees expelled…on foot, horse wagons, and especially the long trains reminiscent of the Nazi transportations convoys to the extermination camps during WW II. “This is another Holocaust in Europe, and we are not going to allow it” declared in 1999, Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister.
*
Congressman Franks, in your interview, you made this unfortunate remark:…This Serbian situation is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring the Jews….”
The story of the Jews in Albanian lands is beginning to unfold: it’s a splendid example of religious tolerance, humanity and civil courage. Not one single, solitary, Jew was handed back to the Nazis. It’s a unique case in Europe. This is a fact now being corroborated by researches at the US.Holocaust Musem, in Washington,D.C., only a few steps from your Capitol office. Your distingusihed colleague at the House, the Honorable Tom Lantos, the only Holocaust survivor of the U.S.House of Representatives can attest and confirm it for you. I will limit myself to the following excerpts from a statement by Mrs. Johanna <><>Neumann, of the US Holocaut Musem, made at the end of December 2006, during a Moslem-Jew joint appearance:
“…My parents and I spent the war years in Albania with Muslim families, various families, but in particular one family who actually saved our lives. My parents were imprisoned for about four days, and our wonderful friend, a gentleman by the name of Pilku – whose familiy is inscribed here at the Museum, as well as in Yad Vashem, as among The Righeous Among the Nations- was able to have them released after four days, saved my father by hiding him once the Germans occupied Albania, and my mother and I were introduced as family members of the household. And we were not touched.
The population in Albania was 85 percent Muslim, and 15 pervent of other religious orientations. Everybody knew who we were, and nobody would ever, or even had the thought of denouncing us. Not at all. As a matter of fact, when Germany occupied Yugoslavia, the Albanian people opened their borders, and allowed them (the Jews) to come in. And, when Germans demanded that these people be returned, for some reasons they knew exactly who it was who had crossed the border, they simply said:” We looked for Jews, we didn’t find any. We know only Albanians, We do not know any Jews”. And they had hidden them in the villages, in families, in hospitals that they declared were quarantined because of typhoid fever. Nobody was handed back over to Germans. And those people deserved every respect that anybody can give them. And these were our friends. The story is a long one but this is the essence of it. They saved us and these were good human beings, and as I said before, the majority of them were Muslims, and we have nothing but the highest respect for these people….”
Congressman Franks, I leave the final judgement to you, as I do hope that deep in your conscience you will take into serious consideration the information I suppied today.
Sincerely yours,
Sami Repishti, Ph.D.
City University of New York (retired)
Former political prisoners in Communist Albania (1946-56)
and Communist Yugoslavia (1960-61)
Human rights activist
30 March 2007
Solana and Olli Rehn
I love Peace
Brussels, 29 March 2007
S113/07
Summary note on the joint report by
Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
and Olli REHN, EU Commissioner for Enlargement,
on the state of preparations of
the future EU and international presence in Kosovo
The joint report, which builds on the previous joint papers on the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo, submitted to the Council by Mr Solana and Mr Rehn, will be presented to foreign ministers at their informal meeting in Bremen on Friday.
Context
The paper analyses the conditions for an effective future EU role in Kosovo and provides an update on the state of transition and implementation preparations. EU coherence will be crucial during both the final stage of the status process and the implementation phase. Local ownership and partnership with the international community are key principles for the implementation of the Status settlement.
Transition Preparations
Following a settlement of Kosovo's future status, the authorities of Kosovo will face a double challenge: to take on competencies passed from UNMIK in accordance with the settlement; and to take the necessary steps to implement the substantive reforms outlined in the comprehensive proposal of the UN Special Envoy. Since October 2006, the ICO/EUSR Preparation Team has been co-chairing a structure designed to deal with questions relating to the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities following a UN Security Council Resolution.
Preparing for the International Civilian Office/EUSR and the ESDP mission
The Status settlement envisages an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR). He/she is envisaged as carrying certain powers and authorities to enable him/her to ensure adherence to the letter and spirit of the Status settlement. The ICO will include and be supported by other partners, including the United States.
The future ESDP Rule-of-Law mission will be designed to support implementation of the Kosovo status settlement and assist Kosovo's judicial and law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.
These tasks will be carried out in full co-operation and coherence with the Commission. In accordance with the Status settlement proposal, the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the EU to establish a Rule of Law mission to support the implementation of the settlement and promote the development of the police and justice sectors in Kosovo and to decide that the mission will have executive powers in the judiciary sector (prosecution of major and organised crime, property rights, correctional services), in the police (organised crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, financial investigations, anti-corruption, border control, crowd and riot control) and in security-related and customs- compliance issues). Member states have expressed agreement with this mandate.
Kosovo's European Perspective
A tangible European perspective based on the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 will reinforce the EU's leverage as a partner of the local institutions and enhance Kosovo's integration in the wider region. Concrete steps should therefore be taken to enable Kosovo to make further progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process after status is settled.
This would mean adopting a Council decision on a European Partnership for Kosovo, which would spell out the priorities for action for Kosovo to move closer to the EU, taking into account the essential requirements of the Status settlement. This should be accompanied by an enhanced technical and political dialogue as well as sufficient financial assistance.
EU approximation is a two-way process. Kosovo needs to meet the same conditions as the rest of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Kosovo should feel that the EU is committed to engage in contractual relations, foster regional cooperation and provide the same opportunities already available to the rest of the region. Strengthening good neighbourly relations will help rebuild trust, foster respect of cultural and religious differences and lay the basis for the reconciliation of future generations.
The European Commission will, at the appropriate time and when the conditions are met, be ready to prepare a feasibility study to examine Kosovo's readiness to engage in contractual relations along the lines of those in the Western Balkan region. This should be conditional on Kosovo's implementation of the Status settlement and key European Partnership priorities, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, good governance and public administration reform.
This will be supported inter alia by EC financial assistance; some €200 million have been allocated to Kosovo over the next three years.
Financial Needs
The International Community needs to ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement the Status settlement and support the development of a democratic, stable, and sustainable Kosovo. The EU has a particular responsibility to facilitate the conditions for a successful intervention, since it will take over the leadership of the future international presence.
Once the different costing elements are known more precisely, the Commission will prepare an overall financial package to be pledged at a donors' conference. EU Member States and our international community partners will need to contribute as well.
Following status, we can expect financing needs to arise in relation to:
1. Kosovo's share of the Yugoslav debt in the wake of status;
2. Expenditure as a result of the status requirements;
3. Kosovo's economic development needs (including institution building and capital investments); and
4. The cost of the international presence
Division of responsibilities
The division of responsibilities between the ICO, ESDP and the Commission will be clear and mutually reinforcing. Whereas the ICO and ESDP mission will support the local authorities to ensure settlement implementation and the consolidation of the area of rule of law, the Commission's role will focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective.
Previous Commission/Council documents on Kosovo:
Commission Communication "A European Future for Kosovo", approved by the College on 20 April 2005.[1]
A European Future for Kosovo - IP/05/450
First joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 14 June 2005 (as requested by the Council in February 2005).
Summary note 14.6.2005
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244, published on 9 November 2005.[2]
2005 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/05/412
Second joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 9 December 2005 (as requested by the Council in November 2005).
Summary note 9.12.2005
The European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, January 2006
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244
Third joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 July 2006 (as requested by the General Affairs and External Relations Council 12 December 2005).
MEMO/06/286
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 published on 8 November 2006. [3]
2006 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/06/412
[1] COM (2005) 156
[2] SEC (2005) 1423
[3] COM (2006) 649 final
Brussels, 29 March 2007
S113/07
Summary note on the joint report by
Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
and Olli REHN, EU Commissioner for Enlargement,
on the state of preparations of
the future EU and international presence in Kosovo
The joint report, which builds on the previous joint papers on the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo, submitted to the Council by Mr Solana and Mr Rehn, will be presented to foreign ministers at their informal meeting in Bremen on Friday.
Context
The paper analyses the conditions for an effective future EU role in Kosovo and provides an update on the state of transition and implementation preparations. EU coherence will be crucial during both the final stage of the status process and the implementation phase. Local ownership and partnership with the international community are key principles for the implementation of the Status settlement.
Transition Preparations
Following a settlement of Kosovo's future status, the authorities of Kosovo will face a double challenge: to take on competencies passed from UNMIK in accordance with the settlement; and to take the necessary steps to implement the substantive reforms outlined in the comprehensive proposal of the UN Special Envoy. Since October 2006, the ICO/EUSR Preparation Team has been co-chairing a structure designed to deal with questions relating to the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities following a UN Security Council Resolution.
Preparing for the International Civilian Office/EUSR and the ESDP mission
The Status settlement envisages an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR). He/she is envisaged as carrying certain powers and authorities to enable him/her to ensure adherence to the letter and spirit of the Status settlement. The ICO will include and be supported by other partners, including the United States.
The future ESDP Rule-of-Law mission will be designed to support implementation of the Kosovo status settlement and assist Kosovo's judicial and law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.
These tasks will be carried out in full co-operation and coherence with the Commission. In accordance with the Status settlement proposal, the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the EU to establish a Rule of Law mission to support the implementation of the settlement and promote the development of the police and justice sectors in Kosovo and to decide that the mission will have executive powers in the judiciary sector (prosecution of major and organised crime, property rights, correctional services), in the police (organised crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, financial investigations, anti-corruption, border control, crowd and riot control) and in security-related and customs- compliance issues). Member states have expressed agreement with this mandate.
Kosovo's European Perspective
A tangible European perspective based on the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 will reinforce the EU's leverage as a partner of the local institutions and enhance Kosovo's integration in the wider region. Concrete steps should therefore be taken to enable Kosovo to make further progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process after status is settled.
This would mean adopting a Council decision on a European Partnership for Kosovo, which would spell out the priorities for action for Kosovo to move closer to the EU, taking into account the essential requirements of the Status settlement. This should be accompanied by an enhanced technical and political dialogue as well as sufficient financial assistance.
EU approximation is a two-way process. Kosovo needs to meet the same conditions as the rest of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Kosovo should feel that the EU is committed to engage in contractual relations, foster regional cooperation and provide the same opportunities already available to the rest of the region. Strengthening good neighbourly relations will help rebuild trust, foster respect of cultural and religious differences and lay the basis for the reconciliation of future generations.
The European Commission will, at the appropriate time and when the conditions are met, be ready to prepare a feasibility study to examine Kosovo's readiness to engage in contractual relations along the lines of those in the Western Balkan region. This should be conditional on Kosovo's implementation of the Status settlement and key European Partnership priorities, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, good governance and public administration reform.
This will be supported inter alia by EC financial assistance; some €200 million have been allocated to Kosovo over the next three years.
Financial Needs
The International Community needs to ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement the Status settlement and support the development of a democratic, stable, and sustainable Kosovo. The EU has a particular responsibility to facilitate the conditions for a successful intervention, since it will take over the leadership of the future international presence.
Once the different costing elements are known more precisely, the Commission will prepare an overall financial package to be pledged at a donors' conference. EU Member States and our international community partners will need to contribute as well.
Following status, we can expect financing needs to arise in relation to:
1. Kosovo's share of the Yugoslav debt in the wake of status;
2. Expenditure as a result of the status requirements;
3. Kosovo's economic development needs (including institution building and capital investments); and
4. The cost of the international presence
Division of responsibilities
The division of responsibilities between the ICO, ESDP and the Commission will be clear and mutually reinforcing. Whereas the ICO and ESDP mission will support the local authorities to ensure settlement implementation and the consolidation of the area of rule of law, the Commission's role will focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective.
Previous Commission/Council documents on Kosovo:
Commission Communication "A European Future for Kosovo", approved by the College on 20 April 2005.[1]
A European Future for Kosovo - IP/05/450
First joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 14 June 2005 (as requested by the Council in February 2005).
Summary note 14.6.2005
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244, published on 9 November 2005.[2]
2005 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/05/412
Second joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 9 December 2005 (as requested by the Council in November 2005).
Summary note 9.12.2005
The European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, January 2006
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244
Third joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 July 2006 (as requested by the General Affairs and External Relations Council 12 December 2005).
MEMO/06/286
The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 published on 8 November 2006. [3]
2006 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/06/412
[1] COM (2005) 156
[2] SEC (2005) 1423
[3] COM (2006) 649 final
27 March 2007
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
I love Peace
Security Council Distr.: General 26 March 2007 Original: English
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51), by which the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo’s future status, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey herewith the report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status and, in an addendum, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1) prepared by my Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.
Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Ban Ki-moon
07-27223 (E) 230307
*0727223*
Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community
1 In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status.
2 Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences — almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress could be achieved.
3 My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.
4 Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.
5 The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.
S/2007/168
Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option
1 A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.
2 For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply not tenable.
Continued international administration is not sustainable
1 While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration.
2 Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.
Independence with international supervision is the only viable option
1 Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia.
2 While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life.
3 Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests.
4 I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.
5 Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.
Conclusion
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.
S/2007/168
16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.
Annex
Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
I. General
1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.
II. Provisions of the Settlement
1 Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.
2 Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.
3 Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the
S/2007/168
areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.
1 Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.
2 Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.
3 Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.
4 Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.
9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that
the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.
5 Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.
6 International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.
7 European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.
8 International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.
9 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.
III. Implementation
1 Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.
2 During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.
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1 At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.
2 Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.
Security Council Distr.: General 26 March 2007 Original: English
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51), by which the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo’s future status, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey herewith the report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status and, in an addendum, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1) prepared by my Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.
Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Ban Ki-moon
07-27223 (E) 230307
*0727223*
Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community
1 In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status.
2 Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences — almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress could be achieved.
3 My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.
4 Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.
5 The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.
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Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option
1 A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.
2 For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply not tenable.
Continued international administration is not sustainable
1 While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration.
2 Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.
Independence with international supervision is the only viable option
1 Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia.
2 While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life.
3 Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests.
4 I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.
5 Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.
Conclusion
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.
S/2007/168
16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.
Annex
Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
I. General
1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.
II. Provisions of the Settlement
1 Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.
2 Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.
3 Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the
S/2007/168
areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.
1 Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.
2 Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.
3 Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.
4 Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.
9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that
the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.
5 Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.
6 International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.
7 European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.
8 International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.
9 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.
III. Implementation
1 Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.
2 During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.
S/2007/168
1 At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.
2 Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.
Proposals for Kosovo Statuse
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Press StatementTom Casey, Deputy SpokesmanWashington, DCMarch 26, 2007
Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status
After over a year of negotiations, UN Special Envoy and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari has delivered to the UN Secretary General his proposals for Kosovo's future status. We are grateful to President Ahtisaari for his patient, skillful and balanced work leading the Kosovo status process.
The United States welcomes and supports his recommendations.
The UN Special Envoy's proposals will give the people of Kosovo clarity about their future for the first time in many years. They contain far-reaching guarantees to protect the rights and security of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities. President Ahtisaari has also proposed that Kosovo become independent, subject to a period of international supervision.
The Kosovo status process is entering its final and decisive phase. As the UN Security Council prepares to review President Ahtisaari's recommendations, we will be engaged in full and intensive consultations with our Security Council partners and the parties.
The resolution of Kosovo's status should be seen in the historical context of the tragic circumstances of the break-up of Yugoslavia, which began in the 1990s. The UN Security Council, which in 1999 passed a resolution that placed Kosovo under UN administration and envisioned a political process to determine status, has long treated Kosovo as a special case.
Since the crisis in this region began sixteen years ago, President George W. Bush and his two predecessors have worked to realize a vision of a Europe, whole, free and at peace. We believe that President Ahtisaari's proposals will allow the region to move beyond the conflicts of the 1990s and towards a brighter Euro-Atlantic future.
2007/230 Released on March 26, 2007
Press StatementTom Casey, Deputy SpokesmanWashington, DCMarch 26, 2007
Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status
After over a year of negotiations, UN Special Envoy and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari has delivered to the UN Secretary General his proposals for Kosovo's future status. We are grateful to President Ahtisaari for his patient, skillful and balanced work leading the Kosovo status process.
The United States welcomes and supports his recommendations.
The UN Special Envoy's proposals will give the people of Kosovo clarity about their future for the first time in many years. They contain far-reaching guarantees to protect the rights and security of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities. President Ahtisaari has also proposed that Kosovo become independent, subject to a period of international supervision.
The Kosovo status process is entering its final and decisive phase. As the UN Security Council prepares to review President Ahtisaari's recommendations, we will be engaged in full and intensive consultations with our Security Council partners and the parties.
The resolution of Kosovo's status should be seen in the historical context of the tragic circumstances of the break-up of Yugoslavia, which began in the 1990s. The UN Security Council, which in 1999 passed a resolution that placed Kosovo under UN administration and envisioned a political process to determine status, has long treated Kosovo as a special case.
Since the crisis in this region began sixteen years ago, President George W. Bush and his two predecessors have worked to realize a vision of a Europe, whole, free and at peace. We believe that President Ahtisaari's proposals will allow the region to move beyond the conflicts of the 1990s and towards a brighter Euro-Atlantic future.
2007/230 Released on March 26, 2007
11 March 2007
Kosovo's Road to Independence
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By Morton Abramowitz7 March 2007The Wall Street JournalKosovo, still trying to emerge from Belgrade's longand difficult rule and more recently frominternational control, has a long way to go toestablish a viable, stable state. But its slow,halting progress is being impeded by its former Serbmasters, backed in the United Nations by Russia.Once the poorest and mostly forgotten part of theformer Yugoslavia, Kosovo still suffers from massiveunemployment, weak political institutions, and muchcorruption. But it is an increasingly vital place, andits energetic people are looking for a new burst ofactivity when independence finally arrives. Meanwhile, Serbia's glory has dimmed. It could becomea dynamic state, as evidenced by recent market reformsand an uptick in economic activity. But it is nolonger a political leader or the hub of the WesternBalkans, and it is unlikely to resume its formerprominence. For some 15 years its people have enduredSlobodan Milosevic, war, international isolation,declining living standards and Belgrade'smismanagement. And if its leaders persist in fightingto the end to hold Kosovo -- and even after defeat totry to undermine an independent Kosovo -- that willnot change much. Kosovo independence is very muchabout Serbia's future.Persistence seems to be the order of the day inBelgrade. The Serb political class, led by PrimeMinister Vojislav Kostunica, is risking the future oftheir country in a desperate attempt to hold on to aterritory they do not control, for a people who wantno part of Serbia, and whom Serbia does not want aspart of its polity. Indeed Kosovo has already beensevered from Serbia.Mr. Kostunica has spent the past year doing his bestto belittle the U.N. secretary-general' s special envoyfor a Kosovo settlement, former Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari, and to resolutely oppose hisproposal for the final status of the territory. Thatproposal provides for what is commonly called"supervised independence, " heavy protection for anunderstandably frightened Serb population and Orthodoxreligious sites, and an EU mission with significantpower over the new state.Mr. Kostunica also spent the year trying to delaymovement on Mr. Ahtisaari's proposal, hopeful thatdelay would enable him to generate support for Serbiansovereignty in a wavering Europe and perhaps sparkviolent behavior from the Kosovo Albanians. Inpursuing delay, Mr. Kostunica crafted and won (in amuch questioned referendum last October) a newconstitution whose preamble proclaims Kosovo aninalienable part of Serbia. He recently threateneddire if unspecified action against any staterecognizing Kosovo's independence. And now there iseven much talk in Belgrade of partitioning Kosovo,which the West has resolutely opposed.Mr. Ahtisaari is expected make his recommendations forKosovo's final status this week, which the U.N.Security Council will take up later this month. TheU.S. and EU countries will accept them and supportrepeal of its resolution 1244 of 1999, that providesfor Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. This will ineffect endorse Kosovo's path to declaringindependence. Mr. Kostunica is pinning his hopes onRussia vetoing any such action, thus leaving 1244intact.Moscow presently asserts that both parties must agreeto any Kosovo settlement, in effect endorsingcontinued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Russia,which has contributed little to the Balkans the past20 years, is threatening to upend the settlement longsought by the West, which has invested enormousresources to bring a measure of stability to the area.Whether in the end Russia vetoes a new U.N. resolutionremains to be seen. Much depends on the determinationof the West to proceed. If the West can not get theRussians to at least abstain on a new resolution, anessentially regional issue becomes a far messierproblem with wider geopolitical concerns. In thatevent the U.S. and EU countries will have to find thefortitude to recognize Kosovo's independence withoutthe stamp of legitimacy of a new U.N. resolution.The Security Council faces a dilemma. Breaking up acountry is a rare event. A number of countries want alegal basis for Kosovo independence, and may proveunwilling to recognize an independent Kosovo withoutone. But many countries also realize that Serbia haslost Kosovo, and that Kosovo independence is essentialto reduce uncertainty in the Balkans and remove amajor cause of instability. Moreover, the chance ofboth Serbia and Kosovo to prosper and be integratedinto the EU requires a resolution of Kosovo's status.Nor does independence necessarily end the Kosovoproblem. Kosovo is not Montenegro, whose separationfrom Serbia was also fiercely resisted by Mr.Kostunica. Many Serbs have a deep emotional attachmentto Kosovo which is easy for foreigners to discount.Serbia's leaders have to decide whether they want toaccept the verdict of the West, to cooperate inshaping a new Balkans, including an independentKosovo, and to pursue seriously membership in the EU.Or do they search for every means to destabilize thenew Kosovo and their neighborhood? The answer is notapparent. Serbia's progress lies in its leaders'hands.Mr. Abramowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, isa senior fellow at the Century Foundation.
By Morton Abramowitz7 March 2007The Wall Street JournalKosovo, still trying to emerge from Belgrade's longand difficult rule and more recently frominternational control, has a long way to go toestablish a viable, stable state. But its slow,halting progress is being impeded by its former Serbmasters, backed in the United Nations by Russia.Once the poorest and mostly forgotten part of theformer Yugoslavia, Kosovo still suffers from massiveunemployment, weak political institutions, and muchcorruption. But it is an increasingly vital place, andits energetic people are looking for a new burst ofactivity when independence finally arrives. Meanwhile, Serbia's glory has dimmed. It could becomea dynamic state, as evidenced by recent market reformsand an uptick in economic activity. But it is nolonger a political leader or the hub of the WesternBalkans, and it is unlikely to resume its formerprominence. For some 15 years its people have enduredSlobodan Milosevic, war, international isolation,declining living standards and Belgrade'smismanagement. And if its leaders persist in fightingto the end to hold Kosovo -- and even after defeat totry to undermine an independent Kosovo -- that willnot change much. Kosovo independence is very muchabout Serbia's future.Persistence seems to be the order of the day inBelgrade. The Serb political class, led by PrimeMinister Vojislav Kostunica, is risking the future oftheir country in a desperate attempt to hold on to aterritory they do not control, for a people who wantno part of Serbia, and whom Serbia does not want aspart of its polity. Indeed Kosovo has already beensevered from Serbia.Mr. Kostunica has spent the past year doing his bestto belittle the U.N. secretary-general' s special envoyfor a Kosovo settlement, former Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari, and to resolutely oppose hisproposal for the final status of the territory. Thatproposal provides for what is commonly called"supervised independence, " heavy protection for anunderstandably frightened Serb population and Orthodoxreligious sites, and an EU mission with significantpower over the new state.Mr. Kostunica also spent the year trying to delaymovement on Mr. Ahtisaari's proposal, hopeful thatdelay would enable him to generate support for Serbiansovereignty in a wavering Europe and perhaps sparkviolent behavior from the Kosovo Albanians. Inpursuing delay, Mr. Kostunica crafted and won (in amuch questioned referendum last October) a newconstitution whose preamble proclaims Kosovo aninalienable part of Serbia. He recently threateneddire if unspecified action against any staterecognizing Kosovo's independence. And now there iseven much talk in Belgrade of partitioning Kosovo,which the West has resolutely opposed.Mr. Ahtisaari is expected make his recommendations forKosovo's final status this week, which the U.N.Security Council will take up later this month. TheU.S. and EU countries will accept them and supportrepeal of its resolution 1244 of 1999, that providesfor Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. This will ineffect endorse Kosovo's path to declaringindependence. Mr. Kostunica is pinning his hopes onRussia vetoing any such action, thus leaving 1244intact.Moscow presently asserts that both parties must agreeto any Kosovo settlement, in effect endorsingcontinued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Russia,which has contributed little to the Balkans the past20 years, is threatening to upend the settlement longsought by the West, which has invested enormousresources to bring a measure of stability to the area.Whether in the end Russia vetoes a new U.N. resolutionremains to be seen. Much depends on the determinationof the West to proceed. If the West can not get theRussians to at least abstain on a new resolution, anessentially regional issue becomes a far messierproblem with wider geopolitical concerns. In thatevent the U.S. and EU countries will have to find thefortitude to recognize Kosovo's independence withoutthe stamp of legitimacy of a new U.N. resolution.The Security Council faces a dilemma. Breaking up acountry is a rare event. A number of countries want alegal basis for Kosovo independence, and may proveunwilling to recognize an independent Kosovo withoutone. But many countries also realize that Serbia haslost Kosovo, and that Kosovo independence is essentialto reduce uncertainty in the Balkans and remove amajor cause of instability. Moreover, the chance ofboth Serbia and Kosovo to prosper and be integratedinto the EU requires a resolution of Kosovo's status.Nor does independence necessarily end the Kosovoproblem. Kosovo is not Montenegro, whose separationfrom Serbia was also fiercely resisted by Mr.Kostunica. Many Serbs have a deep emotional attachmentto Kosovo which is easy for foreigners to discount.Serbia's leaders have to decide whether they want toaccept the verdict of the West, to cooperate inshaping a new Balkans, including an independentKosovo, and to pursue seriously membership in the EU.Or do they search for every means to destabilize thenew Kosovo and their neighborhood? The answer is notapparent. Serbia's progress lies in its leaders'hands.Mr. Abramowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, isa senior fellow at the Century Foundation.
U.N. Hopes Ex-Rebels Will Buy Into Kosovo Peace Deal
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By NICHOLAS WOOD NYTVITINA, Kosovo, March 8 — Hajriz Jakupi is not happy.Over the past few weeks Mr. Jakupi, a former guerrillafighter, has been learning the details of a settlementthat most of the ethnic Albanians who dominate Kosovo say should lead to an independent state. That is adream that he and the other Albanians have long been a waiting. It is the quid pro quo that angers him: that therelatively few Serbs living in Kosovo would havecontrol over certain pockets that include a number ofAlbanian villages, one of which is his own, justoutside this town. “It’s an offense,” Mr. Jakupi said, raising his voice.“It is our territory, it is our land,” he said,speaking of the ethnic Albanians who because of theplanned boundaries would become a minority in themunicipality he comes from.How former fighters like Mr. Jakupi behave in the nextweeks and months will be crucial to the success of theplan devised by the United Nations, which would enablethe Albanians to seek recognition as an independentstate. For now, Mr. Jakupi said, he will express hisopposition “in a peaceful manner.”The calculation of the United Nations is that peoplelike Mr. Jakupi and other former fighters in theAlbanian rebel group called the Kosovo Liberation Armywill accept the deal, since it gives the Albanianpopulation considerable independence, though with adose of international supervision. The United Nations hopes to scale back amultibillion- dollar exercise in which it has beenengaged for nearly eight years, tying down thousandsof peacekeeping troops. Its proposals, which havetaken more than a year to prepare, are expected to goto the Security Council for a vote by June. But as planning proceeds, there is also a worry thatthings might go wrong, and not only among people likeMr. Jakupi, who have been quick to fight before. Mr. Jakupi, 35, leads a group of former fighters fromthe Kosovo Liberation Army, which waged an insurgencyagainst Serbian security forces from 1997 to 1999, aconflict that took 10,000 lives and ultimately forcedNATO to intervene. Some of his colleagues were at thecenter of two other insurgencies, in Macedonia andsouthern Serbia, in 2001. Much also depends on Serbia. It is loath to loseKosovo, a province it controlled for most of the 20thcentury and regards as central to its history andidentity. Many Serbs living in Kosovo are weighingwhether to leave. There is also worry that Serbia willsimply hold on to that northern part of Kosovo wherethe Serbs are centered, splitting the province and notrecognizing the new arrangements on the ground. TheUnited Nations and NATO have never been able to exertdominance in that area. That could provoke renewed conflict, top UnitedNations officials and regional experts warn, fromarmed ethnic Albanians determined to retain Kosovo’scurrent boundaries. Another player in addressing the issue is Russia,which has hinted that it might veto the settlement inthe Security Council. “If independence is not recognized, I think peoplewill take up arms,” Mr. Jakupi said. “It is theminimum we can accept. This is what our heroes gavetheir lives for in the war.”Even if things go well, international and localofficials say, ethnic divisions will not allow thequick exit of peacekeepers and administrators thatother countries involved in the planning hope for. Europe and the United States will need to play therole of arbitrator in the divided and economicallybackward region for years, according to this view,having some oversight over the new government and anability to amend laws and remove public officials. Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June1999, after a 78-day NATO-led bombing campaign forcedout the Serbian security forces accused of atrocitiesagainst ethnic Albanians.Years later there is little doubt among United Nationsofficials that their time here should come to an end,allowing the European Union to take the lead, thoughwith responsibilities much reduced from those theUnited Nations had and with most decision-makingpowers in the hands of the Albanian-led government.Ethnic Albanians are increasingly impatient to controltheir own affairs and have taken their anger outagainst the United Nations. There are frequentprotests against the United Nations in Pristina, theregional capital, most recently on Saturday, whenseveral thousand people marched past the UnitedNations headquarters shouting, “U.N. out.” Under proposals by the United Nations’ chiefnegotiator for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, the UnitedNations would be replaced by a European Union-ledmission with limited but real powers, but Kosovo wouldrun considerable operations on its own. Controls would be put in place to protect minorities.Serbian areas would control their own affairs inhealth and education in five new municipalities, withsome funds from the Serbian government. The EuropeanCommission has allocated 120 million euros (about $158million) over three years to help the minoritycommunities adjust. For the Serbs, “this is attractive, if they engage,”said Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the European Union officialin charge of planning for the next administration.But Serbia’s record of engagement in Kosovo suggeststhat ordinary Serbs may not interact with the newgovernment as much as European officials might wish. For six years Serbia has been putting pressure onSerbs living in Kosovo to keep them from cooperatingwith international or Albanian institutions here,threatening to dock the pay of government workers liketeachers or hospital workers or to cut off theirpensions.Serbia’s prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, anationalist, has said his government will neverrecognize an independent Kosovo. “It will be very hard to implement if the Serbiangovernment is against it,” said Oliver Ivanovic, oneof a handful of Serbian politicians who take part inethnic-Albanian- dominated institutions in Kosovo. Others are also worried that things not will proceedby the book, most notably in the Serbian-dominatednorth of Kosovo.“Here we are just a few months from settlement day andwe don’t know how or what to do,” said Kim Vetting, anadviser with the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe. “How do we maintain controlthere? Nobody is coming up with any answer.”
By NICHOLAS WOOD NYTVITINA, Kosovo, March 8 — Hajriz Jakupi is not happy.Over the past few weeks Mr. Jakupi, a former guerrillafighter, has been learning the details of a settlementthat most of the ethnic Albanians who dominate Kosovo say should lead to an independent state. That is adream that he and the other Albanians have long been a waiting. It is the quid pro quo that angers him: that therelatively few Serbs living in Kosovo would havecontrol over certain pockets that include a number ofAlbanian villages, one of which is his own, justoutside this town. “It’s an offense,” Mr. Jakupi said, raising his voice.“It is our territory, it is our land,” he said,speaking of the ethnic Albanians who because of theplanned boundaries would become a minority in themunicipality he comes from.How former fighters like Mr. Jakupi behave in the nextweeks and months will be crucial to the success of theplan devised by the United Nations, which would enablethe Albanians to seek recognition as an independentstate. For now, Mr. Jakupi said, he will express hisopposition “in a peaceful manner.”The calculation of the United Nations is that peoplelike Mr. Jakupi and other former fighters in theAlbanian rebel group called the Kosovo Liberation Armywill accept the deal, since it gives the Albanianpopulation considerable independence, though with adose of international supervision. The United Nations hopes to scale back amultibillion- dollar exercise in which it has beenengaged for nearly eight years, tying down thousandsof peacekeeping troops. Its proposals, which havetaken more than a year to prepare, are expected to goto the Security Council for a vote by June. But as planning proceeds, there is also a worry thatthings might go wrong, and not only among people likeMr. Jakupi, who have been quick to fight before. Mr. Jakupi, 35, leads a group of former fighters fromthe Kosovo Liberation Army, which waged an insurgencyagainst Serbian security forces from 1997 to 1999, aconflict that took 10,000 lives and ultimately forcedNATO to intervene. Some of his colleagues were at thecenter of two other insurgencies, in Macedonia andsouthern Serbia, in 2001. Much also depends on Serbia. It is loath to loseKosovo, a province it controlled for most of the 20thcentury and regards as central to its history andidentity. Many Serbs living in Kosovo are weighingwhether to leave. There is also worry that Serbia willsimply hold on to that northern part of Kosovo wherethe Serbs are centered, splitting the province and notrecognizing the new arrangements on the ground. TheUnited Nations and NATO have never been able to exertdominance in that area. That could provoke renewed conflict, top UnitedNations officials and regional experts warn, fromarmed ethnic Albanians determined to retain Kosovo’scurrent boundaries. Another player in addressing the issue is Russia,which has hinted that it might veto the settlement inthe Security Council. “If independence is not recognized, I think peoplewill take up arms,” Mr. Jakupi said. “It is theminimum we can accept. This is what our heroes gavetheir lives for in the war.”Even if things go well, international and localofficials say, ethnic divisions will not allow thequick exit of peacekeepers and administrators thatother countries involved in the planning hope for. Europe and the United States will need to play therole of arbitrator in the divided and economicallybackward region for years, according to this view,having some oversight over the new government and anability to amend laws and remove public officials. Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June1999, after a 78-day NATO-led bombing campaign forcedout the Serbian security forces accused of atrocitiesagainst ethnic Albanians.Years later there is little doubt among United Nationsofficials that their time here should come to an end,allowing the European Union to take the lead, thoughwith responsibilities much reduced from those theUnited Nations had and with most decision-makingpowers in the hands of the Albanian-led government.Ethnic Albanians are increasingly impatient to controltheir own affairs and have taken their anger outagainst the United Nations. There are frequentprotests against the United Nations in Pristina, theregional capital, most recently on Saturday, whenseveral thousand people marched past the UnitedNations headquarters shouting, “U.N. out.” Under proposals by the United Nations’ chiefnegotiator for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, the UnitedNations would be replaced by a European Union-ledmission with limited but real powers, but Kosovo wouldrun considerable operations on its own. Controls would be put in place to protect minorities.Serbian areas would control their own affairs inhealth and education in five new municipalities, withsome funds from the Serbian government. The EuropeanCommission has allocated 120 million euros (about $158million) over three years to help the minoritycommunities adjust. For the Serbs, “this is attractive, if they engage,”said Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the European Union officialin charge of planning for the next administration.But Serbia’s record of engagement in Kosovo suggeststhat ordinary Serbs may not interact with the newgovernment as much as European officials might wish. For six years Serbia has been putting pressure onSerbs living in Kosovo to keep them from cooperatingwith international or Albanian institutions here,threatening to dock the pay of government workers liketeachers or hospital workers or to cut off theirpensions.Serbia’s prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, anationalist, has said his government will neverrecognize an independent Kosovo. “It will be very hard to implement if the Serbiangovernment is against it,” said Oliver Ivanovic, oneof a handful of Serbian politicians who take part inethnic-Albanian- dominated institutions in Kosovo. Others are also worried that things not will proceedby the book, most notably in the Serbian-dominatednorth of Kosovo.“Here we are just a few months from settlement day andwe don’t know how or what to do,” said Kim Vetting, anadviser with the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe. “How do we maintain controlthere? Nobody is coming up with any answer.”
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