Improving International Peacebuilding Efforts: The Example of Human Rights Culture in Kosovo.

I love Peace

here is nice article about improving the international peacebuilding efforts-Kosovo. I'm very sorry that i couldn't find the whole essay but it's worthy to read even a part of it...


Julie Mertus
Kosovo today is a house of cards. One false move and the house will fall down. Should the international troops--in particular the U.S. and British troops--pull out of Kosovo, it will collapse into communal violence. (1) The international security presence in Kosovo has generally succeeded in preventing the outbreak of another violent armed conflict but has accomplished little else beyond that. This is not surprising. Militaries can help prevent war, but they alone cannot build a sustainable peace. (2) The cessation of hostilities through the use of military force does not, in and of itself, resolve the strategic dilemmas, structural imbalances, and open wounds of unaddressed abuses and interpersonal hostilities. As David Lake and Donald Rothschild stress in their exhaustive study of ethnic conflict, a "stable peace can arise only as effective institutions of government are reestablished, the state begins again to mediate between distrustful ethnic groups, and the parties slowly gain confidence in the safeguards contained in the new ethnic contracts." (3) Peacebuilding requires the efforts of a host of civilian actors focused on institution building, interpersonal reconciliation, and social transformation over the long term. More than 250 well-intentioned nongovernmental and governmental organizations have flooded into Kosovo offering a range of resources and promises. (4) Elections have been held, (5) homes have been rebuilt, schools have reopened, and roads have been repaved. Police and judges have been trained, and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is well under way in its investigations into war crimes committed in Kosovo. Nonetheless, not one of the larger international goals that brought the international community to Kosovo in the first place has been reached. Kosovo is decidedly not a multiethnic and secure society, and equal access to basic human rights protections remains illusory. (6) Local police and administrative and judicial systems are still unable to operate independent of international oversight and, instead of joining government, many of the "best and brightest" in Kosovo have withdrawn from participation altogether. That the citizenry of Kosovo--Serb and Albanian alike--perceive no legitimate governance structure and process only magnifies pervasive feelings of insecurity and unfairness. As the international community looks toward new nation-building challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the struggle for "lessons learned" from Kosovo is acute. The experience of Kosovo suggests that there must be more and better attempts to incorporate local actors and experiences and to draw on them in building human rights cultures. I divide my argument into four parts: (1) an explanation of the use of the term human rights culture and the introduction of a framework for understanding and analyzing the local impact of human rights norms in post-conflict societies; (2) a discussion of the nature of the human rights culture in Kosovar society prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing in 1999; (3) an exploration of the impact of postagreement civil intervention on human rights culture; and (4) suggestions for improvement, with specific attention to human rights education. Toward a Framework for Analyzing "Human Rights Culture" The notion of human rights refers to two fundamental precepts. The first of these precepts is the "dignity principle," or the notion that each human being should be treated with dignity solely because he or she is human and not because he or she belongs to a certain group or has achieved a certain stature. (7) Full acceptance of the "dignity principle" compels the embrace of the "equality principle." This is the idea that all people have dignity. One cannot claim to believe in the idea of human rights and also believe that these rights apply to only some individuals, or that only some states have a responsibility to respect human rights. (8) The disempowered turn to human rights discourse because it so "successfully manages to articulate (evolving) political claims." (9) In Jack Donnelly's words, "Human rights is the language of the victims and the dispossessed." (10) As the disempowered shape human rights ideology and use it for their own goals, they exercise their moral agency. Over time, the individuals and groups that adopt human rights language and thinking become a human rights people. The human rights framework becomes a taken-for-granted lens through which they can view and understand the world and their role in it. (11) Human rights cultures exist when human rights are one of "the forms through which people make sense of their lives." (12) In other words, a human rights culture is a way of seeing the world through the lens of human rights and consequent with the principles of human dignity and equality. It is through human rights culture that human rights norms take root in and influence a population. (13) However, the adoption of human rights culture is not one of simply embracing purely universal interpretations of human rights, but rather consists of the reconceptualization of culture itself through a struggle to interpret human rights norms in a cultural context. (14) Adopting human rights language is an essential step in building a human rights culture, (15) but language alone is insufficient. Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a population develops its own shared (yet contested) understanding of the prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the "frame in which people derive a sense of who they are and where they are going." (16) Central to this process is a population's own experiences of rights deprivation and rights affirmation, which often occur through storytelling. (17) Human rights storytelling serves several functions. Storytelling provides both a "sentimental education" (18) that generates the kind of sympathy necessary for the acceptance of human rights norms and for the validation of the experience of abuse and thus "represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship." (19) Human rights activists in Belgrade, for example, exposed stories about abuses against Albanians in order to garner the Serbs' sympathy for Albanians and to garner the support of the international community against Slobodan Milosevic. (20) Kosovar Albanians and anti-Milosevic Serbs strongly believe that if not for the human rights storytelling, the NATO intervention never would have occurred. (21) Human rights storytelling also facilitates a common understanding of experience (22) and in so doing promotes group cohesion. In Kosovo, the informal telling of stories in Kosovar family living rooms and the more formalized collection of stories by human rights groups served to strengthen Albanian solidarity as a united, oppressed people. (23) Similarly, Serbian stories about Albanians solidified their identity as victims at the hands of Albanians. (24) In this way, within one society, human rights storytelling was both unifying and fragmenting. A useful framework for analyzing the impact of human rights institution building on violently divided postagreement societies is suggested by the work of Christine Bell, who examines the role of human rights in peace agreements, (25) and of John Paul Lederach, who emphasizes the importance of transforming social relationships and structures that institutionalize violence. From these works, we can identify three roles for human rights culture building: an instrumental role, a constitutive role, and a transformative role. Human rights norms, once institutionalized and internalized, play an instrumental role in that they are crucial for advancing some other good. The spread of a human rights culture can lead to increased participation of citizens...

Open Letter to Trent FRANKS (R.Az)

I love Peace

February 5, 2006
The Honorable Trent FRANKS (R.Az)U.S. House of Reprentatives1237 Longworth House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515Fax: (202) 225.6328 Dear Congressman Franks: I have read with great dismay your “Interview” recently given to the American Legion Magazine, regarding “The Serbian Situation….”. I quote:
“…The Serbian situation is an example of the struggle between an ideology that affirms the sanctity of life and the tolerance of all religions, and an ideology that uses violence to force a majority on unwilling individuals. This is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring Jews…Much like Hezbollah, those who lay claim to Kosovo and neighboring lands have made clear their intent to create a religiously and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian state…”
As a student of Balkan affairs, I find your statements to be completely inaccurate, incendiary, and contrary to the interests of the local population, to the U.S.Government policies in the area, and to peace and political stability in the Balkans.
The religious connotation you give, and fully endorse, to the political issues regarding the sad state of affairs where Serbia finds itself today, cannot hide the terrible crimes perpetrated by the successive Serb governments, especially since 1912, and which culminated with the genocidal aggression of the war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Serbia. Since you have approached the “problem of Kosovo” from this vantage point, I would like to make the following clarifications:
The contents of your statements, as well as the tone, echo the declarations of His Grace Bishop Artemije of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova, clearly indicating His Grace’s “aloofness” for the fate of the e n t i r e unfortunate Kosova population –Moslem, Eastern Orthodox and Catholic. Sounding the alarm against “the militant Jihad and terrorism in the heart of Europe” the honorable Bishop neglects to explain why from 1389 to 1912, ALL major churches and objects of worship of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosova were protected by the local Albanians, who by the end of the 17th century began their conversion to Islam.
The fear of having”…1.300 Serbian religious objects lost” is unfounded since the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, these “jewels of medieval architecture” have been protected and preserved by the local Moslem and Catholic population, often at the risk of their lives. As late as 1960 ,the late Patriarch of ther Serb Orthodox Church, Gherman, decorated the Albanian family Nikci, of Peje, for having protected the Patriarchate of Peje for generations. There was no complaint then against the Albanians, until ‘Serb politics’ fabricated the threat of annihilation of the Serb Orthodox Church. Spme of those responsible for these politics of division are now facing the
International Courtfor War Crimes in Yugoslavia, at the Hague (Netherland).
It is these “Serb politics’ that have mobilized the dark forces of the Serb Orthodox Church –including His Grace Bishop Artemije whom you met in Washington,D.C.—to declare that Kosova is”occupied” by Albanians (92 percent of the population) and that “…every state has the right to fight an occupier to liberate an occupied part of its terrirory…This is the only response worthy of the State, and the Serbian people”.
Who is the enenmy? It’s Islamic extremism among the Kosova Albanians, a theme incessantly repeated to intimidate the international community…and assiduously exploited to deceive American Christian believers.
The entire scenario turns uglier when one thinks of this “man of God”, Bishop Artemije, never raising the voice to protest the massacres of the marauding Serb “paramilitary gangs’ (Arkan,Franks etc.) as well as of the regular Serbian Army in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally in Kosova. His silence will forever remain a black stain in the history of his Church. There were few low-level Serb clergy who oppoesd the war and its destruction. “Our” Bishop was not one of them!
Historically, “…Serb nationalist doctrine emphasized the role of the Orthodox Church,- wrote Noel Malcolm, of the Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy- as an essential constituent of Serbian identity. Albanian nationalist doctrine, on the other hand, emphasized the Albanian language, accepting the religious diversity of the Albanians…Religion thus mattered, to a certain extent, in reality, because it mattered in Serbian national ideology”.
Andrew Herscher, of the University of Michigan, explains how”…recent studies of violence in anthropolgy, sociology, and political science have come to recognize the ‘ethnicity’ of violence is an abstracion, an interpretation and a staging; violence comes to be understood as ‘ethnic’ in narrations undertaken both by perpetrators and victims”. He states that”…representatives of both Albanian and Serb communities have inflicted violence against the other’s religious sites and have documented and memorialized violence against their own religious sites, in each case, in order to shape particular notions of ethnic identity- which means to be Albanian, or Serb, in Kosova”.
Writing about recent events, Professor Herscher had this to say:

“…During the counter-insurgency campaign waged by Serb forces against the Kosova Liberation Army in l998-l999, however, along with mass explusion of Albanians from Kosova, religious sites associated with Islam were targeted for destruction. Approxi-mately 200 of the more than 600 mosques in Kosova were damaged or destroyed during the 1998-1999, along with Sufi lodges and Islamic schools, archives and libraries … buildings were ruined by deliberately inflicting violence, including vandalism, arson, shelling or toppling of minarets, and the dynamiting of the building from within…” He concluded:
” Yet, the targeting of religious sites does not represent a history of “ethnic violence’ in Kosova, as mush as an ongoing attempt to inextricably enmesh ethnicity, religion, violence and history for contemporary political ends”.
It is these “political ends” that the Serbian lobby in Washington,D.C., is now serving by using the moral and political authority of the distinguished US. Congressmen.

The American scholar, Professor Serge R. Doucette,Jr. in an Essay: “Fourth of July and ’The Face of Terror’” wrote:
“…Serbia has in its recent history initiated five wars against its neighbors; all were justified by their goal of “Greater Serbia”, and all had the sanction and support of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian Orthodox Church has consistently manipulated and distorted Christian faith in service of Serbian greed for territorial gain and power. There is no such thing as a minor or justified atrocity, or act of terrorism: but, as wrong as Palestinian suicide bombings are against the Israelis, and as immoral and cowardly as the acts of 9/11 were, they pale in comparison to the atrocities committed by the Serbs against ethnic Albanians.
… Serbian repetition of crimes against humaniy can be seen as a result of a Serbian “mentality” developed and fostered by a Mystical relationship with the Orthodox Churxh which is inseparable with the existentce of the Nation.
Since its inception in the later part of the 13th century, there has Never been a time in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church that it has defended the Humanitarian Rights of anyone, but the Serbs themselves!
.. When you study Serbian history, you will come to undertsand that for Serbs, religion is not governing their daily ways of life, and they rarely attend church on a regular basis. Unlike Albanians, and others…they believe that if their “Church” is destroyed, they wil cease to exist. And, it is this belief that is effectively manipulated by Serbian religious and political leaders. The Serbian Orthodox Church becomes the motivation to sustain aggression, violence and atrocities against the others.”
*
The painful history of Serb repression in Kosova, where the victims were the Albanians, is fully documented. I will submit only two documents dated in 1919 and in 1999:

1) Paris Peace Conference,1919,vol.XII,PPC, 184.018/ 3
The Secretary of State to Mr. A.J.Balfour (British Foreign Minister),Paris,April 18,1919

“…British Embassy at Washington has informed the Department of State as following regarding the alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro:” Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova, Podjour, and Roshji have been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region…” Very truly yours, Robert Lansing, (Secretary of State)
2) Explaining the reason for NATO intervention , President W.J.Clinton had this to say:
“…We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosova from a mounting military offensive…Milosevic stripped Kosova of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed. Now, they started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their bodies. We have seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets. Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and their sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. Its is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people, whose leaders have already agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative…” (March 1999, Federal Document Clearing House)
(Research indicates that 174 Albanian families in Kosova were locked in their houses and burned alive by Serbian troops, men women and children!)

It is, therefore, utterly insane to think that “Moslem” Albanian demands for an indepen-dent Kosova would receive the favorable reception we witness today, if their aims were to build an “Islamic”,”terrorist” state, “to affirm…an ideology that uses violence …(with) the intent to create a religious and ethnically pure Muslim Albanian State…” The inter-national community that support Albanians in Kosova is predominantly Christian-not Moslem- from the U.S. of America to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy , the European Union, the overwhelming academic world, intelectuals, analysts, diplomats, “think tanks”, and human rights organizations. The civilized world preseves intact the horrible images of the Serb aggression in Kosova during the 1998-1999 years- the long columns of refugees expelled…on foot, horse wagons, and especially the long trains reminiscent of the Nazi transportations convoys to the extermination camps during WW II. “This is another Holocaust in Europe, and we are not going to allow it” declared in 1999, Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister.
*
Congressman Franks, in your interview, you made this unfortunate remark:…This Serbian situation is not unlike Israel’s struggle against those who seek religious fulfillment by massacring the Jews….”

The story of the Jews in Albanian lands is beginning to unfold: it’s a splendid example of religious tolerance, humanity and civil courage. Not one single, solitary, Jew was handed back to the Nazis. It’s a unique case in Europe. This is a fact now being corroborated by researches at the US.Holocaust Musem, in Washington,D.C., only a few steps from your Capitol office. Your distingusihed colleague at the House, the Honorable Tom Lantos, the only Holocaust survivor of the U.S.House of Representatives can attest and confirm it for you. I will limit myself to the following excerpts from a statement by Mrs. Johanna <><>Neumann, of the US Holocaut Musem, made at the end of December 2006, during a Moslem-Jew joint appearance:
“…My parents and I spent the war years in Albania with Muslim families, various families, but in particular one family who actually saved our lives. My parents were imprisoned for about four days, and our wonderful friend, a gentleman by the name of Pilku – whose familiy is inscribed here at the Museum, as well as in Yad Vashem, as among The Righeous Among the Nations- was able to have them released after four days, saved my father by hiding him once the Germans occupied Albania, and my mother and I were introduced as family members of the household. And we were not touched.
The population in Albania was 85 percent Muslim, and 15 pervent of other religious orientations. Everybody knew who we were, and nobody would ever, or even had the thought of denouncing us. Not at all. As a matter of fact, when Germany occupied Yugoslavia, the Albanian people opened their borders, and allowed them (the Jews) to come in. And, when Germans demanded that these people be returned, for some reasons they knew exactly who it was who had crossed the border, they simply said:” We looked for Jews, we didn’t find any. We know only Albanians, We do not know any Jews”. And they had hidden them in the villages, in families, in hospitals that they declared were quarantined because of typhoid fever. Nobody was handed back over to Germans. And those people deserved every respect that anybody can give them. And these were our friends. The story is a long one but this is the essence of it. They saved us and these were good human beings, and as I said before, the majority of them were Muslims, and we have nothing but the highest respect for these people….”

Congressman Franks, I leave the final judgement to you, as I do hope that deep in your conscience you will take into serious consideration the information I suppied today.

Sincerely yours,

Sami Repishti, Ph.D.
City University of New York (retired)
Former political prisoners in Communist Albania (1946-56)
and Communist Yugoslavia (1960-61)
Human rights activist

Solana and Olli Rehn

I love Peace

Brussels, 29 March 2007
S113/07

Summary note on the joint report by
Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
and Olli REHN, EU Commissioner for Enlargement,
on the state of preparations of
the future EU and international presence in Kosovo


The joint report, which builds on the previous joint papers on the future EU role and contribution in Kosovo, submitted to the Council by Mr Solana and Mr Rehn, will be presented to foreign ministers at their informal meeting in Bremen on Friday.


Context

The paper analyses the conditions for an effective future EU role in Kosovo and provides an update on the state of transition and implementation preparations. EU coherence will be crucial during both the final stage of the status process and the implementation phase. Local ownership and partnership with the international community are key principles for the implementation of the Status settlement.


Transition Preparations

Following a settlement of Kosovo's future status, the authorities of Kosovo will face a double challenge: to take on competencies passed from UNMIK in accordance with the settlement; and to take the necessary steps to implement the substantive reforms outlined in the comprehensive proposal of the UN Special Envoy. Since October 2006, the ICO/EUSR Preparation Team has been co-chairing a structure designed to deal with questions relating to the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovo authorities following a UN Security Council Resolution.


Preparing for the International Civilian Office/EUSR and the ESDP mission

The Status settlement envisages an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR). He/she is envisaged as carrying certain powers and authorities to enable him/her to ensure adherence to the letter and spirit of the Status settlement. The ICO will include and be supported by other partners, including the United States.

The future ESDP Rule-of-Law mission will be designed to support implementation of the Kosovo status settlement and assist Kosovo's judicial and law-enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability.
These tasks will be carried out in full co-operation and coherence with the Commission. In accordance with the Status settlement proposal, the UN Security Council is expected to authorise the EU to establish a Rule of Law mission to support the implementation of the settlement and promote the development of the police and justice sectors in Kosovo and to decide that the mission will have executive powers in the judiciary sector (prosecution of major and organised crime, property rights, correctional services), in the police (organised crime, war crimes, inter-ethnic crimes, financial investigations, anti-corruption, border control, crowd and riot control) and in security-related and customs- compliance issues). Member states have expressed agreement with this mandate.


Kosovo's European Perspective

A tangible European perspective based on the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 will reinforce the EU's leverage as a partner of the local institutions and enhance Kosovo's integration in the wider region. Concrete steps should therefore be taken to enable Kosovo to make further progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process after status is settled.

This would mean adopting a Council decision on a European Partnership for Kosovo, which would spell out the priorities for action for Kosovo to move closer to the EU, taking into account the essential requirements of the Status settlement. This should be accompanied by an enhanced technical and political dialogue as well as sufficient financial assistance.

EU approximation is a two-way process. Kosovo needs to meet the same conditions as the rest of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Kosovo should feel that the EU is committed to engage in contractual relations, foster regional cooperation and provide the same opportunities already available to the rest of the region. Strengthening good neighbourly relations will help rebuild trust, foster respect of cultural and religious differences and lay the basis for the reconciliation of future generations.

The European Commission will, at the appropriate time and when the conditions are met, be ready to prepare a feasibility study to examine Kosovo's readiness to engage in contractual relations along the lines of those in the Western Balkan region. This should be conditional on Kosovo's implementation of the Status settlement and key European Partnership priorities, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, good governance and public administration reform.

This will be supported inter alia by EC financial assistance; some €200 million have been allocated to Kosovo over the next three years.


Financial Needs

The International Community needs to ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement the Status settlement and support the development of a democratic, stable, and sustainable Kosovo. The EU has a particular responsibility to facilitate the conditions for a successful intervention, since it will take over the leadership of the future international presence.

Once the different costing elements are known more precisely, the Commission will prepare an overall financial package to be pledged at a donors' conference. EU Member States and our international community partners will need to contribute as well.
Following status, we can expect financing needs to arise in relation to:

1. Kosovo's share of the Yugoslav debt in the wake of status;
2. Expenditure as a result of the status requirements;
3. Kosovo's economic development needs (including institution building and capital investments); and
4. The cost of the international presence


Division of responsibilities

The division of responsibilities between the ICO, ESDP and the Commission will be clear and mutually reinforcing. Whereas the ICO and ESDP mission will support the local authorities to ensure settlement implementation and the consolidation of the area of rule of law, the Commission's role will focus in particular on assisting the authorities to increase their capacities to govern Kosovo with a long-term European perspective.


Previous Commission/Council documents on Kosovo:

Commission Communication "A European Future for Kosovo", approved by the College on 20 April 2005.[1]
A European Future for Kosovo - IP/05/450

First joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 14 June 2005 (as requested by the Council in February 2005).
Summary note 14.6.2005

The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244, published on 9 November 2005.[2]
2005 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/05/412

Second joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 9 December 2005 (as requested by the Council in November 2005).
Summary note 9.12.2005

The European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, January 2006
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo under UNSCR 1244

Third joint paper presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 July 2006 (as requested by the General Affairs and External Relations Council 12 December 2005).
MEMO/06/286

The Commission's Progress Report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 published on 8 November 2006. [3]
2006 Progress report on Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 - MEMO/06/412

[1] COM (2005) 156
[2] SEC (2005) 1423
[3] COM (2006) 649 final

Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I love Peace


Security Council Distr.: General 26 March 2007 Original: English
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51), by which the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo’s future status, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey herewith the report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status and, in an addendum, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1) prepared by my Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.
Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Ban Ki-moon
07-27223 (E) 230307
*0727223*

Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community
1 In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status.
2 Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences — almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress could be achieved.
3 My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.
4 Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.
5 The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.

S/2007/168

Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option
1 A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.
2 For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply not tenable.

Continued international administration is not sustainable
1 While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration.
2 Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.

Independence with international supervision is the only viable option
1 Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia.
2 While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life.
3 Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests.
4 I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.
5 Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.

Conclusion
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.
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16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.

Annex
Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement
I. General
1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.
II. Provisions of the Settlement
1 Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.
2 Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.
3 Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the

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areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.
1 Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.
2 Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.
3 Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.
4 Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.
9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that
the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.
5 Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.
6 International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.
7 European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.
8 International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.
9 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.

III. Implementation
1 Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.
2 During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.

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1 At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.
2 Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.

Proposals for Kosovo Statuse

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Press StatementTom Casey, Deputy SpokesmanWashington, DCMarch 26, 2007
Proposals for Kosovo’s Final Status
After over a year of negotiations, UN Special Envoy and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari has delivered to the UN Secretary General his proposals for Kosovo's future status. We are grateful to President Ahtisaari for his patient, skillful and balanced work leading the Kosovo status process.
The United States welcomes and supports his recommendations.
The UN Special Envoy's proposals will give the people of Kosovo clarity about their future for the first time in many years. They contain far-reaching guarantees to protect the rights and security of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities. President Ahtisaari has also proposed that Kosovo become independent, subject to a period of international supervision.
The Kosovo status process is entering its final and decisive phase. As the UN Security Council prepares to review President Ahtisaari's recommendations, we will be engaged in full and intensive consultations with our Security Council partners and the parties.
The resolution of Kosovo's status should be seen in the historical context of the tragic circumstances of the break-up of Yugoslavia, which began in the 1990s. The UN Security Council, which in 1999 passed a resolution that placed Kosovo under UN administration and envisioned a political process to determine status, has long treated Kosovo as a special case.
Since the crisis in this region began sixteen years ago, President George W. Bush and his two predecessors have worked to realize a vision of a Europe, whole, free and at peace. We believe that President Ahtisaari's proposals will allow the region to move beyond the conflicts of the 1990s and towards a brighter Euro-Atlantic future.
2007/230 Released on March 26, 2007

Kosovo's Road to Independence

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By Morton Abramowitz7 March 2007The Wall Street JournalKosovo, still trying to emerge from Belgrade's longand difficult rule and more recently frominternational control, has a long way to go toestablish a viable, stable state. But its slow,halting progress is being impeded by its former Serbmasters, backed in the United Nations by Russia.Once the poorest and mostly forgotten part of theformer Yugoslavia, Kosovo still suffers from massiveunemployment, weak political institutions, and muchcorruption. But it is an increasingly vital place, andits energetic people are looking for a new burst ofactivity when independence finally arrives. Meanwhile, Serbia's glory has dimmed. It could becomea dynamic state, as evidenced by recent market reformsand an uptick in economic activity. But it is nolonger a political leader or the hub of the WesternBalkans, and it is unlikely to resume its formerprominence. For some 15 years its people have enduredSlobodan Milosevic, war, international isolation,declining living standards and Belgrade'smismanagement. And if its leaders persist in fightingto the end to hold Kosovo -- and even after defeat totry to undermine an independent Kosovo -- that willnot change much. Kosovo independence is very muchabout Serbia's future.Persistence seems to be the order of the day inBelgrade. The Serb political class, led by PrimeMinister Vojislav Kostunica, is risking the future oftheir country in a desperate attempt to hold on to aterritory they do not control, for a people who wantno part of Serbia, and whom Serbia does not want aspart of its polity. Indeed Kosovo has already beensevered from Serbia.Mr. Kostunica has spent the past year doing his bestto belittle the U.N. secretary-general' s special envoyfor a Kosovo settlement, former Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari, and to resolutely oppose hisproposal for the final status of the territory. Thatproposal provides for what is commonly called"supervised independence, " heavy protection for anunderstandably frightened Serb population and Orthodoxreligious sites, and an EU mission with significantpower over the new state.Mr. Kostunica also spent the year trying to delaymovement on Mr. Ahtisaari's proposal, hopeful thatdelay would enable him to generate support for Serbiansovereignty in a wavering Europe and perhaps sparkviolent behavior from the Kosovo Albanians. Inpursuing delay, Mr. Kostunica crafted and won (in amuch questioned referendum last October) a newconstitution whose preamble proclaims Kosovo aninalienable part of Serbia. He recently threateneddire if unspecified action against any staterecognizing Kosovo's independence. And now there iseven much talk in Belgrade of partitioning Kosovo,which the West has resolutely opposed.Mr. Ahtisaari is expected make his recommendations forKosovo's final status this week, which the U.N.Security Council will take up later this month. TheU.S. and EU countries will accept them and supportrepeal of its resolution 1244 of 1999, that providesfor Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. This will ineffect endorse Kosovo's path to declaringindependence. Mr. Kostunica is pinning his hopes onRussia vetoing any such action, thus leaving 1244intact.Moscow presently asserts that both parties must agreeto any Kosovo settlement, in effect endorsingcontinued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Russia,which has contributed little to the Balkans the past20 years, is threatening to upend the settlement longsought by the West, which has invested enormousresources to bring a measure of stability to the area.Whether in the end Russia vetoes a new U.N. resolutionremains to be seen. Much depends on the determinationof the West to proceed. If the West can not get theRussians to at least abstain on a new resolution, anessentially regional issue becomes a far messierproblem with wider geopolitical concerns. In thatevent the U.S. and EU countries will have to find thefortitude to recognize Kosovo's independence withoutthe stamp of legitimacy of a new U.N. resolution.The Security Council faces a dilemma. Breaking up acountry is a rare event. A number of countries want alegal basis for Kosovo independence, and may proveunwilling to recognize an independent Kosovo withoutone. But many countries also realize that Serbia haslost Kosovo, and that Kosovo independence is essentialto reduce uncertainty in the Balkans and remove amajor cause of instability. Moreover, the chance ofboth Serbia and Kosovo to prosper and be integratedinto the EU requires a resolution of Kosovo's status.Nor does independence necessarily end the Kosovoproblem. Kosovo is not Montenegro, whose separationfrom Serbia was also fiercely resisted by Mr.Kostunica. Many Serbs have a deep emotional attachmentto Kosovo which is easy for foreigners to discount.Serbia's leaders have to decide whether they want toaccept the verdict of the West, to cooperate inshaping a new Balkans, including an independentKosovo, and to pursue seriously membership in the EU.Or do they search for every means to destabilize thenew Kosovo and their neighborhood? The answer is notapparent. Serbia's progress lies in its leaders'hands.Mr. Abramowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, isa senior fellow at the Century Foundation.

U.N. Hopes Ex-Rebels Will Buy Into Kosovo Peace Deal

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By NICHOLAS WOOD NYTVITINA, Kosovo, March 8 — Hajriz Jakupi is not happy.Over the past few weeks Mr. Jakupi, a former guerrillafighter, has been learning the details of a settlementthat most of the ethnic Albanians who dominate Kosovo say should lead to an independent state. That is adream that he and the other Albanians have long been a waiting. It is the quid pro quo that angers him: that therelatively few Serbs living in Kosovo would havecontrol over certain pockets that include a number ofAlbanian villages, one of which is his own, justoutside this town. “It’s an offense,” Mr. Jakupi said, raising his voice.“It is our territory, it is our land,” he said,speaking of the ethnic Albanians who because of theplanned boundaries would become a minority in themunicipality he comes from.How former fighters like Mr. Jakupi behave in the nextweeks and months will be crucial to the success of theplan devised by the United Nations, which would enablethe Albanians to seek recognition as an independentstate. For now, Mr. Jakupi said, he will express hisopposition “in a peaceful manner.”The calculation of the United Nations is that peoplelike Mr. Jakupi and other former fighters in theAlbanian rebel group called the Kosovo Liberation Armywill accept the deal, since it gives the Albanianpopulation considerable independence, though with adose of international supervision. The United Nations hopes to scale back amultibillion- dollar exercise in which it has beenengaged for nearly eight years, tying down thousandsof peacekeeping troops. Its proposals, which havetaken more than a year to prepare, are expected to goto the Security Council for a vote by June. But as planning proceeds, there is also a worry thatthings might go wrong, and not only among people likeMr. Jakupi, who have been quick to fight before. Mr. Jakupi, 35, leads a group of former fighters fromthe Kosovo Liberation Army, which waged an insurgencyagainst Serbian security forces from 1997 to 1999, aconflict that took 10,000 lives and ultimately forcedNATO to intervene. Some of his colleagues were at thecenter of two other insurgencies, in Macedonia andsouthern Serbia, in 2001. Much also depends on Serbia. It is loath to loseKosovo, a province it controlled for most of the 20thcentury and regards as central to its history andidentity. Many Serbs living in Kosovo are weighingwhether to leave. There is also worry that Serbia willsimply hold on to that northern part of Kosovo wherethe Serbs are centered, splitting the province and notrecognizing the new arrangements on the ground. TheUnited Nations and NATO have never been able to exertdominance in that area. That could provoke renewed conflict, top UnitedNations officials and regional experts warn, fromarmed ethnic Albanians determined to retain Kosovo’scurrent boundaries. Another player in addressing the issue is Russia,which has hinted that it might veto the settlement inthe Security Council. “If independence is not recognized, I think peoplewill take up arms,” Mr. Jakupi said. “It is theminimum we can accept. This is what our heroes gavetheir lives for in the war.”Even if things go well, international and localofficials say, ethnic divisions will not allow thequick exit of peacekeepers and administrators thatother countries involved in the planning hope for. Europe and the United States will need to play therole of arbitrator in the divided and economicallybackward region for years, according to this view,having some oversight over the new government and anability to amend laws and remove public officials. Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June1999, after a 78-day NATO-led bombing campaign forcedout the Serbian security forces accused of atrocitiesagainst ethnic Albanians.Years later there is little doubt among United Nationsofficials that their time here should come to an end,allowing the European Union to take the lead, thoughwith responsibilities much reduced from those theUnited Nations had and with most decision-makingpowers in the hands of the Albanian-led government.Ethnic Albanians are increasingly impatient to controltheir own affairs and have taken their anger outagainst the United Nations. There are frequentprotests against the United Nations in Pristina, theregional capital, most recently on Saturday, whenseveral thousand people marched past the UnitedNations headquarters shouting, “U.N. out.” Under proposals by the United Nations’ chiefnegotiator for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, the UnitedNations would be replaced by a European Union-ledmission with limited but real powers, but Kosovo wouldrun considerable operations on its own. Controls would be put in place to protect minorities.Serbian areas would control their own affairs inhealth and education in five new municipalities, withsome funds from the Serbian government. The EuropeanCommission has allocated 120 million euros (about $158million) over three years to help the minoritycommunities adjust. For the Serbs, “this is attractive, if they engage,”said Torbjorn Sohlstrom, the European Union officialin charge of planning for the next administration.But Serbia’s record of engagement in Kosovo suggeststhat ordinary Serbs may not interact with the newgovernment as much as European officials might wish. For six years Serbia has been putting pressure onSerbs living in Kosovo to keep them from cooperatingwith international or Albanian institutions here,threatening to dock the pay of government workers liketeachers or hospital workers or to cut off theirpensions.Serbia’s prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, anationalist, has said his government will neverrecognize an independent Kosovo. “It will be very hard to implement if the Serbiangovernment is against it,” said Oliver Ivanovic, oneof a handful of Serbian politicians who take part inethnic-Albanian- dominated institutions in Kosovo. Others are also worried that things not will proceedby the book, most notably in the Serbian-dominatednorth of Kosovo.“Here we are just a few months from settlement day andwe don’t know how or what to do,” said Kim Vetting, anadviser with the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe. “How do we maintain controlthere? Nobody is coming up with any answer.”

U.N. Police Clash with Kosovo Albanian Protesters

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By REUTERS/ - UN police in Kosovo fired teargas and rubber bullets during clashes on Saturday with ethnic Albanians protesting against a UN plan they say falls short of full independence from Serbia.Hospital officials said they had treated 70 people, including four who were seriously wounded.Fourteen people were arrested as Kosovo and UN riot police advanced on hundreds of demonstrators who were hurling stones and bottles.The clashes, a repeat of riots in November, underscored Western fears of what the United States described last week as a possible ``breakdown in order'' if a decision on the Albanian majority's demand for independence does not come soon.A UN plan unveiled this month would, if adopted by the UN Security Council, set the territory on the path to statehood, eight years after NATO bombs drove out Serb forces and the United Nations took control.But some among Kosovo's 90-percent ethnic Albanian majority are angry at the plan's provisions for a powerful European overseer and self-government for the 100,000 remaining Serbs.The protesters called for an independence referendum and rejected talks with Serbia, which in 1998-99 killed 10,000 Albanians and expelled 800,000 in a two-year war with rebels.``Freedom does not come in packages,'' they chanted, in reference to the plan drafted by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari following months of Serb-Albanian talks in 2006.Kosovo Albanian leaders condemned the violence. ``We said there was no reason to protest, because the process is going in the right direction,'' said a government spokeswoman. WEST VS. RUSSIASerbia opposes the amputation of its medieval heartland, but the Albanians living there reject any return to Serb rule and are impatient to end eight years of U.N.-imposed limbo.Washington and the European Union back Ahtisaari's blueprint and hope the UN Security Council will adopt it by June.UN veto holder Russia, however, repeated on Saturday that it would only back a solution that was also acceptable to fellow-Orthodox nation Serbia.``If we see that one of the parties is not happy with the proposed solution, we should not support that decision,'' Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a conference in Munich.Ahtisaari has invited Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians to a final round of talks in Vienna from February 21 and hopes to present the plan to the UN Security Council in late March.The West has already delayed the process twice to avoid radicalizing Serbia. Ahtisaari said on Friday he saw no chance of the two sides agreeing, ``even if I negotiated all my life.''NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer warned against security gaps in Kosovo during a sensitive transfer of policing tasks this year.The United Nations has been reducing its UNMIK police force in Kosovo which is due to be replaced later this year by EU police. Several NATO nations also want to start winding down the alliance's separate 16,000-plus peace force there.``It is important that under all circumstances there should be an adequate police force, be it UNMIK or part of the EU mission,'' de Hoop Scheffer told a small group of reporters on the margins of a security conference in Munich.``It is important we don't see gaps. Because if there were gaps, that would immediately have consequences for KFOR,'' he said of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR).

No more on Kosovo

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Ian Williams/The Guardian - UKFebruary 8, 2007 9:00 PM In 2005, the UN heads of state summit accepted contemporary humanitarian standards of international law and accepted the " Responsibility to Protect", a doctrine which says that international humanitarian law trumps claims to state sovereignty. In effect, it takes up those words from the Declaration of Human Rights and says that sovereignty is a contract between a people and their state, and a state that massacres and mistreats its own people has broken that contract.King George III tried to make the American colonists pay some taxes to fund the war that Britain had just fought to get the French out of North America.The American response was that "when in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."One would have thought that opinions of mankind should know the causes impelling Kosovo's independence fairly well. The ten years of apartheid that Slobodan Milosevic's regime practiced upon the ethnically Albanian Kosovars, after he dissolved their government in 1989, followed by the intense attempt at ethnic cleansing in 1999 should make it fairly plain that the "political bands" had been stretched beyond breaking point.It is clear that Milosevic's behaviour effectively renounced any claims to loyalty from and justified sovereignty over the vast majority of Kosovars. Instead, Serb nationalists were left with more traditional claims to sovereignty: Serbia conquered Kosovo just before the First World War.Of course after Milosevic's overthrow, the Serbs could have said they are really sorry for what happened, and offered to make amends. They did not. Serb nationalist leaders blustered and tried to demonize their victims - although, to give them a bit of credit, they were forced to prosecute some of the perpetrators of mass murders in Kosovo when over a thousand semi-rotten Albanian cadavers turned up buried under police stations in Serbia and from under lakes where truckloads of them had been dunked. The post-mortem cleansing had been intended to remove the evidence of atrocities.But while Zoran Djindic hoped that revealing the mass graves would help raise support in Serbia for extraditing Milosevic, the temporary enthusiasm of the Serbian security forces for apprehending war criminals rapidly returned to its normal low ebb. It took several years for the Belgrade authorities to identify the DNA and return the corpses to Kosovo, but as gestures go, returning the fetid evidence without too much in the way of returning indictments does not really send a strong signal of contrition.So far, this is all Belgrade has done to woo Kosovo's Albanian majoirty. Instead, the nationalists have been posturing, running a referendum to declare that Kosovo is an inalienable and integral part of Serbia, while trying to detach the area north of Mitrovica, from which the Albanians were ethnically cleansed, and incorporate it into Serbia.Amusingly, there was no attempt get the citizenry of Kosovo to vote in this referendum. It has about the same strength as a British referendum declaring the13 colonies to be an integral part of the United Kingdom. Which is to say, none.It is time to stop pandering and give the nationalists a reality check. Because the international community came to the rescue of the Kosovars when Milosevic was killing them, it has earned the right to ensure the welfare of other minorities there. But, supervised or not, Kosovan independence is the only way forward. And then the Serbs and Kosovars can join the EU and concentrate on getting the Balkans working and making the frontiers there as irrelevant as they are in the rest of Europe. If the nationalists in Belgrade want to bluster and break off relations with their neighbours, the EU and the US, let them.

"Kosova" or "Kosovo"?

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"Kosova" or "Kosovo"?
What's in a Name?
By J. P. MaherProfessor of Linguistics, Emeritus Northeastern Illinois University


"Kosovo" is a Serbian place name, more fully "kosovo polje", meaning the 'field (or plain) of blackbirds'. "Kosovo Polje" lies just outside the city of Prishtina.
Ornithology lesson: Among North Americans, Australians, and South Africans, only ornithologists can identify the species in question. Kosovo's "black bird" is no crow, nor raven, no starling nor grackle, but "turdus merula", European cousin of the North American rusty-bellied thrush ("turdus migratorius" ), which Yanks call the "robin". In Britain and Ireland "robin" is the name of another species, "erithacus rubecula".
(The "four and twenty 'blackbirds' baked in a pie", of the English rhyme, were of the species "merula", in Serbian called "kos". From this term "kosovo" is the derived possessive adjective.
Like America's harbinger of spring, the black bird called "kos" in Serbian language sings sweetly in the springtime and early summer.
For North Americans the feel of the Serbo-Croatian place name "Kosovo" can only be had from a free translation, "Field of Robins".
Albanians have borrowed the word from the Serbs, whose once overwhelming majority was driven down, especially since the Congress of Berlin, by savage aggression from Albanians incited then and in WW I by Austria-Hungary and Germany, in World War II by Mussolini's puppet Albanians, and after WW II by the discriminatory ethnic cleansing of the Stalinist dictator Josip Broz.
Native Indian place names in America have no meaning in English: e.g. "Michigan" means nothing in English. In Ojibwa "mishshikamaa" means "it is a big lake".
Just so the place names of Ireland have transparent meaning in Gaelic but are meaningless tags in the colonialist English, e.g. "Dublin" is Gaelic "dubh lin" 'black pool', and "Kildare" is "cil dara" 'church of the oak', Just so the names of the Serbian province of Kosovo are clear Serbian formations, but have no meaning in the Albanian language.

Proof of the Serbian origin of the name and the loanword status of the immigrant Albanian term is that the word "kosovo" has a clear etymology to anyone who knows a Slavic language, while Albanian "Kosova" is an opaque, meaningless place name in the Albanian language.
Kosovo is Serbian.

Quote of the day

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"Mabye steps of victory can be little but the efforts would be great"- unknown

Kosovo says Yes to U.N. plan, Serbia says No

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BELGRADE/PRISTINA (Reuters) - U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari unveiled a plan on Friday to set Serbia's
Kosovo' name=c1> SEARCHNews News Photos Images Web' name=c3> Kosovo province on a path to independence, an outcome which Kosovo's majority Albanians quickly applauded but Belgrade rejected.
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Ahtisaari's proposal did not mention "independence" or address the loss of Serbia's sovereignty over the territory, where 90 percent of the people are ethnic Albanian. But both sides said this was clearly what it implied.

The poor landlocked province of two million borders Albania and is cherished by Serbs as the medieval homeland of their nation. Its status is one of the last unresolved problems from the wars that tore apart the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
"Kosovo will be sovereign like all other countries," said Kosovo president Fatmir Sejdiu after meeting Ahtisaari in Kosovo's capital Pristina.

Prime Minister Agim Ceku, a former guerrilla in the 1998-99 Kosovo Liberation Army which fought the forces of the late Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, said the document "is very clear for Kosovo's future." The process will end "when Kosovo becomes an independent state." His cabinet threw a cocktail party.

After a meeting in Serbia, President Boris Tadic agreed the plan "opens up the possibility of independence. " But Tadic said he told the envoy: "Serbia and I as its president will never accept the independence of Kosovo."
Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has condemned Ahtisaari for "anti-Serb bias," and took the lead in rejecting his plan in advance, refusing even to meet the envoy on Friday.

Ahtisaari's plan gives Kosovo access to international bodies usually reserved for sovereign states and allows it to use its own flag and anthem. The Serb minority would have broad self-government.
"The settlement provides for an international representative to supervise the implementation, " Ahtisaari told a news conference. The NATO-led peace force "will continue to provide a safe and secure environment ... as long as necessary."

It includes measures to "promote sustainable economic development including Kosovo's ability to apply for membership in international financial institutions, " he added.
LAST CHANCE
Ahtisaari declined several opportunities to address the issue of Kosovo's ultimate status, saying this would be settled by the U.N. Security Council once he formally presented his plan, following a last round of consultations.

He said the diametrically opposed positions of the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians were "extremely fixed." He was allowing them "one more chance" to agree but was "not terribly optimistic."

"That might require so much time that I don't think I have enough years in my life to achieve that," said the 69-year-old.
Invitations would be sent for further talks starting on February 13 and it would be up to Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders to decide whether to turn up. The former Finnish president mediated months of largely fruitless talks in 2006.
There was no point in waiting for a new government to be formed following Serbia's inconclusive election last month, he said. "Whether it's now or a little bit later, the same people would be on either side of the table."
Ahtisaari said he hoped to send the final plan to the U.N. Security Council by the end of March.
The European Union urged both sides to respond "positively and constructively" to Ahtisaari's proposals. The State Department said the proposal "is fair and balanced. It is a blueprint for a stable, prosperous and multi-ethnic Kosovo."
Kosovo has been run by the U.N. since 1999 when NATO bombing forced Milosevic to withdraw troops accused of killing 10,000 Albanians during a counter-insurgency war. About 100,000 ethnic Serbs remain. Some predict violence and secession, and both NATO and the U.N. mission have made contingency plans for a crisis.

"There is nothing more we can do," said Kosovo Serb accountant Milica Knezevic, "there's no life for us here."

Ahtisaari said in Pristina that the Contact Group guiding diplomacy on Kosovo -- the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- would not accept the partition of Kosovo, which would entail slicing off the mainly Serb north.
Serb premier Kostunica said the envoy's proposals were "illegitimate. " He is urging all parties in the next government to solemnly pledge to cut Serb ties with any country recognising Kosovo's independence, including major Western powers.

Serbia rejects Kosovo breakaway

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This is a email that I got today from political sciencies yahoo group... they are following every step of status period.... and I'm happy about their analyses and interest:

Serbia rejects Kosovo breakawaySerbia's president says he will never accept the independence of Kosovo, after the publication of a UN plan which could allow it to separate.
UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan recommends that Kosovo should govern itself democratically and be able to make international agreements.
But President Boris Tadic said the plan paved the way for independence, which he and Serbia would not accept.
Kosovo's leader said he believed the process would end in full independence.
"Kosovo will be sovereign like all other countries," President Fatmir Sejdiu said, after meeting Mr Ahtisaari.
'Compromise deal'
The UN has administered Kosovo since a Nato bombing campaign forced out Serbian troops in 1999.
KEY PROPOSAL POINTS
Contains no reference to Serbian sovereignty or independence for Kosovo
Blocks Kosovo from joining Albania, or having its Serb areas split off and join Serbia
Kosovo can use national symbols
Kosovo can join international organisations
Creates international envoy mandated by UN and EU with power to intervene in government
Retains Nato and EU forces in military and policing roles
Protects non-Albanian minority with guaranteed roles in government, police and civil service
Protects Serbian Orthodox Church sites and Serbian languageTalks to determine the province's final status have been continuing for years without the two sides coming to agreement.
Ethnic Albanians make up 90% of the province's two million people.
According to the UN, more than 220,000 non-Albanian Kosovans are living as internally displaced refugees in Serbia and Montenegro.
The ethnic Albanian majority overwhelmingly want to break away from Serbia, but Serbs regard the province - which is still officially part of Serbia - as the cradle of their culture, and oppose any solution that would lead to its independence.
Mr Ahtisaari says the proposals are a compromise between ethnic Albanian aspirations for an independent Kosovo and Serbia's wish to keep the province as part of its territory.
"I hope that as a result of this process we can make a new beginning. I think it will take some time and I think we have to be realistic as well that to talk about Kosovo as a model multi-ethnic society will take a long time, but it is important that we make a beginning," he said.
National anthem
But speaking after talks with Mr Ahtisaari in Belgrade, Mr Tadic said that the plan in effect paved the way for Kosovo to become independent.
Imposing independence would violate the fundamental principles of international law and serve as a dangerous political and legal precedent
Boris Tadic

The proposal "does not explicitly mention independence for Kosovo, but it also does not mention territorial integrity of Serbia," he said. "That fact alone, as well as some other provisions, opens the possibility for Kosovo's independence. "
And he insisted that this was not something Belgrade was prepared to accept.
"Imposing independence would violate the fundamental principles of international law and serve as a dangerous political and legal precedent," Mr Tadic said.
Under Mr Ahtisaari's plan, Kosovo would be allowed its own national symbols, including a flag and anthem, and to apply for membership of international organisations like the United Nations.
It would not be unconditional independence, however.
An "international community representative" would be appointed, with powers to intervene if Kosovo tried to go further than the plan allowed, while Nato and EU forces would remain in military and policing roles.
Kosovo could not be partitioned between Serbian and ethnic Albanian areas, nor would Kosovo be allowed to join any other state - implicitly ruling out the creation of a "greater Albania".
The interests of Kosovo's Serbs, including the Serbian Orthodox Church and the language, would be explicitly protected, and there would be guaranteed Serb representation in parliament, the police and civil service.
The UN Security Council will have the final say on whether to adopt the plan.

FInally we got it...

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Finaly we got Ahtisari's proposal.... telling the truth it is not bad plan... except the mitrovica wich i don't agree creating two ethnical municipalities... ok i do agree with creating two municipalities but not devided as it is now... it should have been devided not on south and north Mitrovica but on west and east so we could have two multiethnical municipalities..... becuase telling the truth i think that Mitrovicas plan is not long term plan...
however seams that albanians are going to accept the plan but regarding serbian leaders (from serbia) they won't accept it.... Anyway as I sow on press conferencies Ahtisari made up his mind and won't change anything on plan becuase as he said: "I'm to old and if we go and re-do everything again from begening, my years won't be enough".... it was funny but very diplomatic answer........
So,lets se the plan.... here comes the summary of Ahtisari's plan taken from: http://www.unosek.org/pressrelease/2007-01-16%20EXECUTIVE%20SUMMARY.doc


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


I. General

The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.

II. Provisions of the Settlement

The Settlement consists of a main body with fourteen articles that form its key principles, and twelve Annexes which elaborate upon these principles:

· Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law, the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and which promotes the peaceful and prosperous existence of all its inhabitants.

· Kosovo shall adopt a Constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete Constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of the Constitution.

· Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.

· The protection and promotion of the rights of members of communities is a central element of the Settlement. The Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, education, and symbols. It also provides for specific representation mechanisms for Kosovo non-Albanian community members in key public institutions to safeguard and encourage their effective and active participation in public life. To protect the rights of Kosovo non-Albanian communities in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that certain, enumerated laws may only be enacted if a majority of the Kosovo non-Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.

· The Settlement provides a wide-ranging decentralization proposal, which is extensive in scope and intended to promote good governance, transparency and effectiveness in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which will have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, inter alia, new municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to accept transparent funding from Serbia for a broad range of municipal activities and purposes; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-boundary cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (Gracanica, Novo Brdo, Klokott, Ranilug, Partes, Mitrovica-North).

· The Settlement also provides for a justice system in Kosovo that is integrated, independent, professional and impartial, ensuring access of all persons in Kosovo to justice. It also provides for mechanisms to ensure that the justice system is inclusive, and that its judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multiethnic character of Kosovo.

· The provisions on the protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage will ensure the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in Kosovo. More than forty key religious and cultural sites will be surrounded by Protective Zones to prevent any disruptive commercial and industrial development or construction, and to preserve the cultural dignity of such sites. The Settlement also mandates additional physical security for selected sites. The SOC and its internal organization will be explicitly recognized by the Kosovo authorities, and will be granted inviolability of its property, freedom from taxation and customs duty privileges. The SOC in Kosovo will be also be free to maintain links with the SOC in Belgrade.

· All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo will have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with the International Commission of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.

· The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. It prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.

· The Settlement also provides for a professional, multi-ethnic, and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force will have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly will have enhanced competencies in the selection of the local Station Commander. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF) will be established within one year.. It will have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that the current Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) will be disbanded within one year.

· Recognizing that fulfilling Kosovo’s responsibilities under the Settlement will require a wide range of complex and difficult activities, the Settlement provides for a future international presence to supervise and support the relevant efforts of Kosovo’s authorities. This presence consists of three principle components:

An International Civilian Representative (ICR), double-hatted as the EU Special Representative, will be appointed by an International Steering Group (ISG) comprising key international stakeholders. The ICR will have ultimate supervisory authority over the implementation of the Settlement. The ICR will have specific powers conferred upon him/her to allow him to take the actions necessary to oversee and ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. These include the authority to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction or remove public officials whose actions are determined by the ICR to be inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Settlement. The ICR will also be the final authority in Kosovo regarding the civilian aspects of the Settlement.

A European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Mission will monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law. Specifically, it will assist Kosovo in the development of efficient, fair and representative police, judicial, customs and penal institutions, and have the authority to assume other responsibilities to ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security.
An NATO-led International Military Presence will provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the ICR and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as those institutions are capable of assuming the full-range of security responsibilities.

· The OSCE, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, will be requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for successful implementation of the Settlement.


III. Implementation of the Settlement

· Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there will be a 120 day transition period, during which UNMIK’s existing mandate will remain unchanged. To ensure immediate supervision over implementation of the Settlement by Kosovo, however, the ICR will possess the authority to monitor such implementation and make recommendations to UNMIK on actions to be taken to ensure compliance.
· During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the ICR, will be responsible for approving a Constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement. The new Constitution and legislation will become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.
· At the end of the transition period, UNMIK’s mandate will expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK will be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.
· Within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement, general and local elections are to be held.
· The mandate of the ICR will continue until the ISG determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.

Today is "that" day

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if you are asking your self wich must be that day that I'm talking about...probebly you are not kosovar...becuase all kosovars used to wait for about 7 years for this day...... a day when the 1244 resolution will end and the status quote will move toward...

So today is the day that Mr. Ahtisari will represent his proposal about kosovo status.
what did he cooked on his misterious kittchen???!!!! and did we gonna like it..... it's all question mark for now....

anyway kosovar-albanians are waiting to have Kosovo Independence and kosovar-serbians or most of them are waiting to have a return of kosovo on serbia on same situation as it used to be before 1999. who will see their dream comming true....I think neither side....

that's because international politics is not on Kosovo-albanians side and aslo is not on serbian side.

I'm saying this because just few days ago, british minister for international relation used to represent to Europian Union the proposal for new resolution where was proposed Kosova Indepedence but majority of Evropian Parlament requested to disregard that article and also they modified the resolution by removing the Serbia's soverignity from Kosovo...and they approved the resolution without kosovo independence article and without serbia's soverignity which means something/nothing for both sides.

anyway, regarding this situation what whould be the Ahtisar's proposal today???

I may assume that its not gonna be the full independence and also it's not gonna be the return to the situation pre-war(1999).
anyway the proposal that will be accpeted for both sides is as follows:
First proposal (which has most possibility) can be the Kosovo with attributions of state which means with the possibility to be represented by it's own on interational organizations and with the full right respect of minorities with decentalization wich performs a strong municipality with a lots of competencies expecually on municipality with serbian majority and also a lots of such municipalities. also including the right of serbia to finance this municipalities but just if those finances are review and approved by Kosovo Government, without forgeting here the north Mitrovica which needs to be on Kosovo territory unical with the south Mitrovica with the two "presidents"(representatives) from each side and with an board that will take decisions; also for a period of time kosovo needs to be under observal of UE and NATO. (limmited independence)

-Kosovar-albanians will accept this proposal but they won't be happy(the situation will be under controll and there won't be demonstrations)
-Kosovar-serbians will accept this proposal and they also won't be happy and NATO needs to be focused especially on Mitrovica.

other proposals gonna result with demonstartions and revolt of either albanian or serbian side....